"In the past, a number of jihadists initiated processes of ideological de-radicalization and doctrinal revisions that transformed their stance towards violence. The book investigates the reasons why this does not happen among contemporary jihadists and posits that, once jihad ceased to be national and became global, it no longer had a set of features that made de-radicalization possible"--
The terrorist threat in 2023 has been characterised by new levels of unpredictability. This is due to two main factors that have unfolded only recently with unparalleled intensity. The first is the bipolarity of the threat. On the one hand, structured and semi-structured radical groups are operating in complex scenarios, such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. On the other, in the West we have been witnessing a recrudescence of lone-actor attacks that, although characterised by low lethality, represent a cause for concern. There is a risk that this dichotomy could catch experts off guard. The second factor that makes the threat particularly unpredictable is the ideological fluidity that is pervading contemporary radical milieux and radicalisation trends: individuals with diverse ideological backgrounds borrow tropes, narratives and communication strategies from other ideologies and adapt them to match their worldviews through processes of reciprocal influencing and cross-pollination. This article aims to analyse the bipolarity between the focus on international crises amid a rise in lone-actor attacks and the ideological fluidity of radical environments to assess how these two factors have generated unprecedented levels of unpredictability when it comes to terrorism and radicalisation.
This article examines the most widespread stances on the war in Ukraine taken within the far-right and the jihadist milieux. Within these contexts, positions are far from unified and the different narratives exploited on the topic reflect the heterogeneity of the radical postures. Far-right movements and supporters express views ranging from open hostility to Russia and President Vladimir Putin to complete mistrust of NATO and the West. This makes it possible to find these groups on both sides of the battlefield. However, it is necessary to emphasize here that the narrative about Ukraine being run by fascists is no more than Russian propaganda, designed to discredit Ukraine's efforts to defend itself against Russia's aggression and weaken international solidarity toward Kyiv. Similarly, a number of jihadist groups and ideologues urge their followers to join the conflict regardless of the side in order to harm unbelievers or, on the contrary, to stay away from it as this would imply giving assistance to the impious. The Russian war against Ukraine is having significant implications for both far-right and jihadi networks, both of which might be able to capitalise on events in organisational, political and communicative terms.
This article argues that similarities between jihadism and far-right radicalism are increasing, particularly with regard to the spectacularisation of violence. Spectacularisation means representing and performing violence in the form of a show, for instance through live-streaming, with a renewed emphasis on captivating symbols and much less attention paid to the ideological foundations on which the radical project is supposed to rely. After the March 2019 shooting in Christchurch, New Zealand, the spectacularisation of racist, anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic violence increased, thus consolidating that event as a turning point in the evolution of the contemporary far right and the history of jihadism—which has far-right affinities. Lured by the performance of violence, the number of contemporary far-right sympathisers is steadily growing in a virtual environment that closely resembles that of jihadists, where patterns and mechanisms of online recruitment and grooming are proliferating.
La tesi ha un duplice obiettivo. Innanzitutto, aspira ad illustrare i cambiamenti avvenuti nella concezione di jihad tra due forme di jihadismo distinte, quella che puó essere definito "nazionale" - esemplificato dalla Ğamā'a al-Islāmiya (Gruppo Islamico) e dal Jihad al-Islāmy (Jihad Islamico) - e quello globale, esemplificato da al-Qa'ida e dalla seconda fase del pensiero e dell'azione di Ayman al-Zawahiri. Il secondo obiettivo è verificare l'ipotesi secondo la quale, a seguito dell'emersione di al-Qa'ida come attore regionale ed internazionale, un processo di de-radicalizzazione come quello attuato dai due gruppi jihadisti egiziani in esame non può più avere luogo. Fino ai tardi anni novanta del ventesimo secolo il jihad nazionale, caratterizzato da constituency uniforme per provenienza, rivendicazioni e fattori scatenanti eminentemente nazionali, nonchè da un nemico identificato nell'establishment al potere in un determinato stato, è stato la norma e non l'eccezione. "La strada per Gerusalemme doveva passare dal Cairo" e il movimento jihadista, con pochissime eccezioni, dava priorità al Nemico Vicino (i governanti arabi percepiti come corrotti ed occidentalizzati e le minoranze religiose) sul Nemico Lontano (Israele, gli Stati Uniti, i loro alleati e in generale il cosiddetto Occidente). Il lavoro si propone di dimostrare che i processi di de-radicalizzazione dei gruppi egiziani analizzati sono stati possibili proprio grazie alla dimensione nazionale della loro lotta e che, una volta che il jihad diventa globale, tali processi non sono più possibili. Con la transnazionalizzazione del jihad infatti, vengono a mancare i requisiti fondamentali di un autentico processo di de-radicalizzazione collettiva e politica, quali in particolare interessi e motivi di frustrazione unitari e comuni, un nemico comune e interno al proprio orizzonte nazionale e una leadership del gruppo nazionale, in grado di creare un terreno comune – tanto di scontro quanto di dialogo – con le istituzioni del proprio paese. ; The objective of this project is twofold. First, it aims at illustrating the changes that have occurred in the conception of jihad between two distinct forms of jihadism in the MENA region, i.e. national and global jihadism. Second, it aspires to verify the research hypothesis according to which, once jihad goes global, it is no longer possible for an organic process of collective and political de-radicalization to happen, because global jihad does not possess a set of prerequisites that allow the process to occur. From a geographical perspective, Egypt will be chosen as the reference country. The national conception of jihadism will be exemplified