Suchergebnisse

Introduction: sheep, snow, and bear diplomacy -- Pieces of the puzzle: theories of rivalry politics -- Building pressure: dynamic two-level pressures and rivalry politics -- Zooming in: introduction to the case studies -- Ruin before reconciliation: the Somali-Ethiopian rivalry -- Peace (not) now: the Israeli-Egyptian rivalry -- Climbing the wall: the Sino-American rivalry -- Zooming out: evidence from fifty-six rivalries -- Conclusion.

"Fighting Abroad, Fighting at Home (and Vice Versa): Identifying the Relationship Between Civil and Interstate Conflict with Fewer Assumptions" published on by Oxford University Press.

Previous research has uncovered only ambiguous evidence of the mechanisms that support or inhibit democratic trajectories in the aftermath of civil war. Here I suggest that one specific form of transnational aid during a civil war may have reverberating consequences after the fighting stops. Specifically, when a state emerges to control the executive after a conflict with the help of a previous interstate enemy, the leadership is vulnerable to political attacks on their patriotism and judgment. As such, open democracy becomes a less attractive option for these executives. I investigate this proposition using difference-in-difference matching estimation, as well as several alternative specifications. The findings strongly suggest the presence of disincentives to democratize for those executives that received help from external rivals. This research provides a new set of tools for identifying the causes and potential remedies to deficient democracy after civil wars.

In the ongoing debate concerning whether democracies can carry out effective national security policy, the role of transparency costs has received little attention. I argue for a more nuanced understanding of how some democracies that possess specific investigative institutions, such as national security–relevant freedom of information laws, legislative oversight powers, and press freedoms, are able to avoid the problems of which democracy skeptics warn. Using a new dataset on national security accountability institutions in democracies within a Bradley‐Terry framework, I find that national security oversight mechanisms raise the probability that a democracy wins international disputes as well as increasing the expected number of enemy casualties, as compared to democracies that lack effective oversight. Contra previous theories of foreign policy efficacy, I find that the chances for democratic foreign policy success are maximized when competitive elections are linked to institutions that increase the retrospective revelation of previously classified information.

Varied research traditions suggest that dovish leaders will be thrown out of office under harsh external circumstances. Below, I elaborate a model of rivalry maintenance that draws on and refines the insight from studies of leadership tenure and foreign policy. Specifically, I expect a leader who offers unreciprocated cooperation to a rival (a dove) to be more likely to be deselected from power than a leader that takes a harder line vis‐à‐vis the rival (a hawk). I test this expectation using event history techniques and data spanning the 1950–1990 time period and find strong evidence that dovish leaders pay an electoral price within a rivalry context. The findings suggest an internationally contingent domestic incentive to maintain rivalry and conflict over time.

The different phases of the leadership long cycle are hypothesized to significantly alter the number of great power rivalries that terminate and initiate. Specifically, the global war phase is expected to "shock" dyads into and out of rivalry. Bivariate and multivariate event history techniques are used to show that periods of capability deconcentration are associated with increased great power rivalry terminations but not initiations. Furthermore, terminations are less likely to occur during phases of systemic capability concentration than in other periods, as the theory predicts. The expectations concerning rivalry initiations are not supported.

Democracy Declassified tackles an enduring question of particular current importance: How do democratic governments balance the need for foreign policy secrecy with accountability to the public? Secrecy has national security uses, but it can also be abused. Democracy Declassified highlights and then explores how formal oversight institutions can allow for immediate secrecy, while curtailing executive abuses and corrosive public skepticism.