Suchergebnisse

There is little debate, particularly clear, 'no bullshit' debate within the risk and regulation community, much as there is a lack elsewhere within academia. Without it, much goes unclarifed and arguments aren't tested and pushed to their limits, which is generally where they need to go. On these grounds alone I would welcome the different approaches to European/American precaution set out by Vogel and Wiener. But there are more positive things to say about these competing representations, irrespective of which one prefers. This is a discussion rich in empirical detail but that goes beyond individual issues towards systemic patterns, relating the data to wider themes and an overall framework. What's more, it concerns a matter of real contemporary significance and interest that citizens generally – at least those of America and Europe – should know about, and even have a view upon. And it's genuinely interesting – irrespective of any engagement with the academic study of risk and regulation.

This article analyzes the character, extent, and patterns of media coverage of the 2010 volcanic ash cloud, comparing it with coverage of other major natural hazards, such as Deepwater Horizon. It does so drawing upon sociological themes and concludes that the ash cloud was reported largely in its own terms rather than being amplified as a wider, uncertain threat. As well as the absence of major incident and casualties two interrelated factors are highlighted to explain this result. Emphasizing the importance of hazard duration, the unexpected arrival and short‐lived character of the ash cloud was one important factor that limited the potential for sustained media amplification. More broadly, this was an "act of God" with no clear responsible agents. This preliminary study suggests that contemporary media risk narrative requires a focus for institutional blame attribution, and without a plausible candidate amplification may not acquire momentum.

This article critically reflects upon the introduction of behavioural, 'nudging' approaches into UK policy making, the latest in a series of regulatory innovations. Initiatives have focused particularly upon correcting lifestyle risk behaviours, marking a significant continuity with previous 'nannying' policy. On the other hand, nudging represents a departure, even inversion of previous approaches that involved the overstating of risk, being based partly upon establishing a norm that bad behaviours are less, rather than more common than supposed. Despite substantive similarities, its attraction lies in the reaction against the former approach but must also be understood in the context of the economic crisis and a diminished sense of liberty and autonomy that makes intimate managerial intervention seem unproblematic. Problems are, in fact, substantial, as nudging is caught between the utility of unconscious disguised direction and the need to allow some transparency, thereby choice. Further, it assumes clear, fixed 'better outcomes' but encourages no development of capacity to manage problems, contradicting a wider policy intent to build a more responsible and active citizenry. More practically, nudging faces considerable barriers to becoming a successfully implemented programme, in the context of severe, Conservativeled austerity with which it is now associated.

Twenty five years on from Chernobyl, the tragic events in Japan of March 2011 seem to reaffirm the 'risk society' perspective which the 1986 nuclear accident in the former Soviet Union did so much to popularise. It was amidst widespread predictions of mass harm – projected both across Europe and into the future – that German sociologist Ulrich Beck's book of the same name found such a receptive audience. Beck wrote of a new era defined by the greater risk posed by 'manufactured', technological risk than natural, 'external' ones. The way in which the possible, nuclear threat from the damaged Fukushima nuclear plant looms larger than the devastation and the thousands actually killed by the 'natural' earthquake and tsunami reminds us of Beck's distinction.