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Baltijos valstybiu̜ vienybės idėja ir praktika 1918 - 1940 metais: dokumentu̜ rinkinys
In: Lietuvos užsienio politikos dokumentai
In: 1918 - 1940 metai
Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The idea and practice of the unity of the Baltic States: 1918 - 1940
Soviet instigation of revolution in Germany in 1923 and the block of peace of the Baltic countries and Poland
Following the 1919 invasion of the Baltic countries and the 1920 war against Poland, the Bolsheviks' most flagrant attempt at the export of revolution was their venture to inspire a communist coup in Germany, with the redeployment of the 100,000-strong Red Army that had been concentrated at the western borders of the USSR with the hope that the Baltic countries and Poland would permit its transit to Germany without objection. The inspiration was of a grandiose scale. The Bolsheviks' assistance was not limited to just financial support to German communists and revolutionary literature sent to them: military revolutionary units, "the hundreds", were organised, military and party specialists were dispatched to Germany, and even a terrorist group for killing "inconvenient" individuals was formed on the example of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission. Had the coup in Germany succeeded, the country would have been connected with the USSR and after that the revolution would have spread globally. However, the Bolshevik leaders were facing a question of immense importance: how to redeploy their army to Germany and how to overcome the "barrier" of the new countries that had emerged after the war. The initial plan was to push through Romania and Czechoslovakia, but when Joseph Stalin rejected it, the decision was made to direct the main offensive through the so-called Vilnius corridor and to reach East Prussia along the Lithuanian-Polish border. To ensure that the Red Army reached Germany in time not battered, without losses, full of energy, and without causing an international conflict it was resolved to negotiate the transit of the Red Army with Poland and the Baltic countries. For this purpose, a diplomatic mission of the influential Bolshevik Viktor Kopp was dispatched to Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which masked the request for transit under a defence tale: purportedly, the Triple Entente might attempt suppression of the possible revolution in Germany, in which case the Soviets would have to render "moral and material assistance" to the German proletariat. Viktor Kopp proposed that all three countries he was visiting should sign pacts of guarantees that foresaw unhindered transit of the Soviets to Germany in case of "possible events" in that country. Although the governments of Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics and Ernestas Galvanauskas and the Polish authorities occupied different positions towards Moscow, they unambiguously rejected Kopp's proposals and did not yield either to 126 Zenonas Butkus his threats or tempting concessions. Estonia assumed an identical position and communicated its negative response through traditional diplomatic channels. The Baltic countries and Poland arrived at this decision independently, without England or other Western countries promising them direct assistance or even refusing demarches to protest Moscow's actions. In this way they made a weighty contribution to averting Soviet military intervention, to the disruption of the schemes of global revolution that were threatening Germany and the whole of Europe. The larger part of the German public did not succumb to the inspirations of the coup and thus the Soviet grand inspiration of a revolution did not materialise. The danger of the export of revolution, the threat of the intervention of the Red Army in the Baltic countries and Poland did not bring much unity to these countries. Only Estonia and Latvia responded to the threat in a more adequate manner when, having overcome territorial and other disputes, they concluded a defence union on 1 November 1923 and undertook the commitment to lend political, diplomatic, and military assistance to each other. However, none of their northern or eastern neighbours joined this union before the Soviet occupation of these countries in 1940.
