Suchergebnisse

The main purpose of this article is to confront the argument put forward by Giovanni Arrighi and Fortunata Piselli in their 1987 study on capitalist development in Calabria with recent, neo-institutionalist analyses of economic development. In particular, this article asks whether the main building blocks of Arrighi and Piselli's analysis – the importance of social conflicts in determining the outcome of processes of social change, the multiple paths of peripheralization, the key role played by factor mobility across regions of the periphery – may be used in a discussion of current theories of economic development framed within neo-institutional theory. In particular, it can be argued that articulating a dialogue between neo-institutional analyses of economic change and Arrighi and Piselli's approach may provide a very fruitful platform for a renewed discussion of the role of institutions in economic development, especially in the periphery of the world-economy. In addition, a reading of the 1987 essay informed by neo-institutional hypotheses and concerns may yield new insights to be gained from 'Capitalist Development in a Hostile Environment'. The overarching concern of the article is theoretical, and the core of the article will be dedicated, therefore, to a confrontation between Arrighi and Piselli's 1987 essay, on one hand, and, on the other hand, a selection of significant works within the vast literature that has emerged in recent decades on institutions and development.

Since the 2007–2008 global banking crisis, systemic risk has become the central target of policy design in banking regulation in many countries. At the same time, a growing attention has been paid to the systemic importance of bank heterogeneity. The need for diversity has even found its way into official policy documents, both at the European and national level. However, most of the new thinking on the regulatory reforms targeting systemic risk has been conducted within the framework of macro-prudential regulation, which may not be adequate to deal with diversity-related causes of systemic risk. This paper aims, therefore, at contributing to the growing literature on the relationship between systemic risk and banking regulation by (i) explicating the links between systemic risk and banking diversity; (ii) discussing the adequacy of macro and micro-prudential policy instruments to address diversity-related causes of systemic risk in banking; and (iii) laying out a basic framework for diversity-enhancing policies.

The recent banking crisis has brought into question the business model used by most large banks. This collection of essays explores the success of 'alternative banks' - savings banks, cooperative banks and development banks, using case studies from around the world and discussion of both the historical and theoretical context of banking practices

Abstract
A now well-established literature in economics assesses the effect of different forms of bank ownership on various measures of banks' performance. Such literature has its theoretical roots in a surprisingly narrow framework, broadly identified with property rights theory. However, such theory – or bundle of theories – has been increasingly criticized for its inability to account for the emergence, the existence and the functioning of business firms. Indeed, many works and authors counter mainstream property rights theory, arguing instead that firms are entities that cannot be possessed – and that equity ownership should not be equaled with firm ownership.
Nowhere is perhaps this critique more salient than in the field of banking. As the 2007/08 crisis reminded many observers, banks are not just firms or corporations: they are institutions, endowed with a dual social purpose (the creation of money and the setting of rules for access to credit). If the ownership of firms is difficult to conceive, the ownership of institutions such as banks is obviously harder still to envision. However, over the past twenty to thirty years, regulatory reform in finance has led to the empowerment of ownership, and especially private ownership, in the field of banking. This is apparent, for instance, with the 2007/44 European Directive, which fully liberalized equity ownership (and control) of banks.
Yet, even within the actual legal and regulatory framework, there are many limitations to property rights as applied to banks. This paper thus has two aims: firstly, to develop a theoretical explanation of the heuristic and empirical limitations of "bank ownership"; and, secondly, to analyze, on the basis of an empirical case study of Italian banking law, the nature and extent of the property rights associated with ownership in banks.

Abstract
Unlike business models of private banks based on profit maximization and shareholder-oriented governance, alternative banks (such as cooperative banks, government savings banks, and special purpose banks) share business models based on sustainable returns with longer time horizons, corporate missions that include social and public policy goals, and stakeholder-oriented governance. Strong evidence from recent research suggests that alternative banks often equal or outperform joint-stock banks in terms of efficiency, profitability, and risk management. This counters core ideas in contemporary banking theory and expectations of regulators about the superiority of private ownership and market-based banking. Concepts and theories from banking studies help explain how alternative banks outperform private banks in core functions such as creating and managing liquidity, pooling deposits, and reducing information asymmetries and agency costs. However, heterodox theories of the firm and institutional approaches to competitive advantage broaden the scope of analysis to explain further historical, social, and organizational advantages (and risks) in alternative banking. Alternative banks therefore require, and may inspire, alternative theories of banking and new approaches to bank regulation.