Suchergebnisse

THIS PAPER STARTS BY SPECIFYING A MODEL OF ELECTIONS IN WHICH, WHEN DECIDING ON WHICH CANDIDATE TO VOTE FOR, VOTERS ARE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH THE REDISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION. IN THE FORMULATION OF THIS MODEL IT IS EXPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, WHILE A VOTER MAY BE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH WHAT HIS INCOME WILL BE AFTER THE ELECTION IS OVER, A CANDIDATE USUALLY DOES NOT DIRECTLY COMMUNICATE IN DETAIL JUST WHAT INCOME DISTRIBUTION CAN BE EXPECTED IF HE IS ELECTED. RATHER, A CANDIDATE USUALLY CONCENTRATES ON COMMUNICATING HIS POSITIONS ON THE ISSUES OF THE DAY AND LETS THE VOTERS INFER WHAT INCOME DISTRIBUTION THEY CAN EXPECT IF HE IS ELECTED.