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Soviet instigation of revolution in Germany in 1923 and the block of peace of the Baltic countries and Poland
Following the 1919 invasion of the Baltic countries and the 1920 war against Poland, the Bolsheviks' most flagrant attempt at the export of revolution was their venture to inspire a communist coup in Germany, with the redeployment of the 100,000-strong Red Army that had been concentrated at the western borders of the USSR with the hope that the Baltic countries and Poland would permit its transit to Germany without objection. The inspiration was of a grandiose scale. The Bolsheviks' assistance was not limited to just financial support to German communists and revolutionary literature sent to them: military revolutionary units, "the hundreds", were organised, military and party specialists were dispatched to Germany, and even a terrorist group for killing "inconvenient" individuals was formed on the example of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission. Had the coup in Germany succeeded, the country would have been connected with the USSR and after that the revolution would have spread globally. However, the Bolshevik leaders were facing a question of immense importance: how to redeploy their army to Germany and how to overcome the "barrier" of the new countries that had emerged after the war. The initial plan was to push through Romania and Czechoslovakia, but when Joseph Stalin rejected it, the decision was made to direct the main offensive through the so-called Vilnius corridor and to reach East Prussia along the Lithuanian-Polish border. To ensure that the Red Army reached Germany in time not battered, without losses, full of energy, and without causing an international conflict it was resolved to negotiate the transit of the Red Army with Poland and the Baltic countries. For this purpose, a diplomatic mission of the influential Bolshevik Viktor Kopp was dispatched to Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which masked the request for transit under a defence tale: purportedly, the Triple Entente might attempt suppression of the possible revolution in Germany, in which case the Soviets would have to render "moral and material assistance" to the German proletariat. Viktor Kopp proposed that all three countries he was visiting should sign pacts of guarantees that foresaw unhindered transit of the Soviets to Germany in case of "possible events" in that country. Although the governments of Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics and Ernestas Galvanauskas and the Polish authorities occupied different positions towards Moscow, they unambiguously rejected Kopp's proposals and did not yield either to 126 Zenonas Butkus his threats or tempting concessions. Estonia assumed an identical position and communicated its negative response through traditional diplomatic channels. The Baltic countries and Poland arrived at this decision independently, without England or other Western countries promising them direct assistance or even refusing demarches to protest Moscow's actions. In this way they made a weighty contribution to averting Soviet military intervention, to the disruption of the schemes of global revolution that were threatening Germany and the whole of Europe. The larger part of the German public did not succumb to the inspirations of the coup and thus the Soviet grand inspiration of a revolution did not materialise. The danger of the export of revolution, the threat of the intervention of the Red Army in the Baltic countries and Poland did not bring much unity to these countries. Only Estonia and Latvia responded to the threat in a more adequate manner when, having overcome territorial and other disputes, they concluded a defence union on 1 November 1923 and undertook the commitment to lend political, diplomatic, and military assistance to each other. However, none of their northern or eastern neighbours joined this union before the Soviet occupation of these countries in 1940.
BASE
Soviet instigation of revolution in Germany in 1923 and the block of peace of the Baltic countries and Poland
Following the 1919 invasion of the Baltic countries and the 1920 war against Poland, the Bolsheviks' most flagrant attempt at the export of revolution was their venture to inspire a communist coup in Germany, with the redeployment of the 100,000-strong Red Army that had been concentrated at the western borders of the USSR with the hope that the Baltic countries and Poland would permit its transit to Germany without objection. The inspiration was of a grandiose scale. The Bolsheviks' assistance was not limited to just financial support to German communists and revolutionary literature sent to them: military revolutionary units, "the hundreds", were organised, military and party specialists were dispatched to Germany, and even a terrorist group for killing "inconvenient" individuals was formed on the example of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission. Had the coup in Germany succeeded, the country would have been connected with the USSR and after that the revolution would have spread globally. However, the Bolshevik leaders were facing a question of immense importance: how to redeploy their army to Germany and how to overcome the "barrier" of the new countries that had emerged after the war. The initial plan was to push through Romania and Czechoslovakia, but when Joseph Stalin rejected it, the decision was made to direct the main offensive through the so-called Vilnius corridor and to reach East Prussia along the Lithuanian-Polish border. To ensure that the Red Army reached Germany in time not battered, without losses, full of energy, and without causing an international conflict it was resolved to negotiate the transit of the Red Army with Poland and the Baltic countries. For this purpose, a diplomatic mission of the influential Bolshevik Viktor Kopp was dispatched to Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which masked the request for transit under a defence tale: purportedly, the Triple Entente might attempt suppression of the possible revolution in Germany, in which case the Soviets would have to render "moral and material assistance" to the German proletariat. Viktor Kopp proposed that all three countries he was visiting should sign pacts of guarantees that foresaw unhindered transit of the Soviets to Germany in case of "possible events" in that country. Although the governments of Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics and Ernestas Galvanauskas and the Polish authorities occupied different positions towards Moscow, they unambiguously rejected Kopp's proposals and did not yield either to 126 Zenonas Butkus his threats or tempting concessions. Estonia assumed an identical position and communicated its negative response through traditional diplomatic channels. The Baltic countries and Poland arrived at this decision independently, without England or other Western countries promising them direct assistance or even refusing demarches to protest Moscow's actions. In this way they made a weighty contribution to averting Soviet military intervention, to the disruption of the schemes of global revolution that were threatening Germany and the whole of Europe. The larger part of the German public did not succumb to the inspirations of the coup and thus the Soviet grand inspiration of a revolution did not materialise. The danger of the export of revolution, the threat of the intervention of the Red Army in the Baltic countries and Poland did not bring much unity to these countries. Only Estonia and Latvia responded to the threat in a more adequate manner when, having overcome territorial and other disputes, they concluded a defence union on 1 November 1923 and undertook the commitment to lend political, diplomatic, and military assistance to each other. However, none of their northern or eastern neighbours joined this union before the Soviet occupation of these countries in 1940.
