Suchergebnisse

A method is presented for empirically modeling simultaneous decisions using the estimation technique of bivariate probit. This technique is used to examine the directed dispute-initiation behavior of the superpowers during the Cold War. Power-transition concepts of satisfaction and rates of capability change can be used to explain directed dispute-initiation behavior. In particular, the international influence of the rival translates into a superpower's dissatisfaction, making dispute initiation by that superpower more likely, ceteris paribus. Additionally, a rapid strengthening of the challenger, ceteris paribus, increases the likelihood of dispute initiation in either direction. Changes in the hegemon's capabilities, though consistent with power-transition theory, have no effect on dispute-initiation behavior. These effects hold even while controlling for various domestic conditions in each country.

Despite many applications of prospect theory's concepts to explain political and strategic phenomena, formal analyses of strategic problems using prospect theory are rare. Using Fearon's model of bargaining, Tversky and Kahneman's value function, and an existing probability weighting function, I construct a model that demonstrates the differences between expected value and prospect theory when applied to strategic interaction. Critically important to this demonstration is an examination of different types of reference points that make sense for bargaining problems. Four types of reference points are discussed and analyzed: power-based, equity, variants of the status quo, and extreme ``I-want-it-all'' reference points. Each of these types of reference points produce different bargaining behavior at the individual level and in combination with the type of reference point of the other actor. Additionally, I demonstrate that bargaining failure is possible for this model under complete and perfect information using prospect-theoretic logic.

A number of people have modeled Putnam's (1988) analogy of the two-level game to better understand the interaction between domestic and international politics. Milner and Rosendorff's model (1997) has taken on particular significance in this area of research. By applying a Nash bargaining solution to a standard spatial model, they were able to make specific predictions of bargaining behavior with and without domestic constraints. In this paper, I argue that some compromise should be expected in the bargaining, compromise that the Nash bargaining solution does not allow when paired with a linear utility assumption. I present a number of theoretical alternatives for which some degree of compromise is predicted. General solutions are derived given the unidimensional spatial model for the Nash (1950), the Kalai—Smorodinsky (1975), and the Felsenthal—Diskin (1982) bargaining solutions with linear and with quadratic equations. Given the unidimensional spatial context, more compromise is proposed under a given bargaining solution when using quadratic utilities rather than linear utilities. The most compromise is proposed by the Felsenthal—Diskin bargaining solution, followed by the Kalai—Smorodinsky, and then the Nash bargaining solutions.

In many political processes, the order of actions often has as much impact on the final outcome as do the actions themselves. Problems of actor order are neither clearly visible nor well understood in international conflict, but they do exist and are important. A new model is presented, based on Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman's 'international interaction game', that allows the actors to choose strategically who will initiate demands and, subsequently, who will initiate conflict. Adopting the same preference restrictions as were employed for the international interaction game, the equilibrium conditions for status quo and for negotiation are found to be the same for the new game as for the old. The equilibrium conditions for war and for acquiescence by an actor (i.e. giving in to the other's demands) are found to be different between games; propositions for these equilibrium conditions are given. Concerning war, for all cases of war predicted by the original model, reversing the actor order produces a quizzical prediction in which the previous war initiator now acquiesces. For empirical cases of directed dyads, this produces two rather different predictions. Given a random pairing of states in an undirected dyad, the new model produces a single prediction of either war or acquiescence. In addition, some cases that were predicted to lead to an actor's acquiescence under the original model are now cases predicted to lead to war, given endogenous demand initiation.

This article examines the effect of climate change on a type of armed conflict that pits pastoralists (cattle herders) against each other (range wars). Such conflicts are typically fought over water rights and/or grazing rights to unfenced/unowned land. The state is rarely involved directly. The rangeland of East Africa is a region particularly vulnerable to drought and livestock diseases associated with climate change. To analyze the possible effects of climate change on pastoral conflict, we focus our analysis on changes in resource availability, contrasting cases of abundance and scarcity. The role of resources is further contextualized by competing notions of property rights, and the role of the state in defining property and associated rights. We employ a contest success function (CSF) game-theoretic model to analyze the logic of range wars. This CSF approach emphasizes the low-level, non-binary nature of raiding behavior between pastoralist groups over limited natural resources. A central contribution of this approach is that the logic of raiding behavior implies a positive relationship between resources and conflict. This positive relationship is supported by several studies of the rangeland of East Africa, but is generally dismissed by the literature on the 'resource curse'. This relationship is contingent on other factors examined in the model, producing the following results. First, the level of property rights protection provided by the state generally reduces conflict between pastoralist groups. Second, if property rights protection is provided in a biased manner, then conflict between pastoralist groups increases. Third, severe resource asymmetries between two pastoralist groups will induce the poorer group to become bandits (focusing their efforts on raiding and not producing), while the richer group raids in retaliation.

Are levels of sexual violence committed by government security forces in a country prior to conflict predictive of levels of sexual violence in that country during conflict? Most of the scholarship on sexual violence focuses on the phenomenon during armed conflict, and in general the assumption made by these scholars is that conflict exacerbates the sexual violence problem. Cross-sectional analysis appears to support this assertion; however, we argue that the comparison group used by cross-sectional analyses is inappropriate for answering the question of whether conflict impacts the amount of sexual violence in a country. Instead, we propose that the appropriate comparison is between peacetime levels of sexual violence and conflict levels of sexual violence for the same country. To test this relationship, we employ data on sexual violence committed by government security forces in a sample of 170 countries for the time period 1999–2011, using a measure similar to that from Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell. Then, we use a variety of descriptive and inferential statistical tests to examine the relationship between conflict from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and the level of sexual violence in a country. We find that for cases with variation in conflict across our time period, pre-conflict levels of sexual violence are predictive of conflict levels but, contrary to the common assumption, the prediction is no change in the level of sexual violence for most cases.

Much current research in political science focuses on the impact which political institutions have on policy outcomes. A substantial body of this 'neo-institutional' work, often organized around the question, 'Do institutions matter?', examines differences in the performance of presidential and parliamentary systems. The conventional wisdom in the literature has been that presidential and parliamentary systems tend to select different policies and exhibit different patterns of policy change. But the key question is whether the two different kinds of institutional systems should necessarily be expected to choose different policies or exhibit different patterns of policy change. This paper emphasizes that one cannot draw valid inferences about the nature of policy choice and policy change in different kinds of institutional systems just by considering the institutional rules alone. Instead, if we wish to compare the nature of policy choice and policy change in the different systems, it is essential to consider the interaction between the institutional rules and the policy preferences of the individual officeholders in these systems. And what must be compared involves the sets of policy equilibria produced by each of the systems. When these policy equilibria are systematically compared across institutional systems, the results about policy choice and policy change do not always support the inference that 'institutions matter'.