Suchergebnisse

In Secession and Security, Ahsan I. Butt argues that states, rather than separatists, determine whether a secessionist struggle will be peaceful, violent, or genocidal. He investigates the strategies, ranging from negotiated concessions to large-scale repression, adopted by states in response to separatist movements. Variations in the external security environment, Butt argues, influenced the leaders of the Ottoman Empire to use peaceful concessions against Armenians in 1908 but escalated to genocide against the same community in 1915; caused Israel to reject a Palestinian state in the 1990s; and shaped peaceful splits in Czechoslovakia in 1993 and the Norway-Sweden union in 1905. Using more than one hundred interviews and extensive archival data, Butt focuses on two main cases—Pakistani reactions to Bengali and Baloch demands for independence in the 1970s and India's responses to secessionist movements in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam in the 1980s and 1990s. Butt's deep historical approach to his subject will appeal to policymakers and observers interested in the last five decades of geopolitics in South Asia, the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and ethno-national conflict, separatism, and nationalism more generally.

Since World War II, separatist conflicts have been the most common and deadly types of war in international politics. Such wars result from a simple incongruity: ethno-nationalist groups desire a homeland, but on territory that is controlled by states unwilling to give it up. This book examines states' strategies, particularly their use of violence, when confronted by separatist movements. Using more than 110 interviews, American and British diplomatic archives, and newspaper archives, this book's emphasis on external security can account for separatist violence, or its lack thereof, in a variety of historical contexts including Pakistan's treatment of Bengali secessionists; India's treatment of separatism in Assam, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir; interactions between the Ottoman Empire and Armenia; and Israel's attitudes toward Palestine.

Secessionist wars are considered one of the most important sources of violence in international politics. Scholars studying why states adopt coercion or concessions against secessionists have only pointed to domestic factors, such as ethnic heterogeneity or political institutions. By contrast, I argue that state strategy is determined by the external security implications of the secessionist movement. Because secession entails a large and rapid shift in the international balance of power, it generates a commitment problem: Only a state sanguine about future threats can be conciliatory to separatists. Conversely, if the state fears war after border changes, either against the seceded state due to deep identity divisions with the ethnic separatists, or an existing regional adversary due to the war-proneness of its neighborhood, it will adopt coercion. If states choose to coerce, their calibration of violence depends on secessionists' external support; for materialist and emotional reasons, the more third-party support, the more violent the state. Using data from more than 110 interviews, diplomatic papers, and news archives, I test the theory first by contrasting Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce with Israeli intransigence on Palestinian statehood at Oslo, an outcome existing theories would not predict, and then by examining internal variation in India, the country most beset by separatism, across three states in the 1980s: Assam, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir.

Since World War II, separatist conflicts have been the most common and deadly types of war in international politics. Such wars result from a simple incongruity: ethno-nationalist groups desire a homeland, but on territory that is controlled by states unwilling to give it up. This book examines states' strategies, particularly their use of violence, when confronted by separatist movements. Using more than 110 interviews, American and British diplomatic archives, and newspaper archives, this book's emphasis on external security can account for separatist violence, or its lack thereof, in a variety of historical contexts including Pakistan's treatment of Bengali secessionists; India's treatment of separatism in Assam, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir; interactions between the Ottoman Empire and Armenia; and Israel's attitudes toward Palestine.

AbstractThis article addresses Pakistani Islamists' street power — their ability to organize rallies, protests, and demonstrations. Building on research on religion and collective action, I first demonstrate how Friday prayers aid Islamist mobilization. Mosques on Friday serve as a filtering and coordination tool, as tactical "choke" points in urban neighborhoods, and as incitement through the imam's sermon. I then show how Islamist street power affects Islamization in Pakistan. I argue that Pakistan's foundational religious nationalism acts as an "opportunity structure," and affords Islamists agenda-setting and veto power. The success of Islamist agitation depends on the issue contested, the type of regime targeted, and the era in which it is practiced. I use interviews, participant observation at Islamist rallies, an original dataset of all rallies and protests in Pakistan from 2005 to 2010 (n= 4123); and government and local newspaper reports from the 1940s onward to buttress my claims.

AbstractThis article questions the validity of anarchy as an assumption in International Relations theory. Powerful states often provide public goods to smaller states in return for their acquiescence on matters of interest. This transactional provision of public goods is analogous to how central governments behave in domestic environments; thus the hierarchic structure of domestic politics is replicated in international politics. The anarchy-hierarchy distinction, which rests on a neat separation of international and domestic structures, is therefore highly contentious. One public good that great powers provide, largely ignored by the literature on hierarchy, is justice. Powerful states can provide a forum for aggrieved parties to settle their disputes, and thus contain conflicts before they escalate to war. If such a forum is no longer provided, the system reverts to anarchy, where escalation—and therefore, war—is more likely. South America's war-prone decade can be explained by the variation in structural conditions on the continent. Due to the Depression, its Good Neighbor policy, and the onset of World War II, the United States was less interested in South American affairs in the 1930s, resulting in a more anarchic structure and a higher propensity for war.