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1924 m. gruodžio 1 d. komunistinis pučas Taline ir diplomatinė jo maskuotė ; The communist revolt in Tallinn on the 1st of December 1924 and its diplomatic cover-up
This article, based on the archives stored in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia and some recently published documents, investigates the coup attempted by the Soviets on December 1, 1924 in Tallinn and evaluates its consequences within the broad context of international relations. During the research, it was established that an attempt to stage a coup in Estonia had been undertaken both by the Estonian communists and the USSR leadership, which had the highest political body – the Politburo – and the Comintern, a self-crafted tool set up for spreading the communist movement around the world, at its disposal. Thus, the revolution was masterminded by the Soviet authorities, whereas the Estonian communists were mainly responsible for its implementation. The task of the coup leadership was to seize power and hold on to it for some time, long enough to request that the USSR "renders support." Preparations were underway for such support. This is evidenced by military preparations in the northern regions of the USSR and the territory near the Estonian border as well as by the deployment of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Tallinn and the activities of the Soviet embassy located in the capital. The attempted coup turned into a putsch due to the maximum conspiracy of their organizers. The conspiracy was brought about by the then-public awareness that the revolutionary events in Germany in 1923 had been instigated by the Soviets. The attempted coup in Estonia failed due to the extraordinary defensive operations put up by the Estonian authorities and power structures as well as due to the failure to involve the workers and the other strata of society in the coup. Latvia, Estonia's only ally, was the first country to stand by Estonia's side after the country withstood the attempted coup. The lessons were learnt not only by these two countries but by Lithuania as well. They began taking adequate measures to stifle communist activities. Neither France nor England or any other Western state made plans to deploy their fleets to the Baltic Sea to support the Estonians or at least show, in a demonstrative way, their support in such a trying time. They also failed to hold any diplomatic démarches against the Soviets opposing the export of revolution practiced by the Soviets. Due to diplomatic pressure imposed by the USSR, Estonia could not publicly and officially name the actual organizers of the putsch. As a result, only the local communists were indiscriminately accused. Such forced tactics, if only indirectly, had at least partially been influencing the area of historical research as well. However, the sudden and unequivocal liquidation of the putsch in Tallinn could have prompted the USSR to no longer expand its revolutionary export to the West, and the "abstinence" of such kind had lasted until the Second World War. The war itself and the previous collusion with Adolf Hitler made it possible for Stalin to cherish even greater ambitions to renew the spread of communism in other countries.
BASE
Kasmetinės atostogos ; Annual leave
Master thesis analyzes both international and national regulations of annual leave and the peculiarities of its implementation in the Republic of Lithuania labour law. This research reveals the definition of annual leave and the principal attributes, which separate this right from other periods of rest. Is if found, that The right to annual leave is subject to standarts, established both in national and international laws, which must upheld when regulating conditions for the exercise and implementation of aforementioned right. The author draws notice to the problematic aspects of grant, transfer or extenson and remuneration of annual leave and makes proposals for the improvement of such regulations. Systematic analysis provides that minimal annual rest periods must be granted to all employees without consideration of their subjective characteristics. National legislator establishes progressive regulations regarding the estimation of periods for which the worker accumulates his right to annual leave, because even foreseeable circumstances, which reflect the workers will are accaunted. It is determined, that restrictions regarding the implementation of annual leave can be made only if the worker was granted an opportunity to exersize his right. Workers right to annual leave is ensured by allocating sanctions to employers for improper fulfilment of their duties regarding renumeration in advance. Evaluation of European Court of Justice jurisprudence reveals that provisions laid down by national Government relating to calculation of remuneration for annual leave are not suitable because they might discourage employees to take their annual leave and might encourage employers to abuse their rights.
