Suchergebnisse

THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT STYLE ISSUES HAVE A RATIONAL IMPACT ON VOTER THINKING AND THAT THEY WERE SIGNIFICANT IN THE 1972 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. EVIDENCE OF STYLE ISSUE SALIENCE IS EXAMINED; VOTER PERCEPTION IS EXAMINED; AND A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STYLE ISSUES AND VOTE CHOICE IS ANALYZED.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- CONTENTS -- List of Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part One. Preparing the Foundation -- Chapter 1. Knowns and Unknowns -- Chapter 2. History and Theories -- Part Two. The Polarized Electorate -- Chapter 3. Ideology and Polarization -- Chapter 4. Issues and Polarization -- Chapter 5. Circumstantial Evidence -- Part Three. The Polarized Parties -- Chapter 6. Why Are the Parties More Polarized? -- Chapter 7. One-Sided Party Polarization? -- Chapter 8. Why Are the Parties Polarized at All? -- Chapter 9. Polarization and Democracy -- Afterword -- Appendix A. Five Ideological Series -- Appendix B. Regression Analyses of Ideological Orientations -- Notes -- References -- Index

An intriguing phenomenon in American electoral politics is the loss of seats by the president's party in midterm congressional elections. Between 1862 and 1990, the president's party lost seats in the House of Representatives in 32 of the 33 midterm elections. In his new study, James Campbell examines explanations for these midterm losses and explores how presidential elections influence congressional elections. After reviewing the two major theories of midterm electoral change-the ""surge and decline"" theory and the theory of midterms as referenda on presidential performance Campbell draws up

Intro -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter 1 The Impact of Presidential Campaigns -- Chapter 2 The Theory of the Predictable Campaign -- Chapter 3 Studying the Effects of Campaigns -- Chapter 4 The Stable Context of the Campaign -- Chapter 5 Presidential Incumbency -- Chapter 6 The Economic Context of the Campaign -- Chapter 7 The Normal Course of the Campaign -- Chapter 8 Electoral Competition and Unsystematic Campaign Effects -- Chapter 9 How Campaigns Matter -- Epilogue The 2008 Campaign -- Appendix A Partisanship in the American Electorate -- Appendix B Time of the Vote Decision and Partisan Loyalty -- Notes -- References -- Index.

"Presidential campaigns do matter for the outcome of elections. The effects of presidential campaigns are systematic and predictable." "These arguments, based on careful analysis of campaigns and previous studies of them, refute the common wisdom of political scientists that campaigns do not matter and the implied belief of journalists, evidenced in their reporting every four years, that little else matters." "James E. Campbell offers "the theory of the predictable campaign," incorporating the fundamental conditions that systematically affect the presidential vote: political competition, presidential incumbency, and election-year economic conditions."--Jacket

AbstractWhy did the American electorate elect a solid majority of Republicans to the House in 2016 and then 2 years later replace it with a solid majority of Democrats? This article revives the idea of an electoral mandate and applies it to the 2016 and 2018 elections. It proposes a trinity of partisan attitudes serving as the components of electoral mandates: performance, values, and leadership. The election of President Trump in 2016 depended on a mix of performance evaluations (a weak economy) favoring the Republicans and leadership evaluations (Trump's behavior difficulties) muted by value considerations (conservative anger at being unrepresented and the necessity of a choice between Trump and Clinton). These offsetting partisan attitudes made the election close enough that a small number of votes in key states decided the electoral vote outcome. In 2018, performance evaluations again favored Republicans, but now because they presided over a stronger economy. Evaluations of Trump's leadership remained negative. The interaction of values with these leadership assessments now favored Democrats. As the out-party, polarized liberals were motivated by anti-Trump anger. Never-Trump conservatives who had drifted back to vote Republican at the end of the 2016 campaign did not feel that same pressure without the presidency being at stake. About two-thirds of voters in 2018 said their vote was about Trump. Republicans lost to Democrats among these voters by 16 percentage points. Republicans delivered on their 2016 mandate to boost the economy, but had failed to provide leadership that many Americans could feel comfortable with.