The WTO, economic interdependence, and conflict
In: Critical perspectives on the global trading system and the WTO 15
In: An Elgar reference collection
24 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Critical perspectives on the global trading system and the WTO 15
In: An Elgar reference collection
In: International organization, Band 61, Heft 4
ISSN: 1531-5088
In: International organization, Band 61, Heft 4, S. 735-761
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 44, Heft 4, S. 425-446
ISSN: 1552-8766
Studies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stress the role of formal panels in adjudicating trade conflicts. Yet most cases are settled beforehand in informal consultations. This article tests two sets of hypotheses about the decision to escalate GATT cases, one concerning the significance of the right to a panel, the other concerning the effects of political regime type. Results show that the right to a panel did not inspire more early settlement, more escalation, or more resolution through concessions at the panel stage; however, highly democratic dyads are more likely to achieve concession, but only at the consultation stage. This suggests that a strategy of tying hands, rather than adherence to legal (and other) norms of conflict resolution, is likely to shed light on the way democracies use formal third-party adjudication at GATT.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 44, Heft 4, S. 425-446
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 723-749
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 446-477
ISSN: 1086-3338
Disputes filed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are attracting a growing number of third parties. Most observers argue that their participation influences the institution's rulings. The authors argue that third parties undermine pretrial negotiations; their influence on rulings is conditioned by this selection effect. They test their hypotheses, along with the conventional wisdom, using a data set of WTO disputes initiated through 2002. Consistent with the authors' argument, they find that third-party participationlowersthe prospects for early settlement. Controlling for this selection effect, the evidence also suggests that third-party support increases the chances of a legal victory at the WTO.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 446-477
ISSN: 0043-8871
World Affairs Online
In: British journal of political science, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 713-730
ISSN: 1469-2112
Does the geographic concentration of industry 'matter' outside the United States? Observers have long speculated that while geographically concentrated industries may be influential in American politics, this is probably not the case in countries where the electorate votes more as a national constituency. Others disagree, urging that clustered industries have an advantage regardless of how the political map is drawn. We sharpen the terms of debate and weigh in with empirical evidence from a cross-sectional analysis of intended voter turnout in eight member-states of the European Union and a multi-year study of voter turnout in the Netherlands. These tests uniformly show that, across different types of electoral systems, including those in which voters vote as a national constituency, thereby removing any effects of electoral geography per se, workers in traded industries that are physically concentrated are, in fact, substantially more likely to vote than employees in traded but geographically dispersed sectors.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 703-719
ISSN: 0092-5853
Examines whether geographic concentration makes individuals in industries exposed to international commerce more likely to mobilize politically; analysis of manufacturers, 1988 and 1990.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 1028-1050
ISSN: 0092-5853
Explores relationship between industry location and incidence of import protection; uses economic model. Argues that geographically concentrated but politically dispersed industries are more likely to get relief, although some very large industries benefit from being politically concentrated.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 464-476
ISSN: 1468-2478
Abstract
The rulings of internationals courts are often reduced to "who won?," but much more is at stake. Like other institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) offers rulings that balance legal discipline against political constraints. We argue that one way in which the WTO handles politically sensitive issues is by increasing the amount of affect in their rulings. In doing so, judges provide national governments with discursive resources to persuade their domestic audiences of the legitimacy of compliance. To test our expectations, we conduct a text analysis of all rulings rendered by the institution since 1995. Specifically, we find that more politically charged decisions, such as the ones concerning nonfiscal rather than fiscal aspects of national treatment claims, are explained in qualitatively different terms. We also find that, as an issue gets ruled on repeatedly, the amount of affect deployed progressively decreases. In sum, the WTO chooses its words strategically to persuade litigants, and their domestic audiences, of the legitimacy of compliance in politically fraught disputes.
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 2, S. 257-279
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractInternational institutions often moderate the legal decisions they render. World Trade Organization (WTO) panels do this by exercising judicial economy. This practice, which is evident in 41 percent of all rulings, involves the decision not to rule on some of the litigants' arguments. The constraint is that it can be appealed. We argue that panels exercise judicial economy when the wider membership is ambivalent about the future consequences of a broader ruling. This is proxied by the "mixed" (that is, nonpartisan) third-party submissions, which are informative because they are costly, jeopardizing a more decisive legal victory that would benefit these governments too. We empirically test this hypothesis, and find that mixed third-party submissions increase the odds of judicial economy by upwards of 68 percent. This suggests that panels invoke judicial economy to politically appease the wider WTO membership, and not just to gain the litigants' compliance in the case at hand.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 1-42
ISSN: 0043-8871
World Affairs Online