BASE
1924 m. gruodžio 1 d. komunistinis pučas Taline ir diplomatinė jo maskuotė ; The communist revolt in Tallinn on the 1st of December 1924 and its diplomatic cover-up
This article, based on the archives stored in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia and some recently published documents, investigates the coup attempted by the Soviets on December 1, 1924 in Tallinn and evaluates its consequences within the broad context of international relations. During the research, it was established that an attempt to stage a coup in Estonia had been undertaken both by the Estonian communists and the USSR leadership, which had the highest political body – the Politburo – and the Comintern, a self-crafted tool set up for spreading the communist movement around the world, at its disposal. Thus, the revolution was masterminded by the Soviet authorities, whereas the Estonian communists were mainly responsible for its implementation. The task of the coup leadership was to seize power and hold on to it for some time, long enough to request that the USSR "renders support." Preparations were underway for such support. This is evidenced by military preparations in the northern regions of the USSR and the territory near the Estonian border as well as by the deployment of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Tallinn and the activities of the Soviet embassy located in the capital. The attempted coup turned into a putsch due to the maximum conspiracy of their organizers. The conspiracy was brought about by the then-public awareness that the revolutionary events in Germany in 1923 had been instigated by the Soviets. The attempted coup in Estonia failed due to the extraordinary defensive operations put up by the Estonian authorities and power structures as well as due to the failure to involve the workers and the other strata of society in the coup. Latvia, Estonia's only ally, was the first country to stand by Estonia's side after the country withstood the attempted coup. The lessons were learnt not only by these two countries but by Lithuania as well. They began taking adequate measures to stifle communist activities. Neither France nor England or any other Western state made plans to deploy their fleets to the Baltic Sea to support the Estonians or at least show, in a demonstrative way, their support in such a trying time. They also failed to hold any diplomatic démarches against the Soviets opposing the export of revolution practiced by the Soviets. Due to diplomatic pressure imposed by the USSR, Estonia could not publicly and officially name the actual organizers of the putsch. As a result, only the local communists were indiscriminately accused. Such forced tactics, if only indirectly, had at least partially been influencing the area of historical research as well. However, the sudden and unequivocal liquidation of the putsch in Tallinn could have prompted the USSR to no longer expand its revolutionary export to the West, and the "abstinence" of such kind had lasted until the Second World War. The war itself and the previous collusion with Adolf Hitler made it possible for Stalin to cherish even greater ambitions to renew the spread of communism in other countries.
BASE
The Communist Revolt in Tallinn on the 1st of December 1924 and its Diplomatic Cover-Up ; 1924 m. gruodžio 1 d. komunistinis pučas Taline ir diplomatinė jo maskuotė
This article, based on the archives stored in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia and some recently published documents, investigates the coup attempted by the Soviets on December 1, 1924 in Tallinn and evaluates its consequences within the broad context of international relations. During the research, it was established that an attempt to stage a coup in Estonia had been undertaken both by the Estonian communists and the USSR leadership, which had the highest political body– the Politburo– and the Comintern, a self-crafted tool set up for spreading the communist movement around the world, at its disposal. Thus, the revolution was masterminded by the Soviet authorities, whereas the Estonian communists were mainly responsible for its implementation. The task of the coup leadership was to seize power and hold on to it for some time, long enough to request that the USSR "renders support." Preparations were underway for such support. This is evidenced by military preparations in the northern regions of the USSR and the territory near the Estonian border as well as by the deployment of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Tallinn and the activities of the Soviet embassy located in the capital. The attempted coup turned into a putsch due to the maximum conspiracy of their organizers. The conspiracy was brought about by the then-public awareness that the revolutionary events in Germany in 1923 had been instigated by the Soviets. The attempted coup in Estonia failed due to the extraordinary defensive operations put up by the Estonian authorities and power structures as well as due to the failure to involve the workers and the other strata of society in the coup. Latvia, Estonia's only ally, was the first country to stand by Estonia's side after the country withstood the attempted coup. The lessons were learnt not only by these two countries but by Lithuania as well. They began taking adequate measures to stifle communist activities. Neither France nor England or any other Western state made plans to deploy their fleets to the Baltic Sea to support the Estonians or at least show, in a demonstrative way, their support in such a trying time. They also failed to hold any diplomatic démarches against the Soviets opposing the export of revolution practiced by the Soviets. Due to diplomatic pressure imposed by the USSR, Estonia could not publicly and officially name the actual organizers of the putsch. As a result, only the local communists were indiscriminately accused. Such forced tactics, if only indirectly, had at least partially been influencing the area of historical research as well. However, the sudden and unequivocal liquidation of the putsch in Tallinn could have prompted the USSR to no longer expand its revolutionary export to the West, and the "abstinence" of such kind had lasted until the Second World War. The war itself and the previous collusion with Adolf Hitler made it possible for Stalin to cherish even greater ambitions to renew the spread of communism in other countries. ; Straipsnyje, tiriant komunistinį 1924m. gruodžio 1d. pučą, aiškinamasi, kokį vaidmenį jį organizuojant suvaidino Estijos komunistai ir kokį faktiškai aukščiausioji SSRS valdžia– politbiuras ir nuo jo priklausomas Kominternas, kaip į šį pučą reagavo gretimos Baltijos šalys, kaip jis paveikė šių šalių tarptautinę padėtį, jų santykius su Sovietais bei Vakarų valstybėmis. Estams pučą operatyviai likvidavus, pasaulinės revoliucijos eksportas Vakarų kryptimi iš esmės sustojo, sustojo ligi pat Antrojo pasaulinio karo pradžios. Siekiama nustatyti, kaipgi estams tada pavyko ir apginti savąjį valstybingumą, ir sustiprinti gretimų šalių saugumą, taip pat kaip pučas vertintas diplomatijoje bei viešajame diskurse.
