The European scenario has been characterized lately by a systematical harmonization of contract law. The EU Institutions consider the development of a common European contract law as a strategic priority; it could enhance the viability of the EU internal market by facilitating cross-border trade. The thesis analyses the development of the projects that aim at a uniform European contract law, from the specific perspective of liability for breaking off negotiations. After a comparative analysis of the liability for breaking off negotiations in the main European legal systems and in European case law and legislation, the thesis takes into consideration the solution proposed by the instruments for uniform European contract law: the proposal for a Regulation establishing the "Common European Sales Law" (CESL), the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and the Acquis Principles (ACQP). Attention is paid also to the parallel experience of the international instruments of uniform contract law: the Vienna Convention for international sales law and the Unidroit Principles.
Abstract: The paper starts describing the borrowings of the new Proposal of Regulation on Common European Sales Law in respect to both the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and the Consumer Rights Directive, and the further 'debts' in respect to the Principles of Existing EC Contract Law (ACQP) and Principles of European Contract Law (PECL). It then comes to explain the provocative title, the 'non-sense' of pre-contractual information duties in case of non-concluded contracts. In our opinion, no clear enforcement policies for the violation of pre-contractual information duties where a contract is not concluded are provided in the Proposed Regulation on Common European Sales Law (CESL). This is not in tune with the remarkable space (correctly) given to pre-contractual information duties within the formation of contract phase. The paper aims to highlight the importance of an effective enforcement of these rules. This latter problem is intertwined with the question of the interface of the new Proposal of Regulation with national laws and with existing (different) private law rules. Another question afforded in the paper is whether this 'model form instrument' would undermine the contractual autonomy and the classic principle of freedom of contract in current contract law. Our concluding remarks give some explicit suggestions. Résumé: Le présent article décrit tout d'abord les emprunts que la nouvelle Proposition de Règlementsur le Droit Commun Européen de la Vente fait au DCFR et à la Directive sur les Droits du Consommateur, et les autres ''dettes'' vis-à-vis de l' ACQP et de la PECL. Ensuite, il explique le titre provocateur, le ''non-sens'' des devoirs d'information précontractuelle en cas de contrats non conclus. A notre avis, la proposition de Règlement susvisé ne prévoit aucune mesure claire d'exécution concernant la violation des devoirs d'information précontractuelle lorsque le contrat n'est pas conclu. Ceci ne concorde pas avec la place remarquable (correctement) accordée aux devoirs d'information précontractuelle dans la formation du contrat. L' article tente de mettre en lumière l'importance de l'exécution effective de ces règles. Ce dernier problème est mêlé à la question de l'interface entre la nouvelle Proposition de Règlementet les lois nationales et les règles (différentes) de droit privé existantes. Une autre question abordée dans cet article est celle de savoir si cet ''Instrument de forme modèle'' pourrait menacer l'autonomie contractuelle et le principe classique de la liberté contractuelle en droit actuel des contrats. Nos remarques en conclusion donnent quelques suggestions explicites.
