Suchergebnisse

This article will investigate Rawls's claim that his theory is Kantian in origin. In drawing on the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, I will show that Rawls's claim to be Kantian cannot be conclusively explained and assessed without the Lectures. An investigation of the Lectures shows that Rawls forces onto Kant's theory a Rawlsian interpretation which crucially alters Kant's theory. So far the secondary literature has neglected to subject Rawls's Lectures to detailed philosophical scrutiny. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature on Rawls's Kantianism. I will identify three points in Rawls's interpretation of Kant (need for CI-procedure, willing condition, true human needs) which are questionable. I argue that the similarities of Rawls's theory to Kant are due to these (mis)interpretations, which makes Rawls's claim to be Kantian ultimately not legitimate.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS -- Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION -- Chapter 2 DARKNESS AND SILENCE: EVIL AND THE WESTERN LEGACY -- Chapter 3 CONSTRUCTIVISM AND EVIL -- Chapter 4 SYSTEMIC EVIL AND THE LIMITS OF PLURALISM -- Chapter 5 UNREASONABLE OR EVIL? -- Chapter 6 EVIL IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY: ACTS THAT SHOCK THE CONSCIENCE OF MANKIND -- Chapter 7 DOING EVIL JUSTLY? THE MORALITY OF JUSTIFIABLE ABOMINATION -- Chapter 8 EVIL AND THE LEFT -- Chapter 9 THE GLAMOUR OF EVIL: DOSTOYEVSKY AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSGRESSION -- Chapter 10 THE RHETORIC OF MORAL EQUIVALENCE -- Chapter 11 BANAL BUT NOT BENIGN: ARENDT ON EVIL -- INDEX