Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn May 2018, Artidjo Alkostar retired from the Supreme Court of Indonesia after a judicial career spanning almost two decades. Over this period, he presided over many of Indonesia's most prominent and controversial criminal cases and became renowned for routinely rejecting corruption appeals and increasing prison sentences. In the celebratory publications that marked his retirement, Alkostar was held up as a model judge, with senior legal figures, including Supreme Court judges, singling out his strong work ethic, integrity, simplicity of character, and firmness. Curiously absent from the list of praiseworthy attributes were pre-requisites for effective judging, including adequate legal knowledge, transparent legal reasoning and decision-making, objectivity and avoiding the perception of bias. An analysis of Alkostar's most notorious decisions suggests that he, and the judges who served with him, did not always clearly display these pre-requisites. This article considers what this says about judging in Indonesia and what might, in practice, be the defining characteristics of a good judge there.

AbstractThis article describes and critiques the judicial reasoning of Indonesia's Supreme Court, through the lens of the Court's reviews of subnational laws during 2011–17. The resulting picture is a negative one. Most of the Court's decisions were critically flawed, with either very little or no reasoning, and inconsistencies with past decisions. Worse, the Court appears keen to avoid hearing important cases that raise difficult political issues, even though the law governing those issues is clear and easy to apply. These inadequacies are perpetuated by genuine uncertainty about the precise jurisdiction of the Court in judicial review cases. However, the Court has not sought to resolve this uncertainty. Indeed, these decisions appear to reflect a court paying little regard to judicial transparency and accountability, and unwilling or unable to act as an effective check on government power.

Indonesia is home to more Muslims than any other country. Yet it is not an Islamic state and is unlikely to become one, despite the strong and sustained urgings of some Muslim groups. Indonesian Islam is, like Indonesian society itself, dynamic and diverse, accommodating a wide variety of practices and beliefs. One area of contention between conservative Muslims on the one hand, and the state (supported by many more moderate Muslims) on the other, is the extent to which Islamic law should be recognised, applied and enforced by institutions of state. The Indonesian government's response has generally been to limit formal recognition of Islamic law to specified areas of family law and finance, codifying the relevant principles and enforcing them through Islamic courts. This article considers whether the constitutional freedom of religion, introduced in 2000, requires the state to provide mechanisms to apply and enforce the corpus of Islamic law. In particular, it discusses two cases in which Muslims asked the Indonesian Constitutional Court to consider whether freedom of religion required the state to remove restrictions on polygamy, and to allow Indonesia's Religious Courts to apply Islamic law in its entirety, including criminal law.