Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953- 1991 -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Russian Nationalists in Soviet Politics -- The Emergence of Politics by Culture, 1953- 1964 -- The First Phase of Inclusionary Politics, 1965- 1970 -- The Rise and Fall of Inclusionary Politics, 1971- 1985 -- What Went Wrong with the Politics of Inclusion? -- What Is Russia, and Where Should It Go? Political Debates, 1971- 1985 -- The Zenith of Politics by Culture, 1985- 1989 -- The Demise of Politics by Culture, 1989- 1991 -- Epilogue: Russian Nationalism in Postcommunist Russia -- Notes -- Index.

This article seeks to explain why Boris Yeltsin was able to win I996 Russian presidential election despite prolonged economic crisis and the war in Chechnya. The paper advances the argument which emphasizes Yeltsin's ability to recreate political and social alliances which were crucial to his previous electoral successes, on the one hand, and poor electoral strategy and political beliefs of Yeltsin's main challenger, the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov, on the other. In particular, the paper highlights Yeltsin's campaign strategy of turning the election into a referendum on communism rather on his own record and the success of his two candidates only strategy. The paper also argues that Zyuganov communist-nationalist, rather than social-democratic, world view determined his electoral strategy and played a major role in his electoral defeat.

Describes Boris Yeltsin's campaign strategy of turning the election into a referendum on communism rather than on his own record, compared with the strategy of his main challenger, Gennady Zyuganov, head of the Russian Communist Party.