Suchergebnisse

Using time-diary data from 25 countries, we demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between real GDP per capita and the female-male difference in total work time per day -- the sum of work for pay and work at home. In rich northern countries on four continents, including the United States, there is no difference -- men and women do the same amount of total work. This latter fact has been presented before by several sociologists for a few rich countries; but our survey results show that labor economists, macroeconomists, the general public and sociologists are unaware of it and instead believe that women perform more total work. The facts do not arise from gender differences in the price of time (as measured by market wages), as women's total work is further below men's where their relative wages are lower. Additional tests using U.S. and German data show that they do not arise from differences in marital bargaining, as gender equality is not associated with marital status; nor do they stem from family norms, since most of the variance in the gender total work difference is due to within-couple differences. We offer a theory of social norms to explain the facts. The social-norm explanation is better able to account for within-education group and within-region gender differences in total work being smaller than inter-group differences. It is consistent with evidence using the World Values Surveys that female total work is relatively greater than men's where both men and women believe that scarce jobs should be offered to men first.

Evaluating real convergence or divergence in the EU is challenging because it is diffi cult to fi nd an appropriate counterfactual or comparison benchmark, or to formulate one. Should we compare the status quo with convergence that would have been obtained had the European Union (EU) never existed? Or under different monetary arrangements - fl exible or fi xed exchange rates, or a monetary union? With or without deep trade integration, or factor mobility as in the United States? I will exploit recent research and discuss real convergence in the EU, using the new and old German Bundesländer (states) since reunifi cation as a foil for the integration process. German unifi cation provides an excellent laboratory: an economy populated by Europeans with labour and capital mobility unimpeded by national boundaries, trade barriers, or culture, tradition and institutions after 1990.

By any measure, the European Monetary Union and the European Union are in a deep hole. In the summer of 2011 we came uncomfortably close to an uncontrolled sovereign default of an EU country, a member of the European Monetary Union, hardly ten years after the common currency project was launched. In the months that followed, Greece was brought back from the precipice, but by the time of this writing has accumulated sovereign indebtedness of more than €380b or more than 170% of the country's gross domestic product. By current estimates, more than half of this debt is held by foreigners, and mostly by foreign official institutions. How could a country with less than 2% of EU output be the source of such great concern? Quite simply, because in the meantime Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (which along with Greece, are known as the GIIPs countries, or the PIIGS in less politically correct circles) have all spent significant time at the financial edge, with borrowing costs rising enough to threaten the integrity of the Eurozone banking system, the mechanism of payments, the European Central Bank and the common currency itself. In my view, we are still not out of the hole, even though most recent events may belie that assessment.

By any measure, the European Monetary Union and the European Union are in a deep hole. In the summer of 2011 we came uncomfortably close to an uncontrolled sovereign default of an EU country, a member of the European Monetary Union, hardly ten years after the common currency project was launched. In the months that followed, Greece was brought back from the precipice, but by the time of this writing has accumulated sovereign indebtedness of more than €380b or more than 170% of the country's gross domestic product. By current estimates, more than half of this debt is held by foreigners, and mostly by foreign official institutions. How could a country with less than 2% of EU output be the source of such great concern? Quite simply, because in the meantime Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (which along with Greece, are known as the GIIPs countries, or the PIIGS in less politically correct circles) have all spent significant time at the financial edge, with borrowing costs rising enough to threaten the integrity of the Eurozone banking system, the mechanism of payments, the European Central Bank and the common currency itself. In my view, we are still not out of the hole, even though most recent events may belie that assessment.

"Die künftige Entwicklung der ostdeutschen Wirtschaft wird - umrahmt von langsamem Abschwung und von Entvölkerung - von räumlichen Lichtblicken der Stabilisierung oder sogar von Wachstumspolen gekennzeichnet sein." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)