Suchergebnisse

According to a recent International Labour Organization (ILO) report, some 74 million children below the age of 14 are engaged in the so-called 'worst forms' of child labour. Although this number has been declining over time, it is still too high and is a shameful reminder of our inability to achieve global justice. The 'worst forms' of child labour lead to suffering and a loss of schooling opportunities for the children involved. Limited 'accumulation of human capital', to speak in economic jargon, perpetuates poverty and thus creates conditions that increase instances of child labour – it is a depressing cycle. A recent study by Eric Edmonds and Nina Pavcnik of Dartmouth College, US, documents a strong correlation between trade and child labour: when countries trade more, children work less. This is attributed to the positive effect trade has had on family incomes. Most parents prefer not to send their children to work if they don't have to, so the inevitable result of higher incomes is a decline in the incidence of child labour.

The empirical basis for the so-called resource curse was evaluated and it was shown that, despite the topic's popularity in economics and political science research, this apparent paradox is a red herring. The most commonly used measure of 'resource abundance' can be more usefully interpreted as a proxy for 'resource dependence'. In multiple estimations that combine resource abundance and dependence, institutional and constitutional variables, it was found that (i) resource abundance, constitutions and institutions determine resource dependence, (ii) resource dependence does not affect growth, and (iii) there is no evidence that resource-dependent countries end up with slow growth and bad institutions. Rather, countries with bad institutions attract little investment, and as a result they grow more slowly and remain dependent on exports of commodities. But this is not a paradox at all.

Many western politicians are fond of giving public money to farmers to grow more food. In Europe, a relatively recent phenomenon is to pay farmers to not produce food – or, more accurately, to pay them to produce nature. There are now proposals to extend such 'payments for ecosystem services' (PES) schemes to developing countries.

This book argues that development strategies have thus far failed in Western Africa because the many challenges afflicting the area have yet to be explored and understood from the perspective of institutional resources. With a particular focus on three countries on the bend of the Upper West African coast - Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone - this book offers a theory to account for the nature of these institutional elements, to test deductions against evidence, and finally to propose a reset for rural development policy to make fuller use of local institutional resources. Based on quantitative analysis and eight years of multidisciplinary field research, this volume features several large-scale RCTs in the domain of rural development, local governance, and nature conservation. The authors address one of the biggest topics in agricultural and development economics today: the structural transformation of poor, agrarian economies, and they do so through the important and unique lens of institutions.--

Background. Repeated mass drug administration (MDA) with preventive chemotherapies is the mainstay of morbidity control for schistosomiasis and soil-transmitted helminths, yet the World Health Organization recently reported that less than one-third of individuals who required preventive chemotherapies received treatment. Methods. Coverage of community-directed treatment with praziquantel (PZQ) and albendazole (ALB) was analyzed in 17 villages of Mayuge District, Uganda. National drug registers, household questionnaires, and parasitological surveys were collected to track 935 individuals before and after MDA. Multilevel logistic regressions, including household and village effects, were specified with a comprehensive set of socioeconomic and parasitological variables. The factors predicting who did not receive PZQ and ALB from community medicine distributors were identified. Results. Drug receipt was correlated among members within a household, and nonrecipients of PZQ or ALB were profiled by household-level socioeconomic factors. Individuals were less likely to receive either PZQ or ALB if they had a Muslim household head or low home quality, belonged to the minority tribe, or had settled for more years in their village. Untreated individuals were also more likely to belong to households that did not purify drinking water, had no home latrine, and had no members who were part of the village government. Conclusions. The findings demonstrate how to locate and target individuals who are not treated in MDA. Infection risk factors were not informative. In particular, age, gender, and occupation were unable to identify non-recipients, although World Health Organization guidelines rely on these factors. Individuals of low socioeconomic status, minority religions, and minority tribes can be targeted to expand MDA coverage.