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What are the causes of party system consolidation in the postcommunist democracies? It is frequently hypothesized that differences in electoral systems and presidential powers help to explain variation in party system consolidation. In addition, it can be argued that the numbers and support levels of political parties should be affected by the ideological peculiarities of different countries' voting publics. Population size might also be expected to affect the ease with which additional party organizations can be developed and maintained. As far as the availability of data permit, we construct relevant institutional and ideological measures for all 23 post-communist democracies. Regression analysis shows that ideological concentration of electorates is the most consistent and powerful determinant of party system consolidation. Proportionality of electoral systems has a weaker tendency to reduce party system consolidation, while strength of the presidency and population size appear to have little or no impact. Future research should explore whether ideology has played a similar role in other regions. It might also examine the policy consequences of party system consolidation.

Abstract.  Formally organized factions in dominant parties face an electoral dilemma – namely, they need to cooperate sufficiently to ensure party control of government while competing with each other for members. This article examines the efforts of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions to reconcile these conflicting interests during the period 1958–1990. In particular, we are interested in how institutional constraints imposed both by the electoral system and the party affected the ability of the various factions to increase membership. Following the literature, which identifies incumbency, the party endorsement and mainstream faction status as important determinants of electoral success, we investigate the relative ability of individual factions to increase membership by refocusing analysis on the party's non‐incumbent candidates. Consistent with earlier research, we confirm the importance of the party endorsement and mainstream faction status for the electoral success of these candidates. Contrary to current belief, however, we establish empirically that the electoral advantage enjoyed by the non‐incumbent candidates of mainstream factions is not due to a disproportionate number of party endorsements, but rather is heavily influenced by their disproportionate assignment to run in districts with attributes that enhance their electability.

Formally organized factions in dominant parties face an electoral dilemma - namely, they need to cooperate sufficiently to ensure party control of government while competing with each other for members. This article examines the efforts of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions to reconcile these conflicting interests during the period 1958-1990. In particular, we are interested in how institutional constraints imposed both by the electoral system and the party affected the ability of the various factions to increase membership. Following the literature, which identifies incumbency, the party endorsement and mainstream faction status as important determinants of electoral success, we investigate the relative ability of individual factions to increase membership by refocusing analysis on the party's non-incumbent candidates. Consistent with earlier research, we confirm the importance of the party endorsement and mainstream faction status for the electoral success of these candidates. Contrary to current belief, however, we establish empirically that the electoral advantage enjoyed by the non-incumbent candidates of mainstream factions is not due to a disproportionate number of party endorsements, but rather is heavily influenced by their disproportionate assignment to run in districts with attributes that enhance their electability. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

We are pleased at the opportunity to respond to Professor Cox's observations on our article 'An Empirical Theory of Rational Nominating Behaviour Applied to Japanese District Elections', which appeared in the previous issue of the Journal (pp. 259–89). His comments address several points including the motivation of our article, the way in which we characterize his prior work (with various co-authors) on the subject, and the adequacy of our effort to model the nominating process in Japanese district elections. While these points are not always separable, we shall address each of them.