Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade
In: International organization, Band 61, Heft 4
ISSN: 1531-5088
30 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: International organization, Band 61, Heft 4
ISSN: 1531-5088
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 44, Heft 4, S. 425-446
ISSN: 1552-8766
Studies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stress the role of formal panels in adjudicating trade conflicts. Yet most cases are settled beforehand in informal consultations. This article tests two sets of hypotheses about the decision to escalate GATT cases, one concerning the significance of the right to a panel, the other concerning the effects of political regime type. Results show that the right to a panel did not inspire more early settlement, more escalation, or more resolution through concessions at the panel stage; however, highly democratic dyads are more likely to achieve concession, but only at the consultation stage. This suggests that a strategy of tying hands, rather than adherence to legal (and other) norms of conflict resolution, is likely to shed light on the way democracies use formal third-party adjudication at GATT.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 44, Heft 4, S. 425-446
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 723-749
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 446-477
ISSN: 1086-3338
Disputes filed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are attracting a growing number of third parties. Most observers argue that their participation influences the institution's rulings. The authors argue that third parties undermine pretrial negotiations; their influence on rulings is conditioned by this selection effect. They test their hypotheses, along with the conventional wisdom, using a data set of WTO disputes initiated through 2002. Consistent with the authors' argument, they find that third-party participationlowersthe prospects for early settlement. Controlling for this selection effect, the evidence also suggests that third-party support increases the chances of a legal victory at the WTO.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 446-477
ISSN: 0043-8871
World Affairs Online
In: British journal of political science, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 713-730
ISSN: 1469-2112
Does the geographic concentration of industry 'matter' outside the United States? Observers have long speculated that while geographically concentrated industries may be influential in American politics, this is probably not the case in countries where the electorate votes more as a national constituency. Others disagree, urging that clustered industries have an advantage regardless of how the political map is drawn. We sharpen the terms of debate and weigh in with empirical evidence from a cross-sectional analysis of intended voter turnout in eight member-states of the European Union and a multi-year study of voter turnout in the Netherlands. These tests uniformly show that, across different types of electoral systems, including those in which voters vote as a national constituency, thereby removing any effects of electoral geography per se, workers in traded industries that are physically concentrated are, in fact, substantially more likely to vote than employees in traded but geographically dispersed sectors.
In: British journal of political science, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 713-730
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: West European politics, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 187
ISSN: 0140-2382
In: American journal of political science, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 703
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 703-719
ISSN: 0092-5853
Examines whether geographic concentration makes individuals in industries exposed to international commerce more likely to mobilize politically; analysis of manufacturers, 1988 and 1990.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 703-719
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 1028
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 1028-1050
ISSN: 0092-5853
Explores relationship between industry location and incidence of import protection; uses economic model. Argues that geographically concentrated but politically dispersed industries are more likely to get relief, although some very large industries benefit from being politically concentrated.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 1028-1050
ISSN: 0092-5853