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One theme in demographic theory is that, as society changes, human fertility levels remain high because of the continuing influence of outdated "props"to maintain existing levels of fertility. A corollary is that social upheavals might change these conditions, thus leading to a fall in fertility. This article examines thirteen social crises for which there are adequate demographic data ranging from the seventeenth-century English Civil War to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in the late twentieth century. All show marked falls in fertility arising from deferred female marriage, declining marital fertility, or both. The evidence is weak that this change constituted an adjustment of fertility to immediately preceding social conditions but stronger that there was a temporary adjustment to a new period of uncertainty about the future and a continuing adjustment to new socioeconomic and legislative conditions.

This essay argues that demographic theory over the last half‐century has substituted short‐term explanations, often focusing on single demographic events, for long‐term theory. This means not only that the explanations cannot be employed to forecast the situation in the more distant future, but they are inadequate even for short‐term analysis. A basis for a longer‐term theory of fertility transition is proposed, employing the concept of social structure and demographic behavior adjusting, slowly and after a considerable lag, to each of three modes of production. The focus is on the transition from agricultural to industrial production, especially as this is occurring in the most advanced industrial societies. Three major conclusions are drawn. (1) Unanticipated fertility changes over the last 50 years can be incorporated within a single demographic transition theory. (2) Societal and demographic changes are still at an early stage of their transition to full adjustment to industrialization. (3) The trend, associated with women's participation in the work force, toward below‐replacement fertility will continue, but at some stage most governments will probably attempt to raise fertility to replacement level even if the effort is extremely expensive and slows economic growth.

Half the AIDS victims in the world are in East and Southern Africa, where adult HIV sero‐prevalence was 11.4 percent by the end of 1997 and over 25 percent in two countries of Southern Africa. HIV/AIDS infection is not the result of ignorance, as nearly everyone has sufficient knowledge about AIDS and how it is transmitted. The high levels of AIDS arise from the failure of African political and religious leaders to recognize social and sexual reality. The means for containing and conquering the epidemic are already known, and could prove effective if the leadership could be induced to adopt them. The lack of individual behavioral change and of the implementation of effective government policy has roots in attitudes to death and a silence about the epidemic arising from beliefs about its nature and the timing of death. International responsibility may have to be taken before the needed effective policies are put in place.