On Black South Africans, Black Americans, and Black West Indians: Some Thoughts on We Want What's Ours
In: Michigan Law Review, Band 114, Heft 1037
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In: Michigan Law Review, Band 114, Heft 1037
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In: Penn State Law Research Paper 2016
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In: California Law Review, Band 103, Heft 989
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In: Black Women in International Law: Deliberate Interactions, Movements and Actions
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In: 81 New York University Law Review 27, 2014
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In: University of Chicago Law Review, Band 80, Heft 59
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In: Georgetown Immigration Law Review, Band 27, Heft 311
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In: Notre Dame Law Review, 2011
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In: Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 08-12
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In: New York University Law Review, Band 75, Heft 309
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In: Yale Law Journal, Band 105, Heft 513
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Three decades ago Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbit famously wrote about "tragic choices," namely tough policy choices which offend deeply held values, and the accompanying "subterfuges," that is, efforts by policy elites to shield such choices from public view.' Strangely, the "tragic choice" framework has not been applied in the context of U.S. immigration law, although current immigration policy is rife with tragic choices and subterfuges. A case in question is the issue of commodification of visas. It is clear that U.S. policymakers remain deeply committed to maintaining an illusion that U.S. visas are not being "sold."2 For example, in the subprime mortgage financial crisis that began in 2007, U.S. policymakers declined to auction visas to wealthy overseas investors who would be willing to purchase depressed real estate, a policy suggestion that gained considerable currency as a means of buttressing property values.3 Yet, U.S. immigration practice has long made unofficial concessions to commodification, that is, concessions at the margins. Notably, the government generally derives no direct benefit from such concessions, although other parties may extract significant rents. One might call these "informal subterfuges," as a cottage industry has developed with labor brokers and coyotes charging applicants high fees to gain entry to the United States.4 Strikingly, these fees are pervasive, not only in the "black" and "gray" markets (that is, markets outside of the formal economy, sometimes involving inherently illegal activities such as undocumented border crossings). They are also pervasive in the "white" markets (within the formal economy). For example, elite applicants typically employ attorneys and sometimes lobbyists who charge high fees to navigate the complexities of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").5 There are also official concessions to commodification. Indeed, the INA mandates that some migrants "pay" very high prices to obtain the right to enter the United States. Certain elite visa ...
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In: Penn State Law Research Paper No. 06-2021
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In: Penn State Law Research Paper No. 15, 2022
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