Suchergebnisse

Originally published in 1988. This book considers why some public policies succeed and others do not. It looks at the entrepreneurial process that creates public policies and examines whether they prosper or falter because of their political consequences. The programs and personnel of the Atomic Energy Commission are the empirical foundation for these arguments. The data generated by that agency's annual budget-making cycles, collected over time and organised by program, are used as evidence to test some propositions about policy formation within the executive branch of government. The author's concern is with questions of where and how priorities are established in a complex institutional environment. To answer the more fundamental causal question of why some programs prosper while others wither or die, use is made of more historical analysis and comparison of the fortunes of several of AEC's efforts to develop applied nuclear technology.

Worldwide nuclear power reactor manufacturing capacity will exceed worldwide demand by a factor of two or more during the 1980s. Only in France and the Soviet bloc countries is it likely that the ambitious nuclear power programs formulated in the mid-1970s will be implemented. In all other developed countries and in most developing countries, further delays and cancellations of previously announced programs are all but certain.The stalemate over the future of nuclear power is particularly deep in America. Administrative and personnel problems in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, slow progress on radioactive waste disposal by the Department of Energy, severe financial problems for most electric utilities, and drastic reductions in the rate of electricity demand growth combine to make continuation of the five-year-old moratorium on reactor orders inevitable. Many of the ninety plants under construction may never operate and some of the seventy in operation may shut down before the end of their economic life.Contrary to widespread belief, further oil price increases may not speed up worldwide reactor sales. It is possible that the world is heading for a "worst" of all possible outcomes: a large number of small nuclear power programs that do little to meet real energy needs but substantially complicate the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation.

Recent quantitative studies vastly understate the political conflicts and policy choices that are embedded in the budgetary process. The reason for this lies in the way these quantitative studies have organized budgetary data. Thus far the units of analysis have been federal agencies, the administrative categories of government. The "striking regularities" that have been reported reflect—quite accurately—the great stability of the administrative structure of government. However, these categories do not describe the intense competition between programs and policies that takes place within the framework. We argue, further, that the entire metaphor of an inert bureaucratic machine doing this year essentially what it did last year is erroneous. Rather, priority setting in the federal bureaucracy more resembles the market situation of nineteenth century capitalism where aggressive "policy entrepreneurs," unequal in talent and resources, struggle to build and sustain support for their programs. The competition between policies is both reflected in and promoted by the budgetary process. By shifting the units of analysis to programs and transforming these data so that programs of different size are commensurate, we develop an index that reflects the relative growth and decay of programs as they compete for budgetary resources.