Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation
In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 3-4, S. 407-426
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 3-4, S. 407-426
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: American political science review, Band 108, Heft 2, S. 281-296
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
In: American political science review, Band 108, Heft 2, S. 281-296
ISSN: 1537-5943
This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the equilibrium concept to the model, I find that PR promotes representation of small parties in general, even when voters are strategic. However, the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes, which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules. Thus, PR may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters' main concern is policy outcomes.
In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 3, S. 407-426
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: American journal of political science, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 276-291
ISSN: 1540-5907
This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representation with respect to representatives' behavior in each district. However, with respect to representation of the social majority, my findings are indeterminate. On the one hand, there exists an equilibrium in which the majority‐preferred alternative is the outcome guaranteed, except in very special circumstances. On the other hand, this equilibrium is not generally the unique equilibrium, and, for some parameter values, there is an equilibrium in which the majority‐preferred alternative is less likely than the alternative preferred only by the minority to be the outcome.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 276-291
ISSN: 0092-5853
SSRN
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 351-379
ISSN: 1460-3667
We examine strategic voting in open primary elections by developing a Poisson voting game. In the model, two parties simultaneously hold primary elections, with two candidates competing in each party. Each voter chooses to vote for one of the four candidates without knowing how many other voters participate in each primary. Analyzing the model, we investigate what types of strategic crossover voting occur in equilibrium and under what circumstances they occur. In particular, we focus on two types of crossover voting: hedging (voting for the moderate candidate of the opposite party) and raiding (voting for the extreme candidate of the opposite party). We show that the pattern of strategic voting in equilibrium critically depends on candidate positions and uncertainty about the outcome in the general election.
In: The review of international organizations, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 25-58
ISSN: 1559-744X
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 2, S. 367-386
ISSN: 0003-0554