Suchergebnisse

The paper presents a dynamical extension of the well­known Bernheim— Cartwright—Patel model of conformism. In this model the signaling equilibrium is a result of the optimal choice of an individual when he/she maximizes his/ her utility by choosing a donation in the amount x. In doing this the individual takes into account the intrinsic utility based on the generosity type t, and social attitude expressed by two types of observers: rational and naïve. Such an attitude significantly depends on social norms in this society and affects the esteem of the individual. Social attitude toward generosity varies within the broad range and at its endpoints leads to either neglect of the society (I do not care what people think of me) or an ideal conformism when a person chooses the same x as the rest of the public. Cartwright and Patel have shown that the presence of the inexperienced observers greatly affects equilibrium. This paper explores the dynamics of the naïve observers when they are informed by the rational ones. The dynamic law in the form of the differential equation was set and the stable steady­state solutions were found. Besides, while working on the dynamic law some clarifications of the preceding results of the original model were done.

The paper examines the evolution of individual political preferences under the influence of the parties and political groups of which they are members. Individual preferences are considered in terms of proximity to political doctrines of the political institutions in question. The change in political views can be considered as a combination of a steady trend with the imposition of random change, and in this sense it is similar to mutations in biology. The paper shows that stationary distributions of individuals on the political spectrum scale are defined by their utility functions and initial numbers. While the initial distribution was generated by membership of the central party and two groups conventionally called "left" and "right", the stationary distribution has the form of three narrow peaks, the maximums of which are at the points characterizing political doctrines on the political spectrum scale. In addition, it is shown that in the stationary mode, the relative number of members of the "center" party will increase as compared to the initial period, and vice versa, the total share of "left" and "right" will decrease.

Today there are several common approaches to the study of addictive consumer choice. However, one of the existing approaches is often overlooked due to its complexity. This article aims to fill this gap. We start with a brief retrospective overview of the history of the issue and proceed by a detailed analysis of current research in the field of choice theory which takes into account the evolution of preferences over time in the presence of addiction. These preferences lead to deviation of a rational consumer from rationality under the influence of temptation, addiction, desire to have a greater choice etc.