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This volume in the Mansholt series presents state of the art discussions on a wide variety of topics in the field of (agricultural) development. More than 20 chapters have been prepared by internationally known scholars and policy analysts, providing a concise overview of a variety of recent debates in development economics. While the background of most contributors is in economic science, the chapters are prepared so that they feed into ongoing policy discussions and are accessible to a wide readership. The contributions in this volume are organized around five themes: prospects for rural poverty alleviation, sustainable management of natural resources, strategies for enhancing food security, markets and the role of the state, and institutions and governance. It is obvious there are many links between these themes, and indeed the integration between them is emphasized in various chapters. This book is prepared as a festschrift or Liber Amicorum for professor Arie Kuyvenhoven. His retirement from the Development Economics Group at Wageningen University, The Netherlands is a good opportunity to take stock of recent developments in the area of agricultural development economics. Therefore, in addition to being a valuable source of information for readers with an interest in development, this volume is also intended as a farewell gift: to Arie, from friends and colleagues

Abstract.  When countries share access to a common resource stock, optimal management is based on strategic considerations. We develop a general equilibrium model and show that regulatory policies are strategic substitutes under autarky. Trade liberalization not only changes relative prices, but may change the qualitative nature of the game between jurisdictions. In the small country case with exogenous prices, regulatory policies become strategic complements. In the context of a two‐country model, policies remain strategic substitutes but the factors that drive policy changes differ from those under autarky and the small country case. The implications for conservation and resource management are discussed.

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 African Smallholders and Their Market Environment -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Transaction Costs: The Elephant in the Room -- 1.3 The Weakest Shoulders and the Heaviest Burden -- 1.4 Value Chain Development -- 1.5 Policies and Interventions -- 1.6 What This Book Tries to Do (and Does not Do) -- References -- 2 African Agricultural Value Chains: A Brief Historical Overview -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Precolonial Farming -- 2.3 The Scramble for Africa -- 2.4 Extraction and Growth During Colonial Times -- 2.5 Taxing Farmers: African Agriculture After Decolonization -- 2.6 From Taxation to Protection -- 2.7 Conclusions -- References -- 3 Economic Theory and Value Chain Governance -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 How Value Chains Are Governed -- 3.3 Development and Value Chains -- 3.4 Formal and Informal Governance of Value Chains -- 3.5 Relational Contracting in More Detail -- 3.6 Policies, Projects, and Value Chain Performance: Competition and Insurance -- 3.7 Discussion and Conclusions -- Appendix: A Formal Model of Relational Contracting Between a Trader and a Farmer -- References -- 4 The Evolution of Agricultural Value Chains in Africa -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Types of Value Chains -- 4.3 Value Chain Services -- 4.4 Factors Shaping the Transition from Traditional to Complex Value Chains -- 4.4.1 Consequences of Income Growth, Inequality, and Urbanization -- 4.5 Contract Farming -- 4.6 Value Chain Finance -- 4.7 The Role of Imported Food in African Markets -- 4.8 Closing Words -- References -- 5 Smallholders and Markets -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Factor Markets -- 5.3 Input Markets -- 5.4 Output Markets -- 5.5 Smallholder Households -- 5.6 Discussion and Conclusions -- References -- 6 Product Quality and Certification -- 6.1 Producers, Purchases, and Certifying Quality.

The impact of armed conflict may persist long after the end of war, and may include a lasting institutional legacy. We use a novel dataset from rural Burundi to examine the impact of local exposure to conflict on institutional quality, and try to 'unbundle' institutions by distinguishing between three dimensions of the institutional framework: property rights security, local political institutions, and social capital. We find that conflict exposure affects institutional quality, and document that the impact of conflict on institutional quality may be positive or negative, depending on the institutional measure. Specifically, exposure to violence strengthens in-group social capital and promotes tenure security. However, the appreciation for state institutions is negatively affected by exposure to violence. We find no evidence consistent with design-based theories of institutional quality, or the idea that institutional quality is enhanced by interventions of (non)state external actors. Instead our findings provide some support for the theory of parochial altruism. Our results emphasize the importance for policymakers to consider autonomous responses to conflict when designing development programs. They further imply some caution for actors seeking to reform local institutions through top-down interventions.

We critically evaluate the empirical basis for the so-called resource curse and find that, despite the topic's popularity in economics and political science research, this apparent paradox is a red herring. The most commonly used measure of 'resource abundance' can be more usefully interpreted as a proxy for 'resource dependence'—endogenous to underlying institutional factors. In multiple estimations that combine resource abundance and dependence, institutional and constitutional variables, we find that (i) resource abundance, constitutions and institutions determine resource dependence, (ii) resource dependence does not affect growth, and (iii) resource abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality.

We critically evaluate the empirical basis for the so-called resource curse and find that, despite the topic's popularity in economics and political science research, this apparent paradox is a red herring. The most commonly used measure of 'resource abundance' can be more usefully interpreted as a proxy for resource dependence'-endogenous to underlying institutional factors. In multiple estimations that combine resource bundance and dependence, institutional and constitutional variables, we find that (i) resource abundance, constitutions and institutions determine resource dependence, (ii) resource dependence does not affect growth, and (iii) resource abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality.