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Organizational theorists built their knowledge of decision making through a progressive critique of rational choice theory. Their positioning towards rationality, however, is at odds with the observation of rationality persistence in organizational life. This paper addresses this paradox. It proposes a new perspective on rationality that allows the theorizing of the production of rational decisions by organizations. To account for rationality's éternel retour, we approach rational decision making as performative praxis—a set of activities that contributes to turning rational choice theory into social reality. We develop a performative praxis framework that explains how theory, actors, and tools together produce rationality within organizations through three mechanisms: rationality conventionalization, rationality engineering, and rationality commodification. This framework offers new avenues of research on rational decision making and points to the factors that underlie the manufacture of rationality in organizations.

Ethnography has often been seen as the province of the lone researcher; however, increasingly management scholars are examining global phenomena, necessitating a shift to global team-based ethnography. This shift presents some fundamental methodological challenges, as well as practical issues of method, that have not been examined in the literature on organizational research methods. That is the focus of this article. We first outline the methodological implications of a shift from single researcher to team ethnography, and from single case site to the multiple sites that constitute global ethnography. Then we present a detailed explanation of a global team-based ethnography that we conducted over three years. Our study of the global reinsurance industry involved a team of five ethnographers conducting fieldwork in 25 organizations across 15 countries. We outline three central challenges we encountered: team division of labour, team sharing and constructing a global ethnographic object. The article concludes by suggesting that global team-based ethnography provides important insights into global phenomena, such as regulation, finance and climate change among others, that are of interest to management scholars.

This article presents the results of an experiment designed to test theoretical predictions about the impact of public compensation schemes and ambiguity on insurance and self-insurance decisions. Consistent with theory, we find that government assistance significantly reduceswillingness to pay (WTP) for insurance and self-insurance (compared with a free insurance market). As expected, we also find significant differences between WTPs for insurance under different types of government compensation programs. For example, results from our experiment confirm the prediction that the WTP for insurance is smaller under a "Fixed Help" program thanunder a "Contingent Fixed Help" program where the government assistance is conditioned to the purchase of an insurance policy. Thirdly, we find that ambiguity, i.e., uncertainty about probability, significantly increases WTPs for insurance. This result, which indicates thatdecision-makers are ambiguity averse, is in line with previous results on the impact of ambiguity on insurance demand for low probability risks. Lastly, our experiment provides a clear support for the hypothesis that attitude to risk and attitude to ambiguity are two independent phenomena. In fact in this experiment, decision-makers are both risk-seekers (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average smaller than the expected value of the loss) and ambiguity averse (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average higher for an ambiguous risk than for a 'risky' risk). ; Cet article présente les résultats d'une expérience mise en place pour tester des prédictions théoriques concernant l'impact de programmes publics de compensations financières et de l'ambiguïté sur les décisions d'assurance et d'auto-assurance. En conformité avec la théorie, nous montrons que l'aide du gouvernement réduit significativement le consentement à payer (CAP) pour l'assurance et l'auto-assurance (comparé à une situation de référence sans aide publique). Nous prouvons également que les CAP pour l'assurance sont différents en fonction des différents programmes publics testés. Par exemple, les résultats font apparaître que le CAP pour l'assurance est plus faible lorsqu'une aide forfaitaire est accordée que lorsqu'une aide forfaitaire contingente l'est, c'est-à dire lorsque l'aide de l'Etat est contingente à l'achat d'assurance. Ensuite, nous montrons que l'ambiguïté, l'incertitude sur les probabilités, accroît de façon significative les CAP pour l'assurance. Ce résultat, qui indique que les décideurs présentent de l'aversion à l'ambiguïté, est en accord avec les résultats précédents concernant l'impact de l'ambiguïté sur la demande d'assurance pour des risques associés à de faibles probabilités d'occurrence. Finalement, notre expérience fournit un support évident pour l'hypothèse que l'attitude face au risque et face à l'ambiguïté sont deux phénomènes indépendants. En effet, dans cette expérience, les décideurs expriment à la fois une préférence pour le risque (le CAP moyen pour l'assurance est en moyenne plus faible que l'espérance de perte) et une aversion à l'ambiguïté (le CAP moyen pour l'assurance est en moyenne plus élevé pour les risques ambigus que pour les risques non-ambigus).

Egalement publié dans Cahier du LEF ; 2008-05. ; This article presents the results of an experiment designed to test theoretical predictions about the impact of public compensation schemes and ambiguity on insurance and self-insurance decisions. Consistent with theory, we find that government assistance significantly reduceswillingness to pay (WTP) for insurance and self-insurance (compared with a free insurance market). As expected, we also find significant differences between WTPs for insurance under different types of government compensation programs. For example, results from our experiment confirm the prediction that the WTP for insurance is smaller under a "Fixed Help" program thanunder a "Contingent Fixed Help" program where the government assistance is conditioned to the purchase of an insurance policy. Thirdly, we find that ambiguity, i.e., uncertainty about probability, significantly increases WTPs for insurance. This result, which indicates thatdecision-makers are ambiguity averse, is in line with previous results on the impact of ambiguity on insurance demand for low probability risks. Lastly, our experiment provides a clear support for the hypothesis that attitude to risk and attitude to ambiguity are two independent phenomena. In fact in this experiment, decision-makers are both risk-seekers (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average smaller than the expected value of the loss) and ambiguity averse (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average higher for an ambiguous risk than for a 'risky' risk).

Egalement publié dans Cahier du LEF ; 2008-05. ; This article presents the results of an experiment designed to test theoretical predictions about the impact of public compensation schemes and ambiguity on insurance and self-insurance decisions. Consistent with theory, we find that government assistance significantly reduceswillingness to pay (WTP) for insurance and self-insurance (compared with a free insurance market). As expected, we also find significant differences between WTPs for insurance under different types of government compensation programs. For example, results from our experiment confirm the prediction that the WTP for insurance is smaller under a "Fixed Help" program thanunder a "Contingent Fixed Help" program where the government assistance is conditioned to the purchase of an insurance policy. Thirdly, we find that ambiguity, i.e., uncertainty about probability, significantly increases WTPs for insurance. This result, which indicates thatdecision-makers are ambiguity averse, is in line with previous results on the impact of ambiguity on insurance demand for low probability risks. Lastly, our experiment provides a clear support for the hypothesis that attitude to risk and attitude to ambiguity are two independent phenomena. In fact in this experiment, decision-makers are both risk-seekers (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average smaller than the expected value of the loss) and ambiguity averse (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average higher for an ambiguous risk than for a 'risky' risk).

In this rejoinder, we draw attention to some of the possible performative effects of Spicer et al.'s (2016) commentary and reaffirm the importance, in our eyes, of the fundamentally political and material dimensions of performativity.

In recent years, we have witnessed the emergence of 'critical performativity', a concept designed to debate relationships between theory and practice and encourage practical interventions in organizational life. Notwithstanding its laudable ambition to stimulate discussion about engagement between critical management studies researchers and practitioners, we are concerned that critical performativity theory is flawed as it misreads foundational performativity authors, such as Austin and Butler, in ways that nullify their political potential, and ignores a range of other influential theories of performativity. It also overlooks the materiality of performativity. We review these limitations and then use three illustrations to sketch out a possible alternative conceptualization of performativity. This alternative approach, which builds on Butler's and Callon's work on performativity, recognizes that performativity is about the constitution of subjects, is an inherently material and discursive construct, and happens through the political engineering of sociomaterial agencements. We argue that such an approach – a political theory of organizational performativity – is more likely to deliver on both theoretical and practical fronts than the concept of critical performativity.

Cahier du LEF ; 2008-05Cet article a été présenté dans plusieurs conférences sous le titre : Ambiguity, Government Intervention and Inusrance Decision : an Experimental Study ; This article presents the results of an experiment designed to test theoretical predictions about the impact of public compensation schemes and ambiguity on insurance and self-insurance decisions. Consistent with theory, we find that government assistance significantly reduceswillingness to pay (WTP) for insurance and self-insurance (compared with a free insurance market). As expected, we also find significant differences between WTPs for insurance under different types of government compensation programs. For example, results from our experiment confirm the prediction that the WTP for insurance is smaller under a "Fixed Help" program thanunder a "Contingent Fixed Help" program where the government assistance is conditioned to the purchase of an insurance policy. Thirdly, we find that ambiguity, i.e., uncertainty about probability, significantly increases WTPs for insurance. This result, which indicates thatdecision-makers are ambiguity averse, is in line with previous results on the impact of ambiguity on insurance demand for low probability risks. Lastly, our experiment provides a clear support for the hypothesis that attitude to risk and attitude to ambiguity are two independent phenomena. In fact in this experiment, decision-makers are both risk-seekers (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average smaller than the expected value of the loss) and ambiguity averse (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average higher for an ambiguous risk than for a 'risky' risk) ; Cet article présente les résultats d'une expérience mise en place pour tester des prédictions théoriques concernant l'impact de programmes publics de compensations financières et de l'ambiguïté sur les décisions d'assurance et d'auto-assurance. En conformité avec la théorie, nous montrons que l'aide du gouvernement réduit significativement le consentement à payer (CAP) ...

Cahier du LEF ; 2008-05Cet article a été présenté dans plusieurs conférences sous le titre : Ambiguity, Government Intervention and Inusrance Decision : an Experimental Study ; This article presents the results of an experiment designed to test theoretical predictions about the impact of public compensation schemes and ambiguity on insurance and self-insurance decisions. Consistent with theory, we find that government assistance significantly reduceswillingness to pay (WTP) for insurance and self-insurance (compared with a free insurance market). As expected, we also find significant differences between WTPs for insurance under different types of government compensation programs. For example, results from our experiment confirm the prediction that the WTP for insurance is smaller under a "Fixed Help" program thanunder a "Contingent Fixed Help" program where the government assistance is conditioned to the purchase of an insurance policy. Thirdly, we find that ambiguity, i.e., uncertainty about probability, significantly increases WTPs for insurance. This result, which indicates thatdecision-makers are ambiguity averse, is in line with previous results on the impact of ambiguity on insurance demand for low probability risks. Lastly, our experiment provides a clear support for the hypothesis that attitude to risk and attitude to ambiguity are two independent phenomena. In fact in this experiment, decision-makers are both risk-seekers (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average smaller than the expected value of the loss) and ambiguity averse (i.e., the mean WTP for insurance is on average higher for an ambiguous risk than for a 'risky' risk) ; Cet article présente les résultats d'une expérience mise en place pour tester des prédictions théoriques concernant l'impact de programmes publics de compensations financières et de l'ambiguïté sur les décisions d'assurance et d'auto-assurance. En conformité avec la théorie, nous montrons que l'aide du gouvernement réduit significativement le consentement à payer (CAP) pour l'assurance et l'auto-assurance (comparé à une situation de référence sans aide publique). Nous prouvons également que les CAP pour l'assurance sont différents en fonction des différents programmes publics testés. Par exemple, les résultats font apparaître que le CAP pour l'assurance est plus faible lorsqu'une aide forfaitaire est accordée que lorsqu'une aide forfaitaire contingente l'est, c'est-à dire lorsque l'aide de l'Etat est contingente à l'achat d'assurance. Ensuite, nous montrons que l'ambiguïté, l'incertitude sur les probabilités, accroît de façon significative les CAP pour l'assurance. Ce résultat, qui indique que les décideurs présentent de l'aversion à l'ambiguïté, est en accord avec les résultats précédents concernant l'impact de l'ambiguïté sur la demande d'assurance pour des risques associés à de faibles probabilités d'occurrence. Finalement, notre expérience fournit un support évident pour l'hypothèse que l'attitude face au risque et face à l'ambiguïté sont deux phénomènes indépendants. En effet, dans cette expérience, les décideurs expriment à la fois une préférence pour le risque (le CAP moyen pour l'assurance est en moyenne plus faible que l'espérance de perte) et une aversion à l'ambiguïté (le CAP moyen pour l'assurance est en moyenne plus élevé pour les risques ambigus que pour les risques non-ambigus).