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In this paper we analyse a case of adverse selection in the credit market to show that, in the presence of a monopolistic bank, bad firms can be beneficial to accumulation and growth. Two main implications are drawn: first, even if classical diminishing returns on technology are ruled out, growth declines over time. Second, any attempt to make banks more capable of discriminating between bad and good firms will resolve itself into a restraint to growth.

We present a simple agency model with a revenue‐maximizing government and many public officials (agents) in charge of collecting payments from citizens. Agents are of two types, honest and potentially dishonest, with the latter having an inherent propensity to demand bribes from citizens. This propensity may eventually turn into actual (perceived) corruption depending on the strategy pursued by the government. In equilibrium, we derive a non‐linear relationship between potential and perceived corruption and, specifically, three distinct policy regimes in which the opportunistic behaviour is curbed, eradicated or tolerated. Different regimes are characterized by different bureaucracy sizes, and we conjecture that low levels of perceived corruption may, in some circumstances, be due to a dilution effect of bribery cases on large numbers of public employees. Some simple descriptive evidence on European regions appears to confirm our theoretical insights.

Abstract
We present a simple principal-agent model with an employer and two types of employees/workers, low and high skilled. Low-skilled workers are envious of their high-skilled peers, and incur a disutility cost whenever the latter receive a positive surplus from their labor contract. We show that: i) if the envy cost is relatively low (high), high-skilled workers obtain a payoff higher (lower) than that they receive when they are not envied; ii) if the envy cost can be manipulated (increased or reduced), high-skilled workers can take actions of envy-provocation or envy-reduction to further increase their payoff.

AbstractIn a simple model with hidden action, we analyze the role of nonwage benefits (perks) in the structure of incentive‐compatible contracts. We show that the provision of perks depends on the size of the agent's reservation wage. The two main results are: (a) for low levels of the reservation wage, perks are never provided by the principal, but the agent may decide to buy, as own consumption, a certain amount of private benefits; (b) for high levels, the principal may find it profitable to offer perks, and the equilibrium quantity increases more than proportionally with the reservation wage, up to the first‐best level.

Existing datasets provided by statistical agencies (e.g. Eurostat) show that the economic and financial crisis that unfolded in 2008 significantly impacted the lives and livelihoods of young people across Europe. Taking these official statistics as a starting point, the collaborative research project "Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneurship in Europe" (CUPESSE) generated new survey data on the economic and social situation of young Europeans (18-35 years). The CUPESSE dataset allows for country-comparative assessments of young people's perceptions about their socio-economic situation. Furthermore, the dataset includes a variety of indicators examining the socio-economic situation of both young adults and their parents. In this data article, we introduce the CUPESSE dataset to political and social scientists in an attempt to spark a debate on the measurements, patterns and mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of economic self-sufficiency as well as its political implications. ; Existing datasets provided by statistical agencies (e.g. Eurostat) show that the economic and financial crisis that unfolded in 2008 significantly impacted the lives and livelihoods of young people across Europe. Taking these official statistics as a starting point, the collaborative research project "Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneurship in Europe" (CUPESSE) generated new survey data on the economic and social situation of young Europeans (18-35 years). The CUPESSE dataset allows for country-comparative assessments of young people's perceptions about their socio-economic situation. Furthermore, the dataset includes a variety of indicators examining the socio-economic situation of both young adults and their parents. In this data article, we introduce the CUPESSE dataset to political and social scientists in an attempt to spark a debate on the measurements, patterns and mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of economic self-sufficiency as well as its political implications.

Existing datasets provided by statistical agencies (e.g. Eurostat) show that the economic and financial crisis that unfolded in 2008 significantly impacted the lives and livelihoods of young people across Europe. Taking these official statistics as a starting point, the collaborative research project "Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneurship in Europe" (CUPESSE) generated new survey data on the economic and social situation of young Europeans (18–35 years). The CUPESSE dataset allows for country-comparative assessments of young people's perceptions about their socio-economic situation. Furthermore, the dataset includes a variety of indicators examining the socio-economic situation of both young adults and their parents. In this data article, we introduce the CUPESSE dataset to political and social scientists in an attempt to spark a debate on the measurements, patterns and mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of economic self-sufficiency as well as its political implications.

Existing datasets provided by statistical agencies (e.g. Eurostat) show that the economic and financial crisis that unfolded in 2008 significantly impacted the lives and livelihoods of young people across Europe. Taking these official statistics as a starting point, the collaborative research project "Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneurship in Europe" (CUPESSE) generated new survey data on the economic and social situation of young Europeans (18–35 years). The CUPESSE dataset allows for country-comparative assessments of young people's perceptions about their socio-economic situation. Furthermore, the dataset includes a variety of indicators examining the socio-economic situation of both young adults and their parents. In this data article, we introduce the CUPESSE dataset to political and social scientists in an attempt to spark a debate on the measurements, patterns and mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of economic self-sufficiency as well as its political implications.

After online first publication of the article, it was noticed that the family name of author Panos Tsakloglou was erroneously misspelt as Tsakoglou.