by al-Ğamā ͑a al-Islāmiya (Islamic Group, IG) and al-Ğihād al-Islāmy (Islamic Jihad), the two major Egyptian jihadi groups of the twentieth century. Symmetrically, the so-called global jihad and the parabola of Ayman al-Zawahiri (Ayman al-Ẓawāhiri) and his thought will represent the second approach to violent jihadism. The two abovementioned groups, which were active during the last three decades of the twentieth century, constitute ideal case studies because they all performed a process of collective disengagement and de-radicalization that led them to abandon violence. Moreover, the Egyptian cases represent the most telling instances of de-radicalization because they involved comprehensive de-radicalization, i.e. successful de-radicalization processes completed on three levels: organizational, behavioral, and ideological. This is the main reason why Egypt will be preferred to disengagement processes that taken places in other countries, such as Algeria, which seems to partly lack the ideological component. At the same time, the beginning of global jihad in general and the figure of al-Zawahiri in particular will be chosen as the second basis for comparison because they represent the fundamental turning point from national to global jihadism. Indeed, until the late 1990s, when he joined Bin Laden's World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, Zawahiri faithfully adhered to the strategic principle of making jihad against the Near Enemy and kept his focus on overthrowing the Egyptian government. He used to say that "the road to Jerusalem went first through Cairo" confirming the hypothesis that from the 1970s until the mid-1990s the jihadi movement, with few exceptions, did not pay much attention to the Far Enemy – the West and its allies - and focused on the national horizon. In this respect, the second objective of the present research is to demonstrate that, after the emergence of al-Qa'ida as a regional and international player, a similar process of de-radicalization could no longer occur. The global project of al-Qa'ida excludes every chance of undertaking a de-radicalization process in which a group effectively negotiates with a nation-state.
The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has experienced repeated defeats since 2017. To develop more effective counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies, the counterterrorism community has started to focus on the possible consequences in Europe of these defeats. The goal of this article is twofold. First, it aims to address the resilience of jihadism and the major challenges that Europe has to face in dealing with it. Second, it gives an overview of the best practices that should be adopted to face the persistent risks that will have to be addressed in the short and medium terms. Moreover, it argues that understanding the concepts of re-Qaedisation—the process that might cause ISIS-affiliated cells to bear a greater resemblance to the al-Qaeda model—and old-style recruitment—a set of recruitment patterns based on face-to-face interaction, pre-existing bonds and a shared radical milieu—will be crucial to reaching the above-mentioned objectives.
During the last few years and because of the low oil prices in particular, the increasing awareness of the unsustainability of subsidized systems led several MENA countries to take steps to lower subsidies, which have been part of the social contract for decades, especially as far as the energy sector is concerned. Nowadays, the need for reforms is compelling for more than one reason. Namely, the subsidized system distorts market trends, fosters inefficient use of resources, depresses foreign direct investment and fuels overconsumption, which is no longer sustainable, particularly as far as the population growth in most of the MENA countries is concerned. In this paper both the resource-abundant countries and the energy importing nations will be analyzed, in order to investigate similarities and differences between the two and to carry out an initial assessment of the reforms in two representative countries, namely Saudi Arabia, exporting country par excellence, and Egypt, which imports energy.
The emergence of the Islamic State as a regional and ideological player deeply affected the mechanisms of radicalization witnessed worldwide. The article will compare a former instance of jihadism, the Egyptian al-Gamā'a al-Islāmiya (Islamic Group, IG), with the phenomenon of the Islamic State and its wilāyāt system. The Islamic Group, which has been active during the last three decades of the Twentieth century, constitutes an ideal case study because it performed a process of political de-radicalization and disengagement that led its members to abandon violence. The hypothesis underlying the paper is that a similar process could no longer take place in the case of the Islamic State. Indeed, the transnational project of the Caliphate is likely to exclude every chance of undertaking a de-radicalization and/or disengagement process in which a group effectively negotiates with a nation-state, and this difference is likely to represent one of the major counter-terrorism challenges arising from the Syrian-Iraqi scenario. In order to complete its de-radicalization process, the IG issued four books of murāğa'āt, "recantations", in January 2002, under the general title of The Correcting Conceptions Series. The major one was titled The Initiative for Ceasing Violence: a Realistic View and a Legitimate Perspective. It was authored by two Shura Council members and it generally addressed the practical and the ideological reasons behind the initiative. Unquestionably, this gradual process has been possible not only thanks to the new attitudes towards violence endorsed by al-Gamā'a al-Islāmiya, but also to the perceptive reaction of the State. By contrast, the a-national nature of the Islamic State obstructs this process. Indeed, after the local-oriented attitude of the first gam'iyāt and the emergence of al-Qa'ida as the premium brand of global terror, aims, push factors and geographical horizons of jihadism deeply changed. It is therefore not a question whether jihad is a binding religious prescription: it unquestionably is. The fundamental issue is whether and how one is to conduct it by lawful and prudent means and it is precisely this question that profoundly and irremediably divides the national jihadi movements from the Islamic State. As an internal Islamist critique - one that relies on a common Salafi substratum - the gam'iyāt refutation of global jihad may shed a light over the role of Da'ish in the contemporary jihadi panorama.
