Though his most popular works were novels, the British author Samuel Butler was also deeply engaged in the scientific community of his time. Originally, he was a strong supporter of Darwin's theory of evolution, but after digging into the research, Butler identified several problems with Darwin's model. Butler's objections are laid out in the essays collected in Life and Habit.
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Samuel Butler's Erewhon , or Over the Range was published anonymously 1872. In this satire of Victorian society, the main character Higgs discovers an unknown country, the seeming utopia called Erewhon, Nowhere backwards with the "h" and "w" transposed. The starting chapters detailing the discovery of Erewhon were based on Butler's experiences in New Zealand as a young man. Butler was possibly the first to write about the idea that machines might one
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Labor occupies an interesting and important position in the history of critical theory. At the same time, it is difficult even to describe its role in the broad terms of an introduction without controversy. It is possible to begin with Hegel, where labor serves an important epistemic purpose in challenging dualism. As so often happens, what is of theoretical interest for Hegel takes on concrete dimensions for Marx, whether in his concern for relations of production or ever-increasing use of economic analysis. The first generation of the Frankfurt School is certainly indebted to Marx, but the indebtedness coincides with a renewed interest in subjectivity and cultural theoretical questions. Here, it is useful to mention issues of technology as addressed by the early critical theorists, treatments that led Marcuse towards a distrust of technology and Habermas to recover the Hegelian distinction between labor and interaction, eventually recasting it in terms of instrumental and communicative action. Recent years have seen a renewed interest by critical theorists in questions of work, sometimes led by Axel Honneth, sometimes going beyond his work. His deployment of the paradigm of recognition -- particularly with respect to esteem -- reincorporates at least some version of labor into critical theoretical discussion. Some critical theorists have returned to Hegel or Marx to recover notions of labor, while others -- including Honneth -- have begun to incorporate the insights of care work research into the paradigmata of critical theory. David A. Borman characterizes the relationship between Marx and the first generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists in the claim that, while Marx identified the objective conditions of revolution, critical theory set out to identify its subjective conditions. I do not want to evaluate that claim here, but I do want to undertake a small part of the project it describes. This is not undertaken by returning to the usual source texts of the critical theoretical tradition, but by reaching further back into the tradition of philosophy. I do not want to investigate contemporary notions of labor by looking at them or their modern antecedents, but rather their ancient ones. Socrates and Aristotle are examined to articulate a range of possible positions on how labor shapes identity. Kant is turned to next for a picture of the preservation of these ancient convictions in modernity. I conclude, finally, by arguing that these positions are with us still. More than perhaps any other social phenomenon, the significance of labor for social belonging and political participation has been fundamentally reconfigured over the course of the development of political philosophy. Given its origins in the Greek and Hebrew traditions as punishment or a sign of divine disfavor, this is quite a remarkable rehabilitation, effected in Europe, in great measure, over the centuries of Christian domination. This is, at least, one side of the story. It is the side that underlies Rawls's formulations concerning 'fully participating members of society,' a side that provides the grounding for a certain range of arguments for the regularization of the status of undocumented immigrants. At the same time, however, we continue to practice politics in the shadow of a Greek tradition for which some form of independence or self-sufficiency is often viewed as a prerequisite for political participation. If labor is a mark of dependence, then, laboring risks becoming a barrier to political participation. One way to address this tension is to interrogate the concept of independence, particularly with an eye to separating economic or material independence from moral or political autonomy. A particularly helpful example of this strategy is that carried out by Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, in 'A Genealogy of Dependency.' While that treatment is exemplary in its historical and material perspicacity, it gives short shrift to the plausibility of the claim that some aspects of the connection between independent political participation and economic existence ought not to be simply consigned to the dustbin of egalitarian critique. If denying that connection seems to open the way for broader political participation, retaining it seems to hold out the possibility of understanding political participation in a richer, more meaningful way. Adapted from the source document.
Analyses of care work typically speak of three necessary roles of care: the care worker, the care recipient, and an economic provider who makes care materially possible. This model provides no place for addressing the difficult political questions care poses for liberal representative democracy. I propose to fill this space with a new caring role to connect the care unit to the political sphere, as the economic provider connects the care unit to the economic sphere. I call this role that of the "care claimant." The labor of claiming care consists in the development, expression, and advancement of the interests of the care unit. The argument for employing this fourth care role begins by comparing Nel Noddings's phenomenological care unit to Sara Ruddick's family‐based analysis. It then moves to discuss the way Eva Kittay emphasizes the dependency of the charge and its political ramifications to illustrate the need for a care claimant. After distinguishing the care claimant from the other roles of care, I examine the power relationships in the care unit and the position of the care claimant in the public sphere.
This paper argues that, Marx's insistences notwithstanding, there is an ethical core to Marx's critique of capitalism. I attempt to establish this claim through presenting salient points of Marx's critique. From this basis, I move on to discuss Marx's conception of human nature and the way in which it is typically frustrated under pre-communist societies. This frustration is the basis for a moral preference for communism. After pausing briefly to consider the possible criticism that this moral preference is mere ideology, I conclude with the normative heart of the matter. This is addressed by underscoring principal similarities between Marx's work and Aristotle's ethical project, insofar as each comprehends an intuitive description of the good life and an analysis of the prerequisites for obtaining it. A grasp of this similarity opens the door to understanding the normative flip side of Marx's intellectual project.
1 broadside. ; Geneva ballad "attributed to Samuel Butler"--NUC pre-1956 imprints. ; Reproductions of originals in Chetham's Library and British Library. ; Identified as B601 in reel guide; in Wing (CD-ROM, 1996) as A3249.
1 sheet ([1] p.). ; Geneva ballad attributed to Samuel Butler by Wing. ; Verse: "AS I examin'd my Conscience ." ; Imperfect: cropped at foot with partial loss of imprint. ; Reproduction of original in the British Library.
[2], 8 p. ; A satire. ; Formerly Wing B6290, number changed in CD-ROM (1996) to A454A. ; Reproduction of original in Harvard University Libraries. ; Item incorrectly listed in reel guide at 131:11