Suchergebnisse

As competition over grant funding increases, nonprofit organizations (NPOs) are increasingly likely to enter into contracts with government agencies to ensure funding stability and accomplish organizational goals. Public agencies seek to reduce the possibility of contractor performance problems. Unlike profit-seeking firms that may need constant monitoring, NPOs could be more likely to serve as stewards of public resources, delivering services consistent with shared goals. However, few empirical studies have assessed the comparative performance of private and nonprofit contractors to determine whether there are meaningful differences in practice. This study analyzes nearly 25,000 U.S. federal definitive contracts that concluded between 2005 and 2015. Using predictive statistical analyses, findings indicate that nonprofits deliver more complex work than their for-profit counterparts, are less likely to be terminated early, do not require additional contract modifications, and are treated similarly to other vendors. Taken together, the results suggest that there are mutual benefits when governments and nonprofits engage in contracts.

Abstract
Competition over the allocation of scarce resources motivates many public policy choices, and increasingly influences the management of public organizations. With the rise of the business‐like approach espoused by adherents of "new public management," competitive mechanisms are increasingly used in the public sector to improve organization and program performance. Despite the wide acceptance of competition as a viable method to improve public management, little large n empirical work has been done to determine whether competition improves performance, especially in the networked, cross‐sectoral setting of modern governance. Analyzing nearly 20,000 Florida contracts over a three‐year period, this research explores whether competitive sourcing procedures lead to improved contractor performance. Results show that competitive sourcing may be associated with higher contract spending and undesirable contract outcomes. Other factors, including experience, existing relationships, and lower transaction costs, are more likely to lead to better performance.
Practitioner Points

Competition is theorized to drive down costs, encourage innovation, and help hold contractors accountable for their work.
Competitively sourced contracts are more likely to experience cost overruns and to terminate early than noncompetitive contracts, suggesting that competition may not always be the best approach.
Instead, agency‐contractor relationships and goal alignment are better predictors of good performance.

AbstractContracts are increasingly used in government as a way to insert competition into public agencies and policy implementation. Competition among contractors is theorized to drive down costs, encourage innovation, and boost accountability. However, there have been few studies on whether competition actually leads to improved performance among contractors. This analysis examines nearly 25,000 federal contracts to determine how competition is related to performance. Findings indicate that competitively sourced contracts are more likely to suffer from performance problems. However, relationships between contractor and agency correlate with fewer performance problems. This suggests that competition may not be leading to the benefits that many might expect. Instead, relationships and shared experiences, along with other factors, may matter more when seeking to improve contractor performance.

AbstractOutsourcing may lead public administrators to regard service recipients as customers to be satisfied rather than as citizens demanding access and empowerment. This research investigates the extent to which social service nonprofits might bridge the gap between citizenship and customer service to advance shared values and reinforce public institutions. Due to unique institutional and organizational features, such as value-driven commitments, restrictions to financial distribution, and special knowledge of under-represented groups, social service nonprofit contractors may offer distinct advantages over for-profit firms in contract management. We begin by analyzing the conflicting and complementary aspects of citizenship and customer service in democracy and identify the advantages of nonprofit contractors. Then, using the lenses of transaction cost economics and agency theory, we explore how nonprofits can mitigate contract risks while bolstering citizenship. We present several suggestions to guide public agencies and future scholarship on reasserting the importance of public values in modern governance.

AbstractSet aside programs, which preference disadvantaged businesses, have long been among the largest government equity programs in the United States. Set asides ensure government revenues spur economic growth in firms and communities that have traditionally lacked representation in systems of power. However, there has been skepticism about whether set aside programs are compatible with the efficiency objectives of government contracting. Few empirical studies have assessed the comparative performance of small, disadvantaged businesses and other firms to determine if there are differences. Using contract level data from the Federal Procurement Data System: Next Generation, we test whether set aside contracts are associated with a reduction in the government's ability to secure "best value." We find few performance differences between small, disadvantaged businesses, and other vendors across a range of goods and services, suggesting mutual benefits and no outsized risks when governments engage in contracts with disadvantaged firms.

AbstractIn the 1980s, governments around the world adopted New Public Management ideas about inserting competition into government as a way to improve the performance of public organizations. In many nations, contracting out was one method of making governments more businesslike. Yet, there have been few studies of how government contracting behaviors have changed since the early 1980s. We replicate Ferris and Graddy's classic 1986 study of local government production and sector choice to assess how public procurement has changed over the past 35 years. Our findings show that today, contracting out is more commonly used across 25 local government service areas. In contrast to the original study, much of the growth has been in government‐to‐government contracts. For profit firms are also winning more contracts for high transaction cost work, while nonprofits are receiving fewer government contracts in nearly every service area. Our analysis suggests that contracting out remains of the highest importance in 21st‐century governance and that additional research is needed on how to manage contracts to achieve the best value.

As the U.S. recovers from the pandemic, the Biden administration is working to rebuild relationships across levels of government, from the top to the bottom, that were strained during the presidency of Donald Trump. In November 2020, Biden offered urban leaders a seat at the table in coronavirus recovery efforts, promising to avoid partisanship. Addressing the National League of Cities in March 2021, Harris praised urban leadership on COVID-19 – cities like Seattle and New York were among the first to respond to the pandemic, developing testing protocols, tracking new infections and supplying equipment for hospitals – and highlighted the administration's plans to help pay for improvements to local infrastructure. The COVID-19 crisis highlighted the importance of government leaders working together.