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"How did England, once a minor regional power, become a global hegemon between 1689 and 1815? Why, over the same period, did she become the world's first industrial nation? Gary W. Cox addresses these questions in Marketing Sovereign Promises. The book examines two central issues: the origins of the great taxing power of the modern state and how that power is made compatible with economic growth. Part I considers England's rise after the revolution of 1689, highlighting the establishment of annual budgets with shutdown reversions. This core reform effected a great increase in per capita tax extraction. Part II investigates the regional and global spread of British budgeting ideas. Cox argues that states grew only if they addressed a central credibility problem afflicting the Ancien Regime - that rulers were legally entitled to spend public revenue however they deemed fit"--

Following the coalition literature highlighting intraparty politics (e.g., Giannetti and Benoit 2009; Laver 1999; Strøm 2003), I address the well-known "portfolio allocation paradox" (Warwick and Druckman 2006) by introducing a new model of government formation based on two main assumptions. First, no actor has a structural advantage in the negotiations leading to government formation. Second, all actors who can deprive the coalition of a majority (or other critical threshold size) must be included in the negotiations—not just parties. Whereas standard bargaining models are inconsistent with Gamson's Law, the model proposed here implies that equilibrium portfolio allocations should be mostly Gamsonian but with a small-party bias, as the empirical literature has long found. Empirically, I show that my model outperforms the literature's standard specification (due to Browne and Franklin 1973). Moreover, one of the model's new predictions—that candidate-centered electoral rules should promote more Gamsonian portfolio allocations—is supported.

Abstract
Did the English patent system helps to spark the Industrial Revolution? Most scholars addressing this question have focused on whether patents improved the economic incentive to invent. In contrast, I focus on whether patents improved access to useful knowledge—via the requirement (instituted in 1734) that patentees provide technical specifications for their inventions. I documented a structural break in per capita patenting in 1734—but only in London, where specifications were stored. I also documented a structural shift in London-based inventors' responsiveness to non-metropolitan patents in 1734, when specifications for them became regularly available.

I argue that Europe's political fragmentation interacted with her political innovations—self-governing cities and national parliaments—to facilitate "economic liberty," which in turn unleashed faster and more inter-connected urban growth. Examining urban growth over the period 600–1800cethroughout Eurasia, I show that inter-city growth correlations were positive and significant only in Western Europe after 1200ce. Within Western Europe, I show that growth correlations were greatest in the most fragmented and parliamentary areas, individual cities became significantly more tied to urban growth when their realms became parliamentary, and spillover effects (due to competition between rulers) were significant.

This essay reviews models of strategic mobilization and turnout, focusing on two important questions about the effects of electoral rules. First, how does the disproportionality of the electoral system affect the variance and mean of mobilization and turnout? This question has been investigated at least since Gosnell (1930) . In addition to reviewing the literature, I argue that extant models should pay more explicit attention to secondary mobilization (conducted by interest groups, activists, and ordinary voters). Second, how do electoral rules regulating the electoral calendar and vote fusion affect mobilizational spillovers and, hence, incentives to build mobilizational alliances? This question has attracted less attention from modelers but is well represented in the empirical literature.

The difficulty sovereign actors face in making their promises credible is widely appreciated (e.g., North and Weingast 1989; Myerson 2008). In this article, I argue that the English repeatedly usedinstitutions of monopoly brokerageto mediate trades between the sovereign (offering various promises) and subjects (offering revenues). Once set up—at different times in different markets—institutions of monopoly brokerage sparked substantial and abrupt growth in state revenues. Moreover, these revenue increases cannot be explained by changes in promise-holders' ability to punish nonperformance, changes in the preferences of pivotal state decision makers, or changes in high constitutional structure alone.

This essay reviews models of strategic mobilization and turnout, focusing on two important questions about the effects of electoral rules. First, how does the disproportionality of the electoral system affect the variance and mean of mobilization and turnout? This question has been investigated at least since Gosnell (1930). In addition to reviewing the literature, I argue that extant models should pay more explicit attention to secondary mobilization (conducted by interest groups, activists, and ordinary voters). Second, how do electoral rules regulating the electoral calendar and vote fusion affect mobilizational spillovers and, hence, incentives to build mobilizational alliances? This question has attracted less attention from modelers but is well represented in the empirical literature. Adapted from the source document.

Douglass North and Barry Weingast's seminal account of the Glorious Revolution argued that specific constitutional reforms enhanced the credibility of the English Crown, leading to much stronger public finances. Critics have argued that the most important reforms occurred incrementally before the Revolution; and that neither interest rates on sovereign debt nor enforcement of property rights improved sharply after the Revolution. In this article, I identify a different set of constitutional reforms, explain why precedents for these reforms did not lessen their revolutionary impact, and show that the evidence, properly evaluated, supports a view of the Revolution as a watershed.