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OUR REVIEW & EVALUATION FOCUS ON THE THEORETICAL ADEQUACY OF SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF VOTING AND PARTY COMPETITION BASED ON SURVEY DATA. KEY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING DISCUSSIONS ARE: (1) VOTING CANNOT BE PROPERLY EXPLAINED WITHOUT REGARD TO PARTY COMPETITION AND VICE VERSA; (2) THE TYPE OF INPUT CRUCIALLY DETERMINES THE NATURE OF THE SPACE PRODUCED;

This study offers an analysis of the UK's current economic policy options and a plan for improving life for ordinary citizens via a sensible and realistic understanding of governments' limited ability to manage economic performance. It provides a manifesto which political parties could immediately adopt to make life better for all

CRITICALLY EVALUATES METHODOLGY AND ASSUMPTIONS IN ARTICLE BY FARLIE AND BUDGE ON HIGH PREDICTIVE VALUE OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS IN INDICATING POLITICAL ACTIVISM. POINTS OUT FAILURE TO MAKE FULL USE OF FRAMEWORK OF BAYES THEOREM. REJOINDER BY FARLIE AND BUDGE. FOCUS ON CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES OF BEING A COUNCILLOR IN COLCHESTER, ENGLAND.

Most discussions of democratic theory assume that parties should offer clear choices to voters but also show themselves sensitive to public concerns. Under certain circumstances, however, party convergence on these may preclude electoral choice, thus creating conflict between two democratic 'goods'. We examine possible tradeoffs between choice and responsiveness, and see which actually occur in 16 postwar democracies. Party policy positions turn out to be more strongly related to party ideology than popular concerns, thus privileging differentiation and choice over sensitivity and responsiveness. Implications for democratic theory and practice are considered.

The country tables of the data collection 'Political Data 1945-1990. Party Government in 20 Democracies' (European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 24, No. 1 (July 1993), pp. 1-119) are updated and corrected to the end of 1995. Errors and omissions on the level of separate Ministers and/or Ministries have been corrected as well. These are listed as 'changes/corrections' in the corresponding tables in the original data collection. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

THE EDITORS PRESENT A COMPILATION OF DATA ABOUT GOVERNMENTS AND RULING PARTIES IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES FROM 1945 TO 1990: AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, WEST GERMANY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ISRAEL, ITALY, JAPAN, LUXEMBURG, THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS ARE INCREASINGLY USED IN EXPLANATIONS OF VOTING AND ELECTIONS. THEIR ADOPTION IS OFTEN URGED, RATHER UNCRITICALLY, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY PROVIDE A UNIFIED AND EXACT EXPLANATION ACROSS POLITICAL SCIENCE. FAR FROM DOING SO, HOWEVER, THEIR DEFINITIONS OF 'RATIONALITY' MAY DIFFER RADICALLY EVEN WITHIN A LIMITED AREA, SUCH AS PARTY AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR. SHIFTS OF MEANING FROM ONE MODEL TO ANOTHER MAY BE OBSCURED BY MATHEMATICAL FORMALISM, WHICH CONCENTRATES ATTENTION ON THE DERIVATION OF CONCLUSIONS FROM BASIC ASSUMPTIONS, RATHER THAN ON THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND OTHER MODELS. A MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION MAY NOT, HOWEVER, BE THE MOST RELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF ELECTORAL EXPLANATION. RIGOROUS VERBAL FORMULATIONS CAN REPRESENT ELECTORS' AND POLITICIANS' DECISION PROCEDURES MORE REALISTICALLY, WHILE REMAINING GENERALLY ACCESSIBLE AND SUPPORTING DETAILED INTER-COMPARISONS OF THEIR WORKING ASSUMPTIONS. THROUGH THESE, RATIONAL CHOICE EXPLANATIONS CAN BE BROUGHT CLOSER TOGETHER AND DECISIONS BETWEEN THEM MADE WITH A CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IS INVOLVED, THUS PROVIDING A BETTER BASIS FOR CUMULATIVE RESEARCH. THE PROCESS OF THEORETICAL EVALUATION AND ASSIMILATION IS ILLUSTRATED HERE WITH TWO ORIGINAL THEORIES OF VOTING AND PARTY COMPETITION.