Environmental Tax Reform and Producer Foresight
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 22, Heft 6, S. 719-752
ISSN: 0161-8938
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In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 22, Heft 6, S. 719-752
ISSN: 0161-8938
In: Journal of policy modeling: JPMOD ; a social science forum of world issues, Band 22, Heft 6, S. 719-752
ISSN: 0161-8938
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8857
SSRN
Working paper
Recently, it has been demonstrated that pre-existing distortionary taxes can substantially increase the costs of market-based instruments which do not raise revenue, such as non-auctioned emissions quotas. Revenue-raising market-based policy tools, such as carbon taxes, encounter other problems: The redistribution of property rights implied by introduction of such instruments is politically controversial, and in practice, tax rates are often differentiated to reduce political resistance. In the latter case, marginal abatement costs are not equalized between polluters. When comparing a policy with differentiated carbon taxes to a policy of free-issued quotas, financed through distortionary taxes, it is thus not obvious which alternative yields the highest social welfare. In this paper, we use a numerical intertemporal general equilibrium model for the Norwegian economy to compare the welfare effects of a differentiated carbon tax regime, exemplified by the current Norwegian carbon tax structure; a system of grandfathered tradable emission permits; and a uniform carbon tax regime. Grandfathered tradable quotas yield substantially lower welfare than the other two alternatives. However, differentiated taxes produce almost as high welfare as uniform taxes.
BASE
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 69, Heft 2, S. 317-341
ISSN: 1573-1502
While the introduction and reformation of climate policy instruments take place rapidly in Europe, the knowledge on how the instruments interact lags behind. In this paper we analyse different interpretations of the 2030 climate policy goals for residential energy efficiency and how they interact with targets for restricting CO2 emissions. We focus on Norway, whose climate and energy policies are integrated with those of the EU. As we account for investment costs of improving energy efficiency we find substantial welfare costs of energy efficiency policies, particularly when interacting with carbon pricing. Rebound effects within households are small, but economy-wide indirect rebound is significant because energy-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries expand. As residential energy use consists mainly of carbon-free electricity, this expansion of EITE-industries leads to increased total CO2 emissions.
BASE
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 11, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
In small and open economies, absorption of foreign knowledge through international trade often plays a more important role for domestic innovation and growth than investment in domestic R&D. This suggests that trade policies can increase knowledge spillovers from abroad. Public support to R&D can be motivated both by positive internal knowledge externalities and by its ability to expand absorptive capacity. This dynamic, empirical, general equilibrium analysis models these interplays between R&D, trade and productivity. It compares public R&D support and export promotion of R&D based products with respect to long term growth and welfare impacts. We find that export promotion is inferior to R&D support in spurring R&D. However, it is not outperformed in terms of welfare generation. The reason is that existing and politically persistent policy interventions create inefficiencies that can be counteracted by R&D-based export promotion as a second-best policy.
Indirect taxes such as value added taxes (VAT) generate a substantial part of tax revenue in many countries. This paper analyses welfare effects of different reforms in the Norwegian system of indirect taxation. The main reform studied is the introduction of a uniform VAT rate on all goods and services. The Norwegian political VAT reform of 2001 is also analysed. The reforms are analysed by using an intertemporal CGE model for the Norwegian economy. A non-uniform VAT system gives a welfare loss compared to a uniform VAT system.
BASE
In: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Band 120, Heft 2, S. 338-371
SSRN
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 426-455
ISSN: 1540-5982
AbstractWe investigate how, in an open economy, carbon taxes combined with output‐based rebating (OBR) perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner. Analytical results suggest that, whether the purpose of the OBR policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to maximize welfare (accounting for global emission reductions), the OBR rate should be positive in policy‐relevant cases. Numerical simulations for Canada, with the US as the neighbouring trading partner, indicate that the impact of US policies on the OBR rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the Canadian OBR policies. If, for a given US carbon policy, Canada's aim is to restore the competitiveness of domestic emission‐intensive and trade‐exposed (EITE) firms to the same level as before the introduction of its own carbon taxation, we find that the necessary domestic OBR rates will be insensitive to the foreign carbon policies. However, if not only the Canadian carbon tax but also an equally high US tax is introduced, compensatory Canadian OBR rates will be up to 50% lower, depending on the sector and on US OBR policy. If the policy objective is to increase economy‐wide allocative efficiency (welfare) of Canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage, the US policies will have only a minor downward pressure on desirable OBR rates in Canada. Practical choices of OBR rates hardly affect overall domestic economic performance; thus, output‐based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating EITE industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy‐wide allocative efficiency.
In: ZenTra Working Paper in Transnational Studies No. 51 / 2015
SSRN
Working paper
In the absence of effective world-wide cooperation to curb global warming, import tariffs on embodied carbon have been proposed as a potential supplement to unilateral emissions pricing. We consider alternative designs for such tariffs, and analyze their effects on global welfare within a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade and energy. Our analysis suggests that the most cost-efficient policy could be region-specific tariffs on all products, based on direct plus electricity emissions. In the end, however, the potential cost savings through carbon tariffs must be weighed against the administrative costs as well as legal issues and political considerations.
BASE
In the absence of effective world-wide cooperation to curb global warming, import tariffs on embodied carbon have been proposed as a potential supplement to unilateral emissions pricing. We consider alternative designs for such tariffs, and analyze their effects on global welfare within a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade and energy. Our analysis suggests that the most cost-efficient policy could be region-specific tariffs on all products, based on direct plus electricity emissions. In the end, however, the potential cost savings through carbon tariffs must be weighed against the administrative costs as well as legal issues and political considerations.
BASE
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 86, Heft 3, S. 565-603
ISSN: 1573-1502
AbstractTransportation is one of the main contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. Climate regulations on transportation are often a mix of sector-specific regulations and economy-wide measures (such as emission pricing). In this paper we consider how different and partly overlapping climate regulations interact and what are the effects on economic welfare, abatement costs and emissions? Our focus is on Norway, a nation where high taxation of conventional fossil-fuelled cars has paved the floor for another pillar of climate policies: promotion of electric vehicles (EVs) in private transport. Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, we analyse the costs and impacts of the partly overlapping climate regulations in transportation—the cap on domestic non-ETS emissions and the goal of all new cars for private households being EVs—focussing on the outcome in 2030. Second, we respond to a gap in the literature through a methodological development in economy-wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) approaches for climate policy by introducing EV technologies as an explicit transport equipment choice for private households. We find that, for the case of Norway, combining a specific EV target with policy to cap emissions through a uniform carbon price more than doubles the welfare costs.