Suchergebnisse

Acknowledgements -- Contents -- The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods: The Lifework of Richard Cornes -- References -- Efficiency in Contests Between Groups -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Notation and Payoffs -- 3 Decomposition -- 4 Existence, Uniqueness and Properties of Equilibrium -- 5 Examples -- 6 Rent Dissipation -- 7 Comparative Statics -- 7.1 Adding a Group -- 7.2 Adding Contestants -- 8 Conclusion -- Appendix -- References -- Multiple-Aggregate Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Economic Framework -- 3 Study of Group Partial Games -- 4 Nash Equilibrium in the Full Game -- 5 Nested Aggregative Games -- 6 Applications -- 6.1 Group Contests -- 6.1.1 Collective Contests -- 6.1.2 Intra- and Inter-Group Contests -- 6.1.3 Contests with Group Spill-Overs -- 6.2 Bilateral Oligopoly -- 6.3 Group Public Goods -- 7 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix: Proofs -- References -- Strategic Coalition Formation in Global Public Good Provision -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Framework -- 3 Unilateral Cooperation -- 4 Bilateral Cooperation -- 5 Incentives for Coalition Formation -- 5.1 The Optimal Coalition Formation Decision of Group K When Group M Does not Cooperate -- 5.2 The Optimal Coalition Formation Decision of Group K When Group M Cooperates -- 5.3 A Comparison of the Optimal Reactions -- 6 Nash Equilibria at the Coalition Formation Stage: Some General Conditions -- 7 Nash Equilibria at the Coalition Formation Stage: The Cobb-Douglas Example -- 8 Conclusions -- A.1 Appendix: Derivation of the Threshold Level in Proposition 11 -- References -- Evolution of Consistent Conjectures in Semi-aggregative Representation of Games, with Applications to Public Good Games and Contests -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Games and Conjectures -- 2.1 Semi-aggregative Representation of Games -- 2.2 Conjectures and Conjectural Variation Equilibria -- 2.3 Consistent Conjectures

Under conditions of risk it makes a difference whether the discount rate is determined as an expected present or as an expected future value. This difference which is dubbed as the Weitzman-Gollier puzzle has stimulated an intensive discussion which, however, is somewhat confusing. In this paper we try to provide some clarification by separating the different topics of the debate. In particular we give an intuitive explanation for the divergence between the outcomes of the present and the future value approach. Moreover, we show that a declining time patter of the discount rate which is the major implication of Weitzman's present value approach can also be obtained in many other and more appealing ways.

The evaluation of long-term effects of climate change in cost-benefit analysis has a long tradition in environmental economics. Since the publication of the Stern Review in 2006 the debate about the ""appropriate"" discounting of future welfare and utility levels was revived and the most renowned scholars of the profession participated in this debate. In two recent contributions in Environmental and Resource Economics, there was dispute about intertemporal welfare economics between Partha Dasgupta and John Roemer about the correct interpretation of the topic. The aim of this work is to bring together economic and philosophical reasoning about justice and intergenerational equity in the context of climate change. So we adopt the normative view in order to present the most important ethical issues that, particularly in the context of climate policy, are most relevant for the choice of intertemporal discounting. Subsequently we explore whether ethical considerations may also be helpful to justify pure social discounting per se.

Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only under very special conditions. But we show in this note that corner solutions, in which some agents choose zero flat contributions, normally avoid underprovision and illustrate and interpret our results by a simple numerical example

In this paper we explore the relationship between an equitable distribution of the cost shares in public-good provision on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous distribution of cost shares that motivates some coalition of agents to separate and to block an initially given Pareto optimal allocation which can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation process when all agents form a grand coalition. Distributional equity of the individual burdens of public-good contribution is assessed by a specific sacrifice measure (the "Moulin sacrifice") which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative agreement in the public-good economy.

Aktuell ist die Weltwirtschaft von disruptiven Veränderungen und einer hohen Unsicherheit geprägt. Politische Spannungen in Asien, unklare Machtverhältnisse in europäischen Ländern und auch in den USA führen zu Instabilität und negativen Aussichten für die Wirtschaft. Auch die Nachwirkungen von Covid-19 sowie der andauernde russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine haben einen massiven Einfluss auf den globalen Handel und die dazugehörigen Lieferketten. Um gegen diese schwer vorhersehbaren, aber massiv wirksamen negativen Einflussfaktoren besser gewappnet zu sein, müssen Unternehmen ihre Lieferketten widerstandsfähiger (resilienter) gestalten.

Der Vortrag von Karen Pittel hat unter anderem aufgezeigt, wie sich die im Rahmen der Energiewende verfolgten Ziele als Teilziele des für die Ökonomie zentralen Ziels der Wohlfahrtsmaximierung begreifen lassen. Zwischen den Teilzielen bestehen Konflikte, so dass die Aufgabe des Staates bei der Gestaltung der Energiepolitik auch darin zu bestehen hat, einen die Wohlfahrt maximierenden Kompromiss zwischen den einzelnen Zielen zu finden und dieses Zielbündel durch die Wahl geeigneter Maßnahmen umzusetzen. In meinem Kommentar möchte ich kurz darzustellen versuchen, welche spezifischen Charakteristika die mit der Energiewende verfolgten Ziele aufweisen und welche Konsequenzen sich daraus für eine an ökonomischen Standards orientierte Energiepolitik ergeben.