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Demographers have for a long time adopted an empirical approach to the study of the levels and trends of mortality, fertility, and population size. They depend for their analyses on data, usually collected until recent times by government and often for other purposes. Modern demography had its origins in Britain in the second haft of the seventeenth century. The major focus of demographers has usually been on mortality, although fertility studies predominated in the 1960s and 1970s. Mortality decline in the West only became certain in the late nineteenth century. Until the 1960s the fastest mortality declines were for the young, but an unheralded mortality decline among the old thereafter became important. The world, especially in economically advanced countries, is faced with an increasingly high proportion of old people, explained largely, not by mortality decline, but by fertility decline. Explanations for the mortality transition place different emphases on the role of modern medicine, better nutrition, and behavioral and social change, particularly rising levels of education. Even among the old, at least until 85 years of age, there are wide differentials in mortality by educational level. Analysts have divided the mortality transition into stages: (1) high, pretransitional mortality, (2) early transitional mortality with the decline explained by the conquest of infectious disease, and (3) late transitional mortality largely attributable to degenerative disease. Some have now added stage (4), the reduction or delay in death from degenerative causes. Attempts have been made to effect the convergence of demographic and epidemiological approaches to the analysis of mortality, and they have been more successful in the case of medical demographic than in social demographic approaches.

One theme in demographic theory is that, as society changes, human fertility levels remain high because of the continuing influence of outdated "props" to maintain existing levels of fertility. A corollary is that social upheavals might change these conditions, thus leading to a fall infertility. This article examines thirteen social crises for which there are adequate demographic data ranging from the seventeenth-century English Civil War to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in the late twentieth century. All show marked falls in fertility arising from deferred female marriage, declining marital fertility, or both. The evidence is weak that this change constituted an adjustment of fertility to immediately preceding social conditions but stronger that there was a temporary adjustment to a new period of uncertainty about the future and a continuing adjustment to new socioeconomic and legislative conditions.

Demographers and those concerned with population policy are increasingly focusing on the steep fertility declines that occurred in developed countries from the 1960s and the consequent widespread below-replacement fertility levels. The decline has been termed the Second Demographic Transition. This paper argues that the recent demographic change can best be understood and analyzed if we broaden the concept to include the first demographic transition, and the three demographically more settled periods preceding, separating, and following the two fertility transitions. These more settled periods or 'compromises' are examined to ascertain their nature and so to help predict the likely developments in the present or third compromise. It is argued that the third compromise has now extended for 20 years with little movement in fertility rates or other socioeconomic behavior which has been said to be associated with the second transition, and that this provides sufficient evidence for analysis. The approach has two key aspects. First, it is confined in Europe to countries that distinctly experienced the full five demographic periods, namely northwestern and central Europe. Second, the analysis gains strength by including non-European countries that progressed through all five stages, namely the English-speaking countries of overseas European settlement: USA, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.

Demographers have for a long time adopted an empirical approach to the study of the levels and trends of mortality, fertility, and population size. They depend for their analyses on data, usually collected until recent times by government and often for other purposes. Modern demography had its origins in Britain in the second haft of the seventeenth century. The major focus of demographers has usually been on mortality, although fertility studies predominated in the 1960s and 1970s. Mortality decline in the West only became certain in the late nineteenth century. Until the 1960s the fastest mortality declines were for the young, but an unheralded mortality decline among the old thereafter became important. The world, especially in economically advanced countries, is faced with an increasingly high proportion of old people, explained largely, not by mortality decline, but by fertility decline. Explanations for the mortality transition place different emphases on the role of modern medicine, better nutrition, and behavioral and social change, particularly rising levels of education. Even among the old, at least until 85 years of age, there are wide differentials in mortality by educational level. Analysts have divided the mortality transition into stages: (1) high, pretransitional mortality, (2) early transitional mortality with the decline explained by the conquest of infectious disease, and (3) late transitional mortality largely attributable to degenerative disease. Some have now added stage (4), the reduction or delay in death from degenerative causes. Attempts have been made to effect the convergence of demographic and epidemiological approaches to the analysis of mortality, and they have been more successful in the case of medical demographic than in social demographic approaches.