BASE
Kasmetinės atostogos ; Annual leave
Master thesis analyzes both international and national regulations of annual leave and the peculiarities of its implementation in the Republic of Lithuania labour law. This research reveals the definition of annual leave and the principal attributes, which separate this right from other periods of rest. Is if found, that The right to annual leave is subject to standarts, established both in national and international laws, which must upheld when regulating conditions for the exercise and implementation of aforementioned right. The author draws notice to the problematic aspects of grant, transfer or extenson and remuneration of annual leave and makes proposals for the improvement of such regulations. Systematic analysis provides that minimal annual rest periods must be granted to all employees without consideration of their subjective characteristics. National legislator establishes progressive regulations regarding the estimation of periods for which the worker accumulates his right to annual leave, because even foreseeable circumstances, which reflect the workers will are accaunted. It is determined, that restrictions regarding the implementation of annual leave can be made only if the worker was granted an opportunity to exersize his right. Workers right to annual leave is ensured by allocating sanctions to employers for improper fulfilment of their duties regarding renumeration in advance. Evaluation of European Court of Justice jurisprudence reveals that provisions laid down by national Government relating to calculation of remuneration for annual leave are not suitable because they might discourage employees to take their annual leave and might encourage employers to abuse their rights.
BASE
Kasmetinės atostogos ; Annual leave
Master thesis analyzes both international and national regulations of annual leave and the peculiarities of its implementation in the Republic of Lithuania labour law. This research reveals the definition of annual leave and the principal attributes, which separate this right from other periods of rest. Is if found, that The right to annual leave is subject to standarts, established both in national and international laws, which must upheld when regulating conditions for the exercise and implementation of aforementioned right. The author draws notice to the problematic aspects of grant, transfer or extenson and remuneration of annual leave and makes proposals for the improvement of such regulations. Systematic analysis provides that minimal annual rest periods must be granted to all employees without consideration of their subjective characteristics. National legislator establishes progressive regulations regarding the estimation of periods for which the worker accumulates his right to annual leave, because even foreseeable circumstances, which reflect the workers will are accaunted. It is determined, that restrictions regarding the implementation of annual leave can be made only if the worker was granted an opportunity to exersize his right. Workers right to annual leave is ensured by allocating sanctions to employers for improper fulfilment of their duties regarding renumeration in advance. Evaluation of European Court of Justice jurisprudence reveals that provisions laid down by national Government relating to calculation of remuneration for annual leave are not suitable because they might discourage employees to take their annual leave and might encourage employers to abuse their rights.
BASE
Kasmetinės atostogos ; Annual leave
Master thesis analyzes both international and national regulations of annual leave and the peculiarities of its implementation in the Republic of Lithuania labour law. This research reveals the definition of annual leave and the principal attributes, which separate this right from other periods of rest. Is if found, that The right to annual leave is subject to standarts, established both in national and international laws, which must upheld when regulating conditions for the exercise and implementation of aforementioned right. The author draws notice to the problematic aspects of grant, transfer or extenson and remuneration of annual leave and makes proposals for the improvement of such regulations. Systematic analysis provides that minimal annual rest periods must be granted to all employees without consideration of their subjective characteristics. National legislator establishes progressive regulations regarding the estimation of periods for which the worker accumulates his right to annual leave, because even foreseeable circumstances, which reflect the workers will are accaunted. It is determined, that restrictions regarding the implementation of annual leave can be made only if the worker was granted an opportunity to exersize his right. Workers right to annual leave is ensured by allocating sanctions to employers for improper fulfilment of their duties regarding renumeration in advance. Evaluation of European Court of Justice jurisprudence reveals that provisions laid down by national Government relating to calculation of remuneration for annual leave are not suitable because they might discourage employees to take their annual leave and might encourage employers to abuse their rights.
BASE