Suchergebnisse

This paper analyzes the underexplored vertical relationship between European Union agencies (EUAs) and the member states. It is argued that member states' representation on the EUAs' management boards (MBs) may be considered an instance of vertical political accountability and legitimacy—a feature that EUAs are conventionally seen to be lacking. Additionally, this paper analyzes the political attitudes/preferences of the national representatives on EUA MBs because these preferences might also influence the factual behavior and hence the domestic accountability of these board members. However, the empirical data based on an original online survey reveal a rather ambivalent picture concerning vertical political accountability. Strong direct political accountability relationships seem not to be in place, and existing vertical accountability relationships show a technocratic/professional rather than a democratic orientation. This finding is also supported by empirical evidence that MB members possess technocratic rather than democratic attitudes towards accountability. ; + Sprache: eng

Inspired by the notion of demoi-cracy, this contribution analyses the legitimacy of European Union agencies (EUAs). It asks how far member states' representation on the management boards (MBs) of EUAs constitutes an instance of vertical accountability and a possible source of demoi-cratic legitimacy. In accordance with the horizontal dimension of demoi-cracy, the contribution additionally investigates the transnational links between MB representatives and their peers from other member states as possible instances of peer accountability. Drawing on document analysis and an original survey with MB representatives from six EUAs, the empirical results reveal a rather ambivalent picture of MBs' political accountability. Only the MB of the European Railway Agency (ERA) meets the established demoi-cratic criteria in the sense of vertical accountability. All other EUA MBs investigated possess either weak de jure or de facto political accountability (or both). Peer accountability, in contrast, is more pronounced for most EUAs, but is still predominantly nationally rather than transnationally oriented. This implies that, from a demoi-cratic perspective, there is considerable potential to improve MBs' de jure and de facto political and peer accountability. Adapted from the source document.

The role of national representatives on the management boards (MBs) of European Union agencies (EUAs) is crucial in two respects. From a democratic point of view, national MB representatives' accountability may constitute a possible additional source of legitimacy for these technocratic bodies. From the perspective of European integration, their relationship with national institutions tells us about the status of EUAs and the extent to which their MBs constitute an intergovernmental control tool in the hands of the Member States. Contrary to their formal design, the collected data suggest that MBs have a rather supranational, technocratic character. With regard to their contribution to EUAs' democratic accountability, although the general level of accountability is high, the findings are more diverse. However, rather than reflecting control intentions by the Member States, different levels of accountability can best be explained by functional and institutional rather than strategic factors. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe role of national representatives on the management boards (MBs) of European Union agencies (EUAs) is crucial in two respects. From a democratic point of view, national MB representatives' accountability may constitute a possible additional source of legitimacy for these technocratic bodies. From the perspective of European integration, their relationship with national institutions tells us about the status of EUAs and the extent to which their MBs constitute an intergovernmental control tool in the hands of the Member States. Contrary to their formal design, the collected data suggest that MBs have a rather supranational, technocratic character. With regard to their contribution to EUAs' democratic accountability, although the general level of accountability is high, the findings are more diverse. However, rather than reflecting control intentions by the Member States, different levels of accountability can best be explained by functional and institutional rather than strategic factors.

Wenn Statistiken über die Bevölkerung der Schweiz veröffentlicht werden, dann sind die Menschen in der Regel in Schweizer und Ausländer aufgeteilt. Es interessiert, wie gross der Ausländeranteil an der Gesamtbevölkerung ist und wie stark er wächst. Diese statistische Trennung bestimmt unsere Sicht auf die Gesellschaft. Sie zeigt auf, wer dazugehört und wer nicht dazugehört. Doch wie meist, wenn gesellschaftliche Fragen auf zwei dichotome Pole beschränkt werden, hat dies wenig mit der viel komplexeren Wirklichkeit zu tun, vereinfacht oder verzerrt diese vielmehr. In den Statistiken werden die doppelten und mehrfachen Staatsbürgerschaf- ten nicht berücksichtigt. Wenn wir diese in die Berechnungen einbeziehen, entsteht ein neues Bild: Nicht das Bild eines Entweder-Oder, Schwei- zerin-Ausländerin, sondern das Bild eines zunehmenden Sowohl-als-auch, sowohl Schweizer als auch Ausländer. 2016 besass rund ein Viertel aller Schweizerinnen und Schweizer im In- und Ausland eine doppelte oder mehrfache Staatsbürgerschaft, bei den in der Schweiz lebenden waren es 13 Prozent. Von den Schweizerinnen und Schweizern im Ausland können sogar drei Viertel auf zwei oder mehr Pässe zurückgreifen. Dieser Anteil ist im Laufe der Jahre kontinuierlich gewachsen. Und der Anteil der Schweizer Doppelbürgerinnen und -bürger unter der Wohnbevölkerung nimmt in jüngster Zeit schneller zu als der Anteil der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer. Studie im Auftrag der Eidgenössische Migrationskommission EKM ; + ID der Publikation: unilu_38654 + Sprache: Deutsch + Letzte Aktualisierung: 2020-03-03 14:13:45