The Effect of Misperception on Strategic Behavior in Legislative Settings: Social Psychology Meets Rational Choice
In: Political behavior, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 111-127
ISSN: 0190-9320
Some conditions under which simple social-psychological processes may affect collective (committee) decisions in legislative settings are investigated. While rational choice theory predicts that social-psychological effects will be canceled, randomized, or corrected by communication, recurring conditions under which such factors influence individual decisions are posited. A general approach for identifying strategic misperception is then presented & discussed in terms of its ability to predict: (1) the intensity with which committee members pursue alternatives, & (2) the effects of abstention, bandwagon voting, persuasion, & log-rolling. Further research into the comparing models based on fixed preferences (rational choice) & strategic misperception, however, is needed to determine which approach provides the most accurate explanation of the collective decision-making process. 6 Tables, 16 References. Modified HA