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Tina Burretts book is an excellent addition to the comparative literature on political leadership. It will be extremely valuable to scholars of UK and Japanese politics, helping us to understand the elasticity and unpredictability of the contemporary premiership in both countries. Burrett impressively demonstrates the often-surprising similarities across the two countries, explaining how the revolving door premiership, associated with Japan, has now spread to the UK. -- Mark Bennister, University of Lincoln, New Zealand. "This book deftly explores what it takes to be an effective leader in Japan and the UK. A must read for politicians as well as academics and students of politics." --Kono Taro, Minister for Digital Affairs This book analyses prime ministerial leadership in Britain and Japan since 1980. Exploring the interplay between personal skill, institutional resources and situational context in explaining the varying power and agency of different British and Japanese leaders, it asks whether the skills, strategies and circumstances needed for effective leadership are converging across liberal democracies. Comparing Britain and Japan reveals leadership trends that might otherwise go unobserved. The book addresses questions important to aspiring politicians as well as scholars, including: What accounts for the short tenure of most Japanese prime ministers? Does comparison with Japan explain the rapid turnover in British prime ministers since 2016? How is the influence of party factions on prime ministerial power evolving in Japan? Are British political parties more factional than commonly acknowledged? And how do changes in media technology affect leadership opportunities and constraints? The book draws on the authors experience as a political researcher in both the British and Japanese parliaments and on interviews with over 40 politicians and political journalists working in both countries. Tina Burrett is Associate Professor of Political Science at Sophia University, Japan. She is the co-editor of The Routledge Handbook of Trauma in East Asia (2023), and Press Freedom in Contemporary Asia (2019) and author of Television and Presidential Power in Putins Russia (2011). She has worked in the British, Canadian and Japanese parliaments

This article analyses the changing themes of Vladimir Putin's populist messaging during his almost 20 years at the apex of Russian politics. To reveal shifts in Putin's populist rhetoric, the article examines Russian media framing of his four presidential-election campaigns and of Russia's relations with China and the United States (U.S.). Public opinion data is used to assess the impact of Putin's populist propaganda. The article begins by assessing to what degree Putin can be considered a populist politician, concluding that while his rhetoric is populist his rule is largely not. The article further finds that Putin has maintained his populist appeal by turning his ire from domestic economic elites to international political enemies, specifically by positioning himself as the main challenger to U.S. hegemony in the global system. Putin's control of the Russian media, co-opting of opposition populist causes and geopolitical victories in Syria and Crimea have helped him maintain his populist connection with Russian voters. But, the article concludes, growing access to anti-Kremlin online media, the pain of economic sanctions, botched social welfare reforms, and the presence of effective opposition movements are causing Putin's populism to lose its lustre.

This article analyses the changing themes of Vladimir Putin's populist messaging during his almost 20 years at the apex of Russian politics. To reveal shifts in Putin's populist rhetoric, the article examines Russian media framing of his four presidential-election campaigns and of Russia's relations with China and the United States (U.S.). Public opinion data is used to assess the impact of Putin's populist propaganda. The article begins by assessing to what degree Putin can be considered a populist politician, concluding that while his rhetoric is populist his rule is largely not. The article further finds that Putin has maintained his populist appeal by turning his ire from domestic economic elites to international political enemies, specifically by positioning himself as the main challenger to U.S. hegemony in the global system. Putin's control of the Russian media, co-opting of opposition populist causes and geopolitical victories in Syria and Crimea have helped him maintain his populist connection with Russian voters. But, the article concludes, growing access to anti-Kremlin online media, the pain of economic sanctions, botched social welfare reforms, and the presence of effective opposition movements are causing Putin's populism to lose its lustre.

Did Russia seek to influence voting in the Democratic Party's primaries, and if so, to what end? Would the Kremlin rather have seen Bernie Sanders take on President Donald Trump in November than presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden? To answer these questions, this article analyzes reporting by four Russianstate-directed media outlets between October 2019 and March 2020. It finds evidence of a coordinated disinformation campaign against Joe Biden and of narratives designed to undermine voters' confidence in the legitimacy of the primary process. The article concludes that Russia's aversion to Biden stems from his strong commitment to NATO, support for Ukrainian sovereignty and tough line on Russian election meddling. It further concludes that spreading distrust in U.S. democracy was the main aim of Russian interference over and above a preference for a particular candidate. Whether or not Russian media messaging effects U.S. voters, the fact of Russia's meddling itself is a source of disruption and doubt.

This article investigates the media context of Myanmar's recent political reforms and transition of power. Drawing on interviews with 57 Yangon-based media professionals, the article analyzes the media's role as both an agent and subject of political change as Myanmar prepared for parliamentary elections in November 2015. It asks to what extent changes in the Myanmar media system adhere to existing theories of the media's role in the democratization process. Specifically, the article analyzes the features and functions of Myanmar's media during the country's liberalization from 2010 to 2015. The article concludes by assessing what Myanmar's experience adds to our theoretical understanding of the media's transformation during liberalization.

This article investigates the media context of Myanmar's recent political reforms and transition of power. Drawing on interviews with 57 Yangon-based media professionals, the article analyzes the media's role as both an agent and subject of political change as Myanmar prepared for parliamentary elections in November 2015. It asks to what extent changes in the Myanmar media system adhere to existing theories of the media's role in the democratization process. Specifically, the article analyzes the features and functions of Myanmar's media during the country's liberalization from 2010 to 2015. The article concludes by assessing what Myanmar's experience adds to our theoretical understanding of the media's transformation during liberalization.

The tenure of Japanese prime ministers is famously short. Between 2006 and 2012 Japan changed prime minister once a year. What factors can explain Japan's revolving-door premiership? To explore this puzzle, this article applies the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) developed by Bennister, 't Hart and Worthy (2015) to case studies of the nine Japanese prime ministers holding office between 2000 and 2015. Leadership capital is the aggregate of leaders' political resources: skills, relations and reputation. The LCI thus allows analysis of the interplay between individual capacities and contextual conditions in determining leaders' ability to gain, maintain and deploy power. The LCI is applied to answer two questions. Firstly, what accounts for the short tenure of many Japanese premiers? In which of the LCI's three leadership dimensions do Japanese leaders lack capital? Secondly, what forms of capital allow some prime ministers to retain office for longer than average (>2 years)? In particular, the article analyses the leadership of Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) Japan's longest serving prime minister since the 1970s, and incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has held office for three years since December 2012. As well as utilising the LCI to comparatively analyse the tenure of Japan's prime ministers, this article tests the applicability of the Index beyond Western parliamentary democracies.

The tenure of Japanese prime ministers is famously short. Between 2006 and 2012 Japan changed prime minister once a year. What factors can explain Japan's revolving-door premiership? To explore this puzzle, this article applies the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) developed by Bennister, 't Hart and Worthy (2015) to case studies of the nine Japanese prime ministers holding office between 2000 and 2015. Leadership capital is the aggregate of leaders' political resources: skills, relations and reputation. The LCI thus allows analysis of the interplay between individual capacities and contextual conditions in determining leaders' ability to gain, maintain and deploy power. The LCI is applied to answer two questions. Firstly, what accounts for the short tenure of many Japanese premiers? In which of the LCI's three leadership dimensions do Japanese leaders lack capital? Secondly, what forms of capital allow some prime ministers to retain office for longer than average (>2 years)? In particular, the article analyses the leadership of Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) Japan's longest serving prime minister since the 1970s, and incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has held office for three years since December 2012. As well as utilising the LCI to comparatively analyse the tenure of Japan's prime ministers, this article tests the applicability of the Index beyond Western parliamentary democracies.