The study of recent fertility trends in the West has been dominated by examinations of Europe. A better perspective on twentieth-century fertility movements can be gained by giving an equal emphasis to trends in the 'Offshoots' (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). This paper focuses on the periods of rapid fertility decline and to a greater extent on the intervening periods of near-equilibrium. It is suggested that the 'late twentieth century compromise' is more stable than is suggested by reports on its internal strains, and that only massive government intervention could raise fertility.

This essay argues that demographic theory over the last half-century has substituted short-term explanations, often focusing on single demographic events, for long-term theory. This means not only that the explanations cannot be employed to forecast the situation in the more distant future, but they are inadequate even for short-term analysis. A basis for a longer-term theory of fertility transition is proposed, employing the concept of social structure and demographic behavior adjusting, slowly and after a considerable lag, to each of three modes of production. The focus is on the transition from agricultural to industrial production, especially as this is occurring in the most advanced industrial societies. Three major conclusions are drawn. (1) Un-anticipated fertility changes over the last 50 years can be incorporated within a single demographic transition theory. (2) Societal and demographic changes are still at an early stage of their transition to full adjustment to industrialization. (3) The trend, associated with women's participation in the work force, toward below-replacement fertility will continue, but at some stage most governments will probably attempt to raise fertility to replacement level even if the effort is extremely expensive and slows economic growth.

The study of recent fertility trends in the West has been dominated by examinations of Europe. A better perspective on twentieth-century fertility movements can be gained by giving an equal emphasis to trends in the 'Offshoots' (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). This paper focuses on the periods of rapid fertility decline and to a greater extent on the intervening periods of near-equilibrium. It is suggested that the 'late twentieth century compromise' is more stable than is suggested by reports on its internal strains, and that only massive government intervention could raise fertility.

Demographers and those concerned with population policy are increasingly focusing on the steep fertility declines that occurred in developed countries from the 1960s and the consequent widespread below-replacement fertility levels. The decline has been termed the Second Demographic Transition. This paper argues that the recent demographic change can best be understood and analyzed if we broaden the concept to include the first demographic transition, and the three demographically more settled periods preceding, separating, and following the two fertility transitions. These more settled periods or 'compromises' are examined to ascertain their nature and so to help predict the likely developments in the present or third compromise. It is argued that the third compromise has now extended for 20 years with little movement in fertility rates or other socioeconomic behavior which has been said to be associated with the second transition, and that this provides sufficient evidence for analysis. The approach has two key aspects. First, it is confined in Europe to countries that distinctly experienced the full five demographic periods, namely northwestern and central Europe. Second, the analysis gains strength by including non-European countries that progressed through all five stages, namely the English-speaking countries of overseas European settlement: USA, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.

This essay argues that demographic theory over the last half-century has substituted short-term explanations, often focusing on single demographic events, for long-term theory. This means not only that the explanations cannot be employed to forecast the situation in the more distant future, but they are inadequate even for short-term analysis. A basis for a longer-term theory of fertility transition is proposed, employing the concept of social structure and demographic behavior adjusting, slowly and after a considerable lag, to each of three modes of production. The focus is on the transition from agricultural to industrial production, especially as this is occurring in the most advanced industrial societies. Three major conclusions are drawn. (1) Un-anticipated fertility changes over the last 50 years can be incorporated within a single demographic transition theory. (2) Societal and demographic changes are still at an early stage of their transition to full adjustment to industrialization. (3) The trend, associated with women's participation in the work force, toward below-replacement fertility will continue, but at some stage most governments will probably attempt to raise fertility to replacement level even if the effort is extremely expensive and slows economic growth.

One theme in demographic theory is that, as society changes, human fertility levels remain high because of the continuing influence of outdated "props" to maintain existing levels of fertility. A corollary is that social upheavals might change these conditions, thus leading to a fall infertility. This article examines thirteen social crises for which there are adequate demographic data ranging from the seventeenth-century English Civil War to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in the late twentieth century. All show marked falls in fertility arising from deferred female marriage, declining marital fertility, or both. The evidence is weak that this change constituted an adjustment of fertility to immediately preceding social conditions but stronger that there was a temporary adjustment to a new period of uncertainty about the future and a continuing adjustment to new socioeconomic and legislative conditions.