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This paper investigates the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on economic growth across developing countries. It documents the evolution and co-movement of COVID-19 infections with government responses (including health containment measures) across developing countries. It then estimates the impact of the different channels of transmission of COVID-19 on economic growth—thus, identifying factors that contribute to the economic resilience of countries during the pandemic shocks. The findings show that the pandemic's impact on the decline in growth was substantive across the different developing country groups—although at different rates. The estimates show that a deeper downturn in economic activity due to the pandemic can be averted in countries with higher levels of human capital, well-targeted containment measures, and improved global health security. Diversifying trade patterns (across products and markets) is also crucial, and so is strengthening intraregional trade, as higher commerce across borders within the different developing regions may help secure the supply chains of essential goods in times of crisis—and particularly during pandemics. Finally, having fiscal space and a less risky public debt profile can make these economies more resilient against crisis.

We investigate how government interventions such as blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations affect banking competition. These issues are critical for stability, access to finance, and economic growth. Exploiting cross-country and cross-time variation in the timing of interventions and accounting for their nonrandomness, we document that liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations trigger large increases in competition. We also find some more nuanced evidence that zombie banks' market shares in crisis countries evolve together with interventions. A higher frequency of interventions coincides with greater zombie bank presence, and increases in competition are larger when zombie banks occupy bigger market shares.

This paper examines whether domestic output growth helps attract capital inflows and, in turn, capital inflows help boost output growth in a set of 38 Sub-Saharan African countries. Using a two-step approach to address reverse causality and omitted variable issues, the paper finds that output growth in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa does not attract capital inflows. However, aid and foreign direct investment inflows enhance growth, while sovereign debt inflows do not. A 1 percent increase in the level of real aid inflows raises growth of real output per capita by 0.022 percentage point. For foreign direct investment inflows, the figure is 0.002 percentage point.

This paper presents evidence on the impact of labor regulations on income inequality using a recently published database on labor institutions and outcomes as well as different panel data analysis techniques for a large sample of countries for 1970 -2000. When applying our preferred technique we find that both de jure and de facto regulations improve the distribution of income although the former appear to be non-robustly associated with improving income inequality. This result partly reflects the fact that regulations are endogenous and, more interestingly, that different regulation yield distinct effects. Adapted from the source document.

THERE IS A LINK BETWEEN MEASURES OF CORRUPTION, BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. THIS PAPER PRESENTS EVIDENCE ON THE DIRECTION OF CASUALITY BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES AND GROWTH. THE POORER THE COUNTRY, AND THE LONGER THE WAIT, THE HIGHER THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH.

This paper discusses recent trends and investigates the drivers of capital flows across regions in the world, with emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa. The post-global financial crisis behavior of capital flows into Sub-Saharan Africa is unique and differs from that of global capital flows. The structure of financial flows into Sub-Saharan Africa has shifted toward new sources, such as international bond issuances and debt inflows from non–Paris Club governments. The main message is that the behavior of capital flows into Sub-Saharan Africa differs from that of capital flows into global, industrial, and non–Sub-Saharan African developing countries. The regression analysis reveals that gross flows into Sub-Saharan African are predominantly influenced by external factors, such as foreign growth and uncertainty in global markets and policies. Capital flow behavior for Sub-Saharan African countries is different from that of industrial countries due to different economic structures, which render different transmission processes. The main findings suggest that pull and push factors are the driving forces of capital inflows for industrial countries and non–Sub-Saharan African developing countries—especially better economic performance, sound fiscal outcomes, a greater degree of financial openness, and stronger institutions. The impact of these drivers has become stronger in the 2000s. Macroeconomic policy can play an important role in attracting capital inflows. For instance, fiscal discipline promotes greater other investment inflows, and less flexible exchange rate arrangements (more exchange rate stability) foster portfolio investment inflows.

This paper presents new empirical evidence on how fiscal space in Sub-Saharan Africa has evolved over the past 15 years. Fiscal space is a multi-dimensional concept that is proxied by indicators capturing aspects of fiscal sustainability, balance sheet vulnerabilities, external debt positions, and market perception. The analysis relies on a new comprehensive database developed on a wide array of indicators (28) for a large set of countries in the world—of which 48 are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis finds that, breaking with history, Sub-Saharan African countries were able to conduct countercyclical policies amid the 2008–09 global financial crisis, thanks to built-up liquidity and policy buffers. The evidence shows that fiscal adjustment efforts in the region were reversed amid the 2014–16 plunge in commodity prices, and oil and minerals and metals exporters saw a sharp deterioration in their primary balance sustainability gap. The paper finds a great deal of heterogeneity in the post–global financial crisis evolution of the fiscal space in the region. In countries with reduced fiscal space, the increase in the number of tax years to repay the debt fully was 1.1 years for the representative country, and in over one-third of the countries, this increase was more than one standard deviation above the median.

This paper studies the cyclical aspects of fiscal policy in Sub-Saharan Africa countries during 1970–2014. It compares the cyclical properties of real government consumption in the region with those in other developing regions and high-income countries, and examines whether there has been a change in the cyclical nature of fiscal policy in recent years. The analysis finds that government consumption is procyclical in Sub-Saharan African countries, more so than in other regions, and that accounting for endogeneity increases the degree of cyclicality. The cyclical properties of government spending vary along the business cycle, with the level of cyclicality being larger when the level of real economic activity is above the trend relative to when it is below the trend. Mirroring the pattern in other developing regions, the degree of cyclicality has changed since 2002 in Sub-Saharan Africa, with incipient signs of a shift toward acyclical or more countercyclical policies. The evidence does not suggest that resource wealth or fragility increases the procyclicality of government consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Official development assistance is found to exacerbate the procyclical stance of fiscal policy in the region, but the result depends on the relative size of foreign aid received.