INFORMAL RULES OF THE GAME ARE FOUND IN SIX U.S. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS TO BE THE SAME AS THOSE PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED IN STATE LEGISLATURE AND IN CONGRESS. THIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH CONVENTIONAL WISDOM THAT LEGISLATIVE NORMS DEFINE THE BOUNDARIES OF A UNIQUELY LEGISLATIVE ROLE. IT SEEMS NORMS ARE CARRIED IN THE CULTURE AND THEY FACILITATE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF EPHEMERAL AND ON-GOING BODIES.
THE IDEA THAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS SHOULD BE ABOVE POLITICS DERIVES FROM THE JURISPRUDENTIAL NOTION THAT CONSTITUTIONS ARE HIGHER-LAW DOCUMENTS EMBODYING PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH SOCIETY APPROACHES CONSENSUS. AS SUCH CONSTITUTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT. THIS HIGHER LAW DESIGNATION EXPECTS DELEGATES TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS TO MAKE OBJECTIVE, RATIONAL DECISIONS FREE FROM THE NORMAL PULL AND SWAY OF PARTISAN POLITICS. AN ALTERNATIVE DELEGATE ROLE POSTULATES THAT CONSTITUTIONS ARE NOT NEUTRAL DOCUMENTS BUT INSTEAD MAKE PRELIMINARY DISTRIBUTIONS OF POWER AND SCARCE RESOURCES AMONG COMPETING INTERESTS. THIS "REALIST" APPROACH POSITS THAT CONVENTIONS ARE NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM OTHER POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. REALISTS SEE PARTISAN FORCES AS A NORMAL AND ACCEPTABLE PART OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WITHIN CONVENTIONS AND MAINTAIN THAT DECISIONS ARE BEST MADE WHEN THE MAJOR POLITICAL INTERESTS HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE. THESE CONTRASTING ROLE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD CONSTITUTION MAKING HAVE BEEN OBSERVED AMONG DELEGATES TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS. A STUDY FOUND THAT A MAJORITY OF THE DELEGATES HELD "IDEALIST" ATTITUDES TOWARD THEIR MISSION, ALTHOUGH THE CONVENTION ITSELF DID NOT SEEM TO DIFFER FROM THE STATE LEGISLATURE IN THE PARTISANSHIP WHICH CHARACTERIZED ITS ACTUAL OPERATION.
PROPONENTS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY OFTEN ADVOCATE ESTABLISHING CORPORATIST POLICY MAKING MECHANISMS AS AN APPROACH TO FORMULATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY. UTILIZING DATA FROM STATEWIDE TELEPHONE SURVEYS, THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES THE FAILURE OF CORPORATIST POLICY MAKING TO GENERATE PUBLIC SUPPORT IN A REFERENDUM ON AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY PLAN IN RHODE ISLAND. THE STUDY TESTS THREE PROPOSITIONS FROM THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY LITERATURE AND FINDS THAT SUCH POLICY MAKING (1) DID NOT PRODUCE POLICIES WHICH APPEALED TO THE PUBLIC'S CONCERN FOR OTHERS, (2) DID NOT DEFLECT PUBLIC CYNICISM TOWARD GOVERNMENT, AND (3) DID NOT TRANSLATE AN ELITE CONSENSUS INTO MASS SUPPORT FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY PROPOSALS.
