Suchergebnisse

Beleggingsondernemingen en gereglementeerde markten worden sinds 1 november 2007op indringende wijze gereguleerd door de Europese Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), de MiFID-uitvoeringsrichtlijn en de MiFID-uitvoeringsverordening (MiFID-regime). Per 3 januari 2017 - een kleine tien jaar later - wordt het MiFID-regime vervangen door MiFID II, bestaande uit onder meer een richtlijn (MiFID II), de Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) en een indrukwekkende hoeveelheid uitvoeringsmaatregelen. MiFID mag dan de reputatie hebben streng te zijn, MiFID II/MiFIR trekt de teugels nog verder aan. De aanleiding hiervoor laat zich raden: de financiële crisis heeft lacunes blootgelegd in de beleggersbescherming en tekortkomingen in de werking en transparantie van financiële markten. Het MiFID II/MiFIR regime zal een belangrijke impact hebben op de financiële sector. Dit preadvies 2015 uitgebracht voor de Vereniging voor Financieel Recht beoogt de belangrijkste wijzigingen en vernieuwingen die MiFID II meebrengt, te bespreken

Abstract: This article focuses on the question of whether allowing the extent of the protection afforded to an investor under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) I and II to be largely dependent on the distinction between dealing on own account on the one hand and trading on behalf of the client (and other forms of investment service) on the other, is justified. The author submits that this question must be answered in the negative. Under a future MiFID III, an investment firm which acts solely as contractual counterparty should be required to observe the same duty of care as applies in the case of the investment service of execution of orders on behalf of the client. Résumé: Cet article traite de la question de savoir s'il est justifié de permettre que l'étendue de la protection accordée à un investisseur aux termes de MiFID I et II (NdT: Directives concernant les marchés d'instruments financiers) dépende largement de la distinction entre la négociation pour compte propre d'une part et d'autre part la négociation au nom du client (et d'autres formes de services d'investissement). L'auteur indique qu'il faut répondre à cette question par la négative. Aux termes d'un futur MiFID III, il faudrait exiger d'une société d'investissement qui agit uniquement comme contrepartie contractuelle qu'elle respecte le même devoir de prudence que celui qui s'applique dans le cas de services d'exécution d'ordres au nom du client.

AbstractThis article examines to what extent the civil courts are bound by MiFID I/MiFID II under EU law. The following questions are considered in this context: (1) May civil courts be less strict than MiFID I/MiFID II? (2) May civil courts be stricter than MiFID I/MiFID II? (3) May contracting parties be less strict than MiFID I/MiFID II? (4) May contracting parties be stricter than MiFID I/MiFID II? (5) What effect does MiFID I/MiFID II have on the requirement of proximity or relativity in the Member States where this is a requirement for liability in tort? (6) What effect does MiFID I/MiFID II have on the proof of causal link? (7) What is the influence of MiFID I/MiFID II on a contractual limitation or exclusion of liability? (8) Should civil courts apply MiFID I/MiFID II of their own motion?

The unpublished second report of the Lando Commission on The Principles of European Contract Law ('the Principles' or 'PECL') contains an important recent attempt to harmonise the laws of agency of European jurisdictions. Chapter 3 of the Principles deals with 'Authority of Agents'. Following the civil law model, Article 3:102 PECL distinguishes between direct and indirect representation.
Direct representation exists where an agent acts 'in the name of' a principal (Art. 3:102(1) PECL). If the agent acts within the scope of his authority (real or apparent), his acts bind the principal and third party directly; the agent drops out. Indirect representation covers two types of case in which a principal enlists the assistance of an intermediary to act for him in transactions with third parties (Art. 3:102(2) PECL). The first can be termed 'undisclosed agency'. In these cases, the principal confers authority on the intermediary to create privity between him (the principal) and third parties. As it happens, however, the third party neither knows nor has reason to know that the intermediary acts as an agent. The second category of indirect representation can for convenience be termed 'commission agency'. In this case, by contrast, the principal does not confer authority on the intermediary to create privity of contract between him (the principal) and third parties. The intermediary is to act 'in his own name': he is to contract with third parties in a personal capacity. In both cases of indirect representation, intermediary and third party are bound to each other; principal and third party are not (Art. 3:301 PECL). Even so, in two situations the principal is entitled to exercise against the third party the rights that are acquired on his behalf by the intermediary: if the intermediary goes bankrupt or is guilty of a fundamental non-performance of his duties to the principal (Art. 3:302 PECL). The third party is entitled, in similar circumstances, to exercise against the principal the rights that the third party has against the intermediary (Art. 3:303 PECL).