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In the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, non-pharmaceutical protective measures taken by individuals remain pivotal. This study aims to explore what motivates individuals to engage in such measures. Based on existing empirical findings as well as prominent behavioural theories, a partial least squares structural equation model (PLS-SEM) of predictors for pandemic protective behaviour was estimated using a representative German sample (n = 437). The study was preregistered at OSF. The model explains 69% of the variance for behavioural intention, which is strongly correlated with behaviour (ρ = 0.84). The most influential predictor for protective behaviour is its perceived efficacy, followed by normative beliefs and perceptions about costs for protective behaviour. Distrusting beliefs in science and scientists negatively predicted response perceptions and were also strongly and negatively correlated with behaviour. Knowledge about COVID-19 was weakly linked with perceived response efficacy, as well as with behaviour. These findings suggest that communication strategies surrounding COVID-19 should emphasise the efficacy of responses and foster a sense of responsibility.

In the summer of 2021, European governments removed most NPIs after experiencing prolonged second and third waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. Most countries failed to achieve immunization rates high enough to avoid resurgence of the virus. Public health strategies for autumn and winter 2021 have ranged from countries aiming at low incidence by re-introducing NPIs to accepting high incidence levels. However, such high incidence strategies almost certainly lead to the very consequences that they seek to avoid: restrictions that harm people and economies. At high incidence, the important pandemic containment measure 'test-trace-isolate-support' becomes inefficient. At that point, the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and its numerous harmful consequences can likely only be controlled through restrictions. We argue that all European countries need to pursue a low incidence strategy in a coordinated manner. Such an endeavour can only be successful if it is built on open communication and trust. ; peer-reviewed

In the summer of 2021, European governments removed most NPIs after experiencing prolonged second and third waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. Most countries failed to achieve immunization rates high enough to avoid resurgence of the virus. Public health strategies for autumn and winter 2021 have ranged from countries aiming at low incidence by re-introducing NPIs to accepting high incidence levels. However, such high incidence strategies almost certainly lead to the very consequences that they seek to avoid: restrictions that harm people and economies. At high incidence, the important pandemic containment measure 'test-trace-isolate-support' becomes inefficient. At that point, the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and its numerous harmful consequences can likely only be controlled through restrictions. We argue that all European countries need to pursue a low incidence strategy in a coordinated manner. Such an endeavour can only be successful if it is built on open communication and trust.