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For well over a century, the United Fruit Company (UFCO) has been the most vilified multinational corporation operating in Latin America. Criticism of the UFCO has been widespread, ranging from politicians to consumer activists, and from labor leaders to historians, all portraying it as an overwhelmingly powerful corporation that shaped and often exploited its host countries. In this first history of the UFCO in Colombia, Marcelo Bucheli argues that the UFCO's image as an all-powerful force in determining national politics needs to be reconsidered. Using a previously unexplored source—the internal archives of Colombia's UFCO operation—Bucheli reveals that before 1930, the UFCO worked alongside a business-friendly government that granted it generous concessions and repressed labor unionism. After 1930, however, the country experienced dramatic transformations including growing nationalism, a stronger labor movement, and increasing demands by local elites for higher stakes in the banana export business.In response to these circumstances, the company abandoned production, selling its plantations (and labor conflicts) to local growers, while transforming itself into a marketing company. The shift was endorsed by the company's shareholders and financial analysts, who preferred lower profits with lower risks, and came at a time in which the demand for bananas was decreasing in America. Importantly, Bucheli shows that the effect of foreign direct investment was not unidirectional. Instead, the agency of local actors affected corporate strategy, just as the UFCO also transformed local politics and society

From hotel luxury suites to working-class lunchboxes -- The United Fruit Company in Latin America: business strategies in a changing environment -- The United Fruit Company and local politics in Colombia -- The Labor conflicts of the United Fruit Company in Magdalena in the 1920s -- Nobody's triumph: labor unionism in Magdalena after World War II -- The United Fruit Company's relationship with local planters in Colombia.

This article analyzes the long-term strategies employed by multinational oil corporations in a late industrializing country with powerful business groups when faced with economic nationalism. I study the case of Royal Dutch-Shell in Chile from 1913 to 2005, where two oil multinationals controlled 100 percent of the Chilean market until forced by the government to accept a domestic private company, COPEC, into a new three-member cartel. The multinationals accepted this arrangement reluctantly, but in the long term it proved beneficial. COPEC's involvement in Chilean business groups protected the multinationals from hostile actions by the government and gave legitimacy to the cartel. These benefits ended when Chile abandoned its import substitution industrialization strategy in the 1970s.