Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution
In: European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 636/2019
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In: European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 636/2019
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In: Review of Corporate Finance Studies, forthcoming
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In: Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 15-04
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In: Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 17-8
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15249
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In: EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 162, Heft 1, S. 32
ISSN: 1614-0559
In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity giving each member veto power. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogenous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on the entire organization. In the presence of externalities and an incomplete charter, the threat of forming an inner organization can undermine the veto power of the less efficient members and coerce them to exert more effort. We also identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is executed. Finally, we show that majority rules effectively prevent the emergence of inner organizations.
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In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 2, S. 133-137
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w17010
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