Suchergebnisse

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit dem Thema der so genannten technokratischen Regierungen (Beamtenregierungen), die derzeit allmählich zum Phänomen werden. Dies kann mit Fällen der neulich entstandenen technokratischen Regierungen in vielen europäischen Ländern belegt werden. Trotz häufigerer Verbreitung der Beamtenregierungen mangelt es an der Literatur zu diesem Thema. Wissenschaftler setzen sich mit den technokratischen Regierungen meistens durch die Einzelfallstudien auseinander; es fehlt jedoch an Vergleichsstudien. Diese Tatsache lässt eine Reihe von Fragen unbeantwortet. Damit öffnet sich ein breites Forschungsfeld. Dieser Artikel analysiert den aktuellen Forschungsstand zum Thema der Beamtenregierungen, verbessert einige der angewandten Konzepte und stellt Schlüsselfragen dar, die untersucht werden sollten.

Analytical tools are presently lacking to study the role played by the head of state in the government formation process (GFP). To remedy this absence, this paper provides a detailed analysis of that role. Two variables are of major concern: a) the formal powers of the head of state in the GFP, and b) the control over the GFP held by the parliament. These two variables are used to construct a scheme that shows the pronounced heterogeneity exhibited by GFP patterns. The GFP is seen as the result of an institutionally structured bargaining process in which institutional variations make for major differences in expected outcomes. The analysis reveals a large number of GFP patterns. Examples of the GFP taken from several European countries show the patterns should not be subsumed under broad categories, since overgeneralization may lead to confusion and cause the role played by the head of state and political regimes in European countries to be misunderstood. Adapted from the source document.

Theory of parliamentary regimes presumes that parliament can express vote of no confidence in government. On the other hand executive power (government or head of state) is endowed with right to dissolve the parliament. However, these "doomsday devices" are not in balance in many parliamentary regimes, including the Czech Republic. On the basis of a comparative analysis of dissolution provisions in the constitutions of European states the article argues that the government in the Czech Republic should be given the right to dissolve the lower chamber at least in case that the latter expresses vote of no confidence in the former.

The article seeks to describe & interpret recent trends within the Swedish party system. The point of departure for analysis is twofold: (1) to describe past development of patterns of cooperation & conflict among Swedish political parties, (2) an examination of P. Mair's concepts on the structure of party system competition & party system change, which are applied to the Swedish case. Special attention is given to the process of formation of the right-wing as well as the left-wing blocs. The aim of the article is to explain why & under what circumstances these blocs emerged, considering the fact that these blocs were at times almost invisible, at times only slightly salient. Moreover, party cooperation often took place across bloc lines. This analysis of past trends serves as a basis for understanding up-to-date developments within the right-wing bloc & particularly left-wing parties, which -- for the first time in the Swedish party politics history -- have recently declared their intention to form an election alliance & even a government coalition after the 2010 parliamentary elections. The article also discusses the question of whether these trends might lead to a specific version of the two-party system. Adapted from the source document.