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The basic problem with writing a history of American Big Business is finding some method to organize the familiar chronicles of companies and people as well as the usual stories of good and evil into some coherent book of reasonable length. The organizing method adopted by Charles Geisst is to focus on the popular reaction to "monopolies," more accurately, private concentrations of economic power. For the most part, this method succeeds, assisted in no small part by Geisst's smooth style and cynical, perhaps jaded, attitude.

Numerous studies have shown that since about 1900 the largest industrial, financial, and transportation companies have interlocked extensively through a sharing of directors and, much less often, officers (e.g., Bunting and Barbour, 1971; Bunting, 1976a, 1976b; Dooley, 1969). In fact, this interlocking has been so extensive that a virtual network exists whereby nearly any large corporation in principle is able to participate either directly or indirectly, once or twice removed, in the top-level policy deliberations of any other large concern (Mizruchi, 1982; Pennings, 1980).Little is known about the origins of this network. Most research implicitly assumes that the network has resulted from some relatively recent decline in competition and subsequent movement toward economic concentration. This conclusion follows from the commonly accepted proposition that competition precedes monopoly in industrial development. Scherer (1979:47), an authority on modern American industrial organization, cites Marx for the essence of this notion: "'One capitalist always kills many' (creating) a 'constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process.'" In less colorful but more factual terms, Burns (1936:1-42) and many others have described the "decline of competition" and the factors leading to the domination of many industries by relatively few large corporations (literature reviewed in Scherer, 1979:67-70; Blumberg, 1975:16-83).