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Why do communal conflicts turn violent in some regions but not in others? This article identifies conditions for intercommunal cooperation and examines what makes such cooperation break down. Inspired by Ostrom's CPR-theories, it highlights three mechanisms – sanctions, boundaries, and local rules – underpinning intercommunal cooperation. Next, the argument stipulates that government bias can undermine conditions for communal cohabitation, tipping the balance in favor of conflict rather than cooperation. A systematic comparative study between Darfur and Eastern Sudan – building on extensive fieldwork – provides empirical evidence for the argument. These findings provide new insights on how to enhance community resilience to communal violence.

This chapter analyses ethno-communal conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan, which gained independence in 2011. In these two countries, ethno-communal rivalries have primarily manifested in three different types of violent conflicts: communal conflicts, rebel-rebel fighting and civil wars. The study consist of three core parts. First, the chapter provides some empirical information about center-periphery relations (in both Sudan and South Sudan elites in the center enjoys outmost political and economic power while other regions are severely marginalized) and the major violent conflicts in the two countries. Second, the chapter focuses on ethno-communal conflicts in Sudan's westernmost region, Darfur. This section illustrates that an intricate web of ethno-communal conflicts exist in Darfur. It also emphasizes the importance of land and examines the government's role in these different conflicts. Third, the chapter studies the civil war that has devastated South Sudan since December 2013. It shows that legacies from Sudan's North-South war (particularly the Sudanese government's strategy of divide-and-rule) are important for how the war in South Sudan has manifested. ; Conflicts, Connections, Complexities: Towards a Multi-layered Understanding of Civil War

Why do communal conflicts turn violent in some regions but not in others? Communal conflicts pose a severe threat to human security and kill thousands of people each year, but our understanding of this phenomenon is still limited. In particular, we lack knowledge about why some of these conflicts become violent while others are resolved peacefully. This study addresses this knowledge gap and has a novel approach by addressing subnational variations that are unexplained by previous research. The theoretical framework combines insights from three different perspectives focusing on the role of the state, elite interactions, and conditions for cooperation over common resources. Empirically, the research question is investigated by combining within- and between-region analyses of three Sudanese regions: Darfur, Eastern Sudan, and Greater Upper Nile. Despite sharing several similar characteristics, communal conflicts have killed thousands in Darfur and Greater Upper Nile but only a few dozen in Eastern Sudan. The empirical analysis builds on extensive material collected during fieldwork. This study generates several conclusions about the importance of government conduct and how state behavior contributes to the prevalence of violent communal conflicts. It finds that when governments act in a biased manner – favoring certain communities over others – interactions between central and local elites as well as among local elites are disrupted. Unconstructive elite interactions, in turn, have negative effects on three mechanisms that are crucial for communal cooperation. First, when the regime is biased, communal affiliation, rather than the severity and context of a violation, determines the sanctions that are imposed on the perpetrators. Second, government bias leads to unclear boundaries, which contribute to violent communal conflicts by creating disarray and by shifting power balances between the communities. Third, regime partiality distances rules from local conditions and restricts the influence of local actors who have an understanding of local circumstances. The study also reveals why a regime acts with partiality in some areas but not in others. The answer to this question is found in the complex interplay between the threats and opportunities that a region presents to the regime. Taken together, the findings have important implications for the prevention and management of communal conflict.

The current conflicts in Sudan consist of different conflict-types, here presented in a theoretical framework of conflict complementarities. The framework consist of four parallel and interlinked conflicts types: communal conflicts, local elite conflicts, center-periphery conflicts, and cross-border conflicts. The structure of conflict complementarities is used to describe the continuing crisis in Darfur, and the emerging crisis in South Kordofan. The complexities of Sudan's conflict have often been overlooked by outsiders leading to incorrect assessments of the root causes, as well as dynamics of these conflicts. Therefore, this paper makes a call for careful conflict analysis in order to understand the conflicts in Sudan. Although taken place in different areas the root causes of Sudan's conflicts are similar. Poverty and severe marginalization of the peripheries, in combination with bad governance at the center, are the main reasons for conflicts all over the country. Also other areas of Sudan, such as Eastern Sudan and the far North, suffer from these problems. Thus, there is a risk that Sudan's crisis will spread to new areas. For conflicts in Sudan to decline the root causes of the problems need to be tackled. Decentralization that would decrease the huge differences between the center and the marginalized peripheries would be a step in the right direction. Also, the government's propensity for using militias and divide-and-rule strategies has to stop for a brighter future for Sudan. Finally, a stronger commitment from, and co-ordination by, the international community is needed to deal with the continuing crisis in Sudan.

This study sets out to examine what lessons can be learned from Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2005, with particular relevance to power-sharing. The author went to on a field-trip to Khartoum, Juba and Nairobi in July 2009 to complement his previous knowledge the Sudan conflict. The report draws ten lessons learned, and these are divided into the three aspects of process, provisions and implementation. In terms of the process, the report suggests that negotiators should strive to involve both regional actors and actors from the international community, focus on the functioning of the agreement, and seek to enhance the capacity-building of the parties. In relation to the key provision, power-sharing, the report calls for mediators to be wary of including exit options in power-sharing deals. The effects of exclusion and inclusion of various actors should be scrutinized and it is important that the message of the agreement is conveyed to various constituencies. Also, it is important to bring peace dividends for the people to increase the legitimacy of the agreement. Regarding the implementation phase, three key lessons are learned. First, for a successful implementation it is essential to keep the momentum of the signing. Secondly, the signing of an agreement is the start, not the end, of building a durable peace. Finally, the research findings demonstrate the importance of maintaining the moment ripe for implementation after the agreement is signed. One way of facilitating this is by keeping the same parties involved during the implementation process as during the negotiations.

The point of departure for this report is a field study conducted by the author in Sudan during the fall of 2007. The purpose of this analysis is to deepen knowledge about the current crisis in Darfur through a broad approach. The study includes a short background to the crisis in Darfur and examines some of the major actors, the situation on the ground, the peacekeeping process, the negotiations and the international response. It is argued that the current situation in Darfur is a result of three parallel and interlinked types of conflicts: communal conflicts, conflicts between different regional elites, and periphery-centre conflicts. It is also argued that a comprehensive approach to Sudan is needed to find a lasting solution in Darfur and other areas of Sudan. Moreover, the report stresses the vast problems that both the negotiations and the peacekeeping operation face at the moment. Finally, a call is made for a stronger commitment from, and co-ordination by, the international community to solve the conflicts in Darfur. ; UCDP- Uppsala Conflict Data Project

This book examines the continuing devastation in the Darfur region of Sudan, from the perspective of a multiplicity of conflicts of distinct types. The crisis reached its peak in 2003-2004, when certain Arab militias joined forces with the Sudan armed forces in a campaign against insurgent resistance movements. Engulfed in the tumult, Darfurians experienced systematic slaughter, sexual violence, and internal displacement on a massive scale. Although the violence has waned in recent years, the fighting continues to this day.

Although conflict issues – the stated goals of actors engaged in conflict – hold a privileged position in many theoretical explanations of the occurrence, dynamics, and resolution of civil war, global issue data are scarce beyond datasets that focus on specific thematic areas. This article aims to bring issues into the forefront of civil war scholarship by presenting the UCDP Conflict Issues Dataset (CID). This global yearly dataset contains 14,832 conflict issues – divided, at the most disaggregated level, into 120 sub-categories – raised by armed non-state groups involved in intrastate armed conflict in 1989-2017. By bringing issues back in, the UCDP CID provides opportunities to reevaluate several central questions about the onset, duration, intensity, and resolution of civil war.

Why do some peace agreements end armed conflicts whereas others do not? Previous studies have primarily focused on the relation between warring parties and the provisions included in peace agreements. Prominent mediators, however, have emphasised the importance of stakeholders at various levels for the outcome of peace agreements. To match the experience of these negotiators we apply a level-of-analysis approach to examine the contextual circumstances under which peace agreements are concluded. While prominent within the causes of war literature, level-of-analysis approaches are surprisingly scant in research about conflict resolution. This article compares two Sudanese Peace Agreements: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) that ended the North-South war and led to the independence of South Sudan, and the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006) which failed to end fighting in Darfur. We find that factors at the local, national and international level explain the different outcomes of the two agreements. Hence, the two case studies illustrate the merit of employing a level-of-analysis approach to study the outcome of peace agreements. The main contribution of this article is that it presents a new theoretical framework to understand why some peace agreements terminate armed conflict whereas others do not. ; Conflicts, Connections, Complexities: Towards a Multi-layered Understanding of Civil War

Since mid-December 2013, thousands of people have been killed in armed conflict in South Sudan. The fighting is entrenched in a power struggle between the main political contenders ahead of elections which were scheduled for 2015. This article examines the violence in South Sudan since the North-South war ended with a focus on the consequences of the introduction of electoral politics. Our research contributes to the literature on state-building and peace-building in war-torn societies, by exploring how the extreme levels of violence are linked to three groups of factors. First, the stakes involved in being part of the government are extremely high, since it is the only way to secure political and economic influence. Second, the actors involved in political life are dominated by individuals who held positions within the rebel groups, which increases the risk of political differences turning violent. Third, the institutions important for a legitimate electoral process, and which work to prevent violence, are weak or non-existent.