Suchergebnisse

This study examines survival patterns in a large, representative panel of Ugandan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) between 2002 and 2008. It finds no evidence that more effective or more altruistic NGOs have a greater likelihood of survival. The main determinant of survival appears to be access to grants, and NGOs without grants struggle to survive. An investigation of the grant allocation mechanism suggests that effectiveness does not increase an NGO's likelihood of receiving a grant. Grant allocation appears to be neither fair nor effective, but rather to be awarded on the basis of habit rather than merit: once a grant has been allocated there is a strong tendency for it to persist. The odds are stacked against small NGOs that have not previously received grants. A picture emerges of two parallel NGO worlds: one where revenues are small, variable and hard to come by and survival is not very likely, and the other where revenues are high, more stable and more accessible and survival is more likely. The study suggests it may be difficult for an NGO to move from the former to the latter.

Amid widespread calls for NGOs to become more accountable and transparent, this work examines the prevalence of discrepancies between what NGOs say and what they do. It does so using a unique dataset of 300 NGOs in Uganda with corresponding beneficiary assessments. Investigating NGO dishonesty with regards to financial transparency and community participation, the study finds a high incidence of misrepresentation among NGOs. Results from a Heckman probit model suggest that the determinants of misrepresentation differ according to the subject matter: the threat of being caught reduces the likelihood of dishonesty about financial transparency, while a desire to 'save face' to maintain a good reputation appears to be the main motivator of a misrepresentation of community. consultation. The analysis provides tentative indications that NGOs with antagonistic relations with the government may be more likely to hide information and be dishonest. It also lends some support to the view that excessive and unrealistic donor demands may be an obstacle to openness and transparency. The findings of this work caution against an overly naïve and simplistic view of NGOs, and specifically, an overreliance on reported information when regulating, monitoring or surveying NGOs.

Benford's Law asserts that the leading digit 1 appears more frequently than 9 in natural data. It has been widely used in forensic accounting and auditing to detect potential fraud, but its application to nonprofit data is limited. As the first academic study that applies Benford's Law to U.S. nonprofit data (Form 990), we assess its usefulness in prioritizing suspicious filings for further investigation. We find close conformity with Benford's Law for the whole sample, but at the individual organizational level, 34% of the organizations do not conform. Deviations from Benford's law are smaller for organizations that are more professional, that report positive fundraising and administration expenses, and that face stronger funder oversight. We suggest improved statistical methods and experiment with a new measure of the extent of deviation from Benford's Law that has promise as a more discriminating screening metric.

ABSTRACTWe examine the case for donors providing financial incentives to, i.e. subsidizing, NGOs to increase community participation. We show that the introduction of such a 'participation subsidy' may reduce beneficiary welfare. Thus, eliminating community participation from the set of conditions for funding an NGO may in fact benefit target communities. We show how our theoretical analysis may be operationalized by applying it to data from the NGO sector in Uganda. Our empirical findings appear to reject the case for providing a participation subsidy in that context.