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This book investigates the ideological conditions inducing political actors to highlight corruption issues through valence campaigns. Using case studies and comparative analyses of party programmes, legislatives speeches and social media data, the author demonstrates that the more parties and/or candidates present a similar policy programme, the more they rely on valence campaigns. In other words, as the ideologies of parties have become increasingly similar over recent decades, the content of political competition has substantially shifted from policy to non-policy factors, such as corruption issues. These dynamics, and the ideological considerations underpinning them, also provide a novel perspective on recent phenomena in contemporary democracies, such as the growth of negative campaigning, as well as populist strategies based on anti-elite rhetoric. The book will appeal to students and scholars interested in political corruption, valence politics, and electoral campaigning. <.

Elections are a fundamental element of democracy, since elected governments reflect voter preferences. At the same time, it is inevitable that policies pursued by any government closely resemble the preferences of some citizens, while alienating others who hold different views. Previous works have examined how institutional settings facilitate or hinder policy proximity between citizens and governments. Building on their findings, the book explores a series of "so what" questions: how and to what extent does the distance between individual and government positions affect citizens' propensity to vote, protest, believe in democracy, and even feel satisfied with their lives? Using cross-national public opinion data, this book is an original scholarly research which develops theoretically grounded hypotheses to test the effect of citizen-government proximity on three dependent variables. After introducing the data (both public opinion surveys and country-level statistics) and the methodology to be used in subsequent chapters, one chapter each is devoted to how proximity or the absence thereof affects political participation, satisfaction with democracy, and happiness. Differences in political attitudes and behavior between electoral winners and losers, and ideological moderates and radicals, are also discussed in depth.--

In recent years, the news media landscape has been characterized by two distinct patterns: a decline in newspaper circulation, and a persistent degree of ideological slant in newspapers' position. We explore a possible nexus between these two phenomena by means of a model that extends some recent developments in the empirical spatial theory of voting to the reader's choice with respect to newspapers. We assume that ideological proximity to a newspaper affects the choice made by a consumer to read it. Newspapers will then compete among themselves to maximize their respective readerships by finding an optimal placement in the ideological space. However, newspapers can also decide to target readers of a specific type. As we will show, this is a crucial step to take into consideration. We empirically apply our model to the Italian case. We show that Italian newspapers appear largely to behave as theoretically expected. However, the "ideological force" behind this conclusion must be sought in newspapers' competition with respect to that subset of readers which can be identified as regular ones. This result highlights a possible mechanism driving a persistent newspaper ideological slant in time of lower newspaper circulation.

Using new comparative expert data about the 2016 US Presidential Election, this article explores the effects of experts' ideological preferences on their evaluations of electoral integrity. Without contesting the claim that the 2016 election faced challenges of integrity, our analyses reveal a substantial association between negative evaluation of election integrity and experts' ideological orientation. Our results also suggest that this ideological effect is stronger in States that 'swung' from Democratic to Republican in the 2016 election.

Acknowledging the role played by character valence issues in affecting parties' fortunes, several recent papers have investigated the possible intentional use of such issues in electoral contests. A corollary of this line of research has focused on identifying conditions under which parties are expected to invest more in valence campaigning. In this article, we focus on the role played by parties' relative ideological positions in a multiparty setting. We identify the existence of an inverse relationship between the distance of a party from its ideologically adjacent competitors and its incentive to campaign on character valence issues. However, the extent of this relationship can be conditional on institutional and electoral factors. We test these hypotheses by focusing on the emphasis a party places in its electoral manifestos on the specific character valence issue of corruption. Statistical results largely confirm our hypotheses. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

We apply the iterative algorithm by Merrill and Adams (Political Analysis 9:347-361, 2001) to compute the optimal positions of vote-maximizing parties along a one-dimensional space for a large number of elections. This allows us to systematically evaluate factors that push parties toward more centrifugal locations in equilibrium. Our findings largely corroborate expectations suggested by the theoretical literature, albeit with one notable exception: the relative size of a partisan constituency reduces, rather than enhances, the likelihood of a party having an extreme optimal position. We then compare derived equilibrium positions with actual party positions, with the aim of understanding the nature of electoral incentives and offering insights about party-system competition. In particular, we show that the age of a party, the party family to which it belongs, post-election expectations, and internal rules for candidate and leader selection, are all factors that increase the probability of a party approaching the position predicted by pure vote-maximizing considerations. Adapted from the source document.