Suchergebnisse

It is a new truism that the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated an already dire human rights situation across the globe. The waves of protest that swept across the world in the year before the pandemic seemed to have been brought to a sudden halt due to lockdowns and restrictive laws. But at the same time, people everywhere have availed themselves of the wide protective scope of the freedom of assembly, newly re-emphasized in the Human Rights Committee's General Comment of 2020, to come together, protest, and make their voices heard in numerous creative ways. Amid the restrictions, there has been resilience.

This article explores the role of the European Convention on Human Rights in addressing the issue of attacks on civic space, but also the potential effects of shrinking civic space on Strasbourg's work. First, an overview of the notions of civil society and civic space is given, linking these concepts to democracy and human rights. Subsequently, the formal and informal roles for civil society in the judicial decision-making are discussed. Finally, the substantive protection offered to civil society and civic space under the ECHR and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights is analysed. This article argues that the differentiations in theory on the varying contributions of civil society to democracy and human rights are to a large extent reflected in Strasbourg jurisprudence. Even more importantly, the ECHR system and civil society benefit from each other. This is why the current attacks on civic space are not just a problem for civil society itself, but also for the work of the European Court: it is submitted that a shrinking of civic space can also negatively affect the Strasbourg system, as the two are intertwined to a considerable extent.Received: 06 July 2019Accepted: 10 October 2019Published online: 20 December 2019

In many countries civil society is under pressure. Collective citizens' efforts, especially when they have political salience, seem to be regarded with increasing suspicion and even to be actively countered. Anti-NGO laws, arbitrary inspections, harassment, and criminalisation all strike at the roots of civic space. Is this part of a trend of 'reverse transitions', in which countries slide away from democracy? Or is this maybe an even wider shift, manifestations of which can also be observed in more established democracies? What are the possible causes of this shrinking or closing civic space, how does the closure manifest itself, and what are the linkages to human rights? This article will focus on anti-NGO measures as part of a broader global trend.

The limits of the freedom of expression are a perennial discussion in human rights discourse. This article focuses on identifying yardsticks to establish the boundaries of freedom of expression in cases where violence is a risk. It does so by using insights from the social sciences on the escalation of violent conflict. By emphasizing the interaction between violence and discourse, and its effect on antagonisms between groups, it offers an interdisciplinary perspective on an ongoing legal debate. It introduces the notion of "fear speech" and argues that it may be much more salient in this context than hate speech.

AbstractHow should one balance the freedom of expression and the prevention of violence? This article delves into the grey zone between hate speech and incitement to violence by assessing the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in cases of allegedly dangerous speech. Rather than labelling this case law as simplistic, as some critics even within the Court have done, it is shown that the jurisprudence reveals cleavages within the Court on whether to adopt a more or less consequentialist approach on the links between speech and violence. Freedom of expression cases should preferably be assessed on the merits under Article 10 ECHR since this allows for a balancing of the various interests involved. The application of the abuse of rights clause of Article 17 ECHR is for that very reason undesirable, in addition to its inconsistent use by the Court.

The limits of the freedom of expression are a perennial discussion in human rights discourse. This article focuses on identifying yardsticks to establish the boundaries of freedom of expression in cases, where violence is a risk. It does so, by using insights from the social sciences on the escalation of violent conflict. By emphasizing the interaction between violence and discourse, and its effect on antagonisms between groups, it offers an interdisciplinary perspective on an ongoing legal debate. It introduces the notion of 'fear speech' and argues that it may be much more salient in this context than hate speech. Adapted from the source document.