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"On Vulnerability maps out an array of perspectives for critically examining the nature of vulnerability, its unequal patterning across different social groups, alongside the everyday social processes which make us vulnerable - interactions, identity and group dynamics. Each chapter equips the reader with a particular sensitising framework for navigating and questioning what it means to be vulnerable or how people cope amid vulnerability. From deviance, stigma and the spoiling or fracturing of identity, to perspectives such as intersectionality, risk, emotions and the vulnerable body, the book traces the theoretical roots of these different analytical lenses, before applying these through illuminating examples and case studies. Drawing on scholarship across more interpretative, analytic and critical traditions, the chapters combine into a multidimensional toolkit which will enable the study of cultural meanings of vulnerability, the political-economic factors that shape its patterning, with a critical sensibility for 'unlearning' the many assumptions, challenging our sense of who is, or who can be, vulnerable. This book is designed to equip undergraduate and post-graduate students and researchers across the social, health and human sciences, aiding them as they study and question the experiences and structures of vulnerability in our social world"--

Interventions framed through a behavioural lens, particularly 'Nudge', are gaining credence in US and UK policy circles, not least around healthcare. Key tenets of this 'libertarian paternalist' approach are discussed and related to sociological theory. The influential position of nudge begs sociological engagement, indeed its recognition of 'choice architecture' is partially congruent with sociological conceptions of structure-embedded agency. Though recognising the significance of norms, the analysis of nudge fails to appreciate their depth in terms of time, materiality and the socio-cultural. The potency and variable consequences of these social factors are emphasised through Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field. This framework alongside various sociological approaches to risk and uncertainty are proposed as potentially fruitful paths of critical engagement.

Ethics is fundamentally about ethos, attitude, one's grounded stance or existential orientation, not the extrinsicism of concepts or the formalism of rules. Ethics concerns not just any orientation, but that intimate and demanding form of personal development manifested in the experience and practice of self-transcendence. Conversely, the neglect of ethics as self-transcendence introduces deep distortions into the way we socialize students into notions of ethics and professionalism. It introduces subsequent distortions into the conditions of legal practice. It encourages a superficial and extrinsic minimalism. It encourages, in effect, the disastrous conception of legal ethics as ethical legalism. I begin by considering the role of what I take to be the standard model of legal pedagogy in engendering and perpetuating certain distortions concerning objectivity, value, and the good. I then describe and explore a basic, non-minimalist, and non-formalist notion of ethics centering on the notions of orientation, self-transcendence, and self-constitution; such a view of ethics might serve as a counterpoise to some of the defective notions implicit in the standard model of legal pedagogy. Next, I describe a heuristic model of four levels of happiness, which adds dialectical nuances to the basic account of ethics. I conclude with some brief reflections on the role of faith in promoting an ethos of justice.

The era of liberal interventionism is over, and the prevailing international discourse is once again about defending state borders and putting up walls. This broad re-assertion of sovereignty and non-intervention - often considered the normative foundation of the BRICS countries, of the Non-Aligned Movement, of Bandung, of the "Westphalian" South - raises a series of difficult questions, not least about the management of challenges shared by all. How are we to make sense of re-organisations of intervention and non-intervention in global order? Recently the dominant way of approaching these issues has been through the lens of cosmopolitan or liberal-solidarist duties, including the Responsibility to Protect. Yet it seems doubtful that this framework is still capable of posing the right questions or generating the right sorts of answers. This volume offers a new approach that provincializes the conventional debate, de-naturalises what it takes as universal or given, and lays out a series of alternatives at a time when non-intervention, quite suddenly, seems everywhere in the discourse of international society. It does so through a genealogy of the intervention concept since 1945. Intervention before Interventionism is about the ways in which statespeople have re-ordered intervention and non-intervention since the middle of the twentieth century; it is concerned primarily with non-Western contestations of Western-dominated order; it illustrates institutional change in and through decolonization; and it provides a conceptual roadmap for understanding dilemmas of intervention and non-intervention today, particularly in relation to contestation as it has re-emerged in the twenty-first century. While building upon and conversing with existing literature, the book stands out from previous approaches insofar as it is a mapping of international struggles for the re-constitution of intervention in the globalization of the society of states.

The purpose of this paper is to re-theorize the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in the UN through to 2011, the apogee of liberal interventionism in the post-Cold War period. Contrary to a common argument in existing literature, and notwithstanding the adoption of the concept as an annual agenda item of the General Assembly, international contestation is not about implementation as neatly separated from meaning, but rather definition or interpretation. To better understand the boundaries of intergovernmental understanding, we need to interrogate the language or terms of the debate, particularly the ways in which those terms have been practiced. There have been two Responsibilities to Protect in international society. A discursive practice called Southern RtoP, traced through UN-based political dialogue, contests a meaning that has been prevalent for 20 years at least: that of Northern RtoP. This article shows evaluative nuance and data from the perspective of the Global South and provides a discursive history of an ongoing non-aligned protest against a NATO-associated theory of defeasible sovereignty. Deux responsabilités de protéger

This article argues that contemporary debates around intervention, and especially humanitarian intervention, have misunderstood the meaning of these concepts in Cold War international society. By comparing a specific kind of humanitarian interventionism with a specific kind of internationalism, that of a revolutionist strain of Third World practice, it shows that existing studies have paid too little attention to discursive entanglements of coercion, self-determination, and humanitarianism. The Angola case provides a significant illustration: in 1975 the problem of intervention comes to be tied not just to dictatorial interference, but to a logic of self-determination, which is itself tied to causes of anticolonialism and anti-racism. It is too easy to say that the period's rules of non-intervention precluded the legitimate coercive prevention of atrocities and related international crimes. Particular practices of internationalism, linked to the promotion of self-determination, provided a basis for enforcing international human rights treaties, including the Genocide Convention. All this seems very different from what we usually know of the legitimacy of saving strangers and the character of Third World organising in the mid-20th century.

The purpose of this paper is to re-theorize the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in the UN through to 2011, the apogee of liberal interventionism in the post-Cold War period. Contrary to a common argument in existing literature, and notwithstanding the adoption of the concept as an annual agenda item of the General Assembly, international contestation is not about implementation as neatly separated from meaning, but rather definition or interpretation. To better understand the boundaries of intergovernmental understanding, we need to interrogate the language or terms of the debate, particularly the ways in which those terms have been practiced. There have been two Responsibilities to Protect in international society. A discursive practice called Southern RtoP, traced through UN-based political dialogue, contests a meaning that has been prevalent for 20 years at least: that of Northern RtoP. This article shows evaluative nuance and data from the perspective of the Global South and provides a discursive history of an ongoing non-aligned protest against a NATO-associated theory of defeasible sovereignty.

This article argues that contemporary debates around intervention, and especially humanitarian intervention, have misunderstood the meaning of these concepts in Cold War international society. By comparing a specific kind of humanitarian interventionism with a specific kind of internationalism, that of a revolutionist strain of Third World practice, it shows that existing studies have paid too little attention to discursive entanglements of coercion, self-determination, and humanitarianism. The Angola case provides a significant illustration: in 1975 the problem of intervention comes to be tied not just to dictatorial interference, but to a logic of self-determination, which is itself tied to causes of anticolonialism and anti-racism. It is too easy to say that the period's rules of non-intervention precluded the legitimate coercive prevention of atrocities and related international crimes. Particular practices of internationalism, linked to the promotion of self-determination, provided a basis for enforcing international human rights treaties, including the Genocide Convention. All this seems very different from what we usually know of the legitimacy of saving strangers and the character of Third World organising in the mid-20th century.