Suchergebnisse

Many recent electoral studies have been concerned with the desire, intent or ability of individual citizens to control public policy through the franchise. The techniques & assumptions of such studies are to be criticized. It appears that the orthodox view of the electorate as deliberately controlling policy through the choice of candidates applies only to a minority of citizens. It might be well to start a study of purposive voting from the assumption that well-adjusted citizens do not consider the trouble of registering as voters, informing themselves on complex affairs, determining the position of candidates in regard to these affairs, & finally getting to the polls, to be adequately compensated by the personal improvement which the act of voting promises to achieve for them. As an assumption, it is no worse than the one implicit in most studies of 'apathy' &'PO control'; as a hypo it appears more promising than the one that 'politically efficacious' citizens vote. (IPSA). Adapted from the source document.

When do politicians become interested in politics? How do they become oriented to politics? Who are the agents of pol'al soc'tion? What pol'al or soc events seem to arouse attention to politics? What kind of predispositions seem to accompany the initial interest in politics? Are pol'al or other soc beliefs involved in the process of pol'al soc'tion? In a 1957 interview study of 474 US state legislators in California, New Jersey, Ohio & Tennessee, politicians were asked to recall their earliest interest in politics to answer these questions. It was found that a great many sources are operative in initiating pol'al interest. Perhaps the most signif finding was tentative support for the hypo that pol'al soc'tion may occur at almost any phase of the life cycle, even among men & women whose concern with public affairs is presumably more intense & permanent than that of the average citizen, & more often occurs at a relatively early age. Modified AA-IPSA.

Interviews with legislators in 4 US states indicate that some of them become specialists in important subject-matter fields. The member-specialist functions as a communication channel to the society: he simplifies for his fellows the complexities of admin've, sci'ific, educ'al, legal & fiscal problems. This informal expertise system develops alongside the standing committee system despite the difficulty experienced by an elective body in recruiting, training & retaining specialists. It persists apparently because the members need the assistance of someone who (1) has a greater knowledge than they of the matters they regulate but (2) is one of their ingroup & subject to pressures they experience & understand. The appearance of this informal division of labor throws into question the theory that the legislator in a system of separation of powers should & does act primarily as the generalist, the layman & the omnicompetent representative. AA-